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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 

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INDUCTIVE 



PSYCHOLOGY: 



AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 



STUDY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA, 



E. A. KIRKPATRICK, B.S., M.Ph., 

(Lately Fellow oj" Clark University^ 

INSTRUCTOR IN PSYCHOLOGY, 
WINONA (mINN.) state NORMAL SCHOOU, 




/-izm ^<^ 



NEW YORK AND CHICAGO.- 

E. L KELLOGG & CO. 



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Copyright, 1895, by 

E. L. KELLOGG & CO., 

NEW YORK. 



PEEFACE. 



In" no progressive school are the natural sciences now 
taught without the use of plants, animals, apparatus 
and experiments. It is believed that the abstract and 
deductive study of those subjects fails in giving stu- 
dents the real knowledge and power and interest that 
may be gained by concrete and inductive study. This 
little volume is prepared in the belief that the same thing 
is true in an even greater degree in the study of psychol- 
ogy. The study of abstract psychology and of the 
thoroughly dried specimens of mental phenomena given 
for illustration by psychologists leads the pupil to accept 
on faith classifications, principles, and laws that he can 
neither observe, verify, nor apply, and not only fails to 
give him the knowledge and power he should gain from 
the study, but is often useless and even worse than use- 
less. To gain real knowledge and power, the pupil must 
observe and analyze the actual processes of his own mind 
and those of others, instead of taking for granted what 
the author tells him about imaginary mental processes; 
and he must be led to observe, judge, and think for him- 
self. With the teacher this is especially important. If 
he is to make any practical use of psychology whatever 

8 



4 PREFACE. 

in his profession, he must study the subject in the con- 
crete. 

It is now generally recognized that expression is an 
important factor in making acquisitions clear, precise, 
and permanent. In no other study is written expres- 
sion so helpful and even absolutely necessary as in 
psychology; hence the results of the study of every 
topic may very profitably be expressed in writing by the 
pupil. 

This little volume does not claim to be a complete or 
a strictly scientific treatise upon the intellectual powers; 
but it does aim to develop the real j)sychological knowl- 
edge and power and interest necessary to pursue the 
subject understandingly either in books or in daily life, 
and in the school-room. Not what psychologists will 
say, but what thoughts will be suggested to the pupils, 
has been given most weight in selecting, arranging, and 
stating the truths of the science. 

The inductive method of presentation is not adhered 
to strictly, because it does not seem wise to attempt to 
do so in some instances where it is not easy by printed 
directions to produce or point out the mental state to 
be studied. It is, however, inductive in spirit through- 
out, and every live teacher will by questions and sugges- 
tions lead the pupil to go through the mental operations 
described and observe the facts indicated, in a way that 
cannot possibly be done by general printed directions. 
Objects and incidents in the class will continually serve 
as fresh material to the watchful teacher. Observations 
and experiences of teachers and students mean more — 
have more of a living reality — to the students than any 



PREFACE. 5 

that can be given in a book, and hence are better. It is 
for this reason, and because of the value of the habit re- 
sulting- from trying to get such illustrations, that few 
illustrations are given and many required. Much of what 
seems vague or incomplete will become clear and defi- 
nite when these illustrations are discussed. 

The favorable reception accorded to the first edition, 
prepared mainly for my own classes, has led to the 
issuing of a second edition, which has been enlarged 
and revised, in accordance with ideas gained in using it 
in the cla^ss-room and suggestions received from others 
who have used it, especially my colleague, Mr. Galbreath. 
That the book may aid in more psychological teaching 
of psychology, is the hope of the author. 

E, A. K. 

Winona, Minn., Jan. 19, 1895. 



CONTENTS. 



PAET I. 

CHAPTER I.— INTRODUCTION, 

Definition and Scope of Psychology 11 

Method 12 

General Method 12 

Indirect Observation 12 

Probability of Psychological Inferences , 13 

The Subjective Method of Studying Psychology. ....... 15 

The Indirectly Subjective Method. 16 

The Objective Method 19 

Divisions of Psychology 21 

CHAPTER II.— GENERAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 

Consciousness 23 

Attention. ... 24 

Nature 24 

Limits 24 

Importance and Selective Character of Attention 27 

Kinds 29 

Voluntary Attention , 29 

Conditions Favoring and Means of Developing Attention. 30 

Attention and Movement 33 

Signs of Attention ,.. 34 

7 



CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER III.— SPECIAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 

General Divisions 35 

The Presentative Powers 36 

Sensation 36 

Discrimination 38 

Inferring Differences and Resemblances 41 

Perception 41 

Illusions 44 

Apperception 45 

Perception of Space and Time 47 

CHAPTER IV.— THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS. 

Divisions 48 

Mental Images 48 

Imagination — Reproductive, Constructive, and Creative.. 60 

Association , 53 

Memory — Retention, Recall, and Recognition 56 

CHAPTER v.— THINKING. 

Nature and Divisions 66 

Conception 67 

Concepts and Percepts 67 

Concepts and Mental Images 68 

Degree of Definiteness of Concepts 69 

Extension and Intension of Concepts , 71 

Modification of Concepts 71 

Analysis and Abstraction and Abstract Concepts 73 

Classification 74 

_ Generalization 76 

Judgment , 77 

Basis and Accuracy of Judgment 78 

Reasoning 79 

Nature and Kinds 79 

Sources of General Truths 81 



CONTENTS. 

Reasoning and Inference . 82 

Relation of Analysis and Syntliesis to Reasoning 84 

Kinds of Induction <. 87 

Conditions Favoring Success and Accuracy in Reasoning. 89 

CHAPTER VI.— HABIT.. 

Introduction 93 

Nature , 94 

Laws of Habit 95 

Effects of Habit .. 97 

Intellectual Development and Habit. . . 99 

Heredity and Habit 100 

Habit and Ideals 103 

CHAPTER VII.— CHILD STUDY. 

Introductory Remarks 104 

Outlines for the Study in Class of Attention , 105 

Perception and Apperception ......... 106 

Imagination 107 

Memory 109 

Conception 110 

Reasoning. ... Ill 

Outlines for the Study of Individual Children outside of 
School ,111 



PART II. 

FEELINGS. 
CHAPTER I.— FEELING IN GENERAL. 

Nature and Variety of Feeling 115 

Importance of Feeling 117 

Methods of Studying Feelings 117 

Signs of Feelings „ 119 



CONTENTS. 

Connection between Feelings and tlieir Expression. 120 

Feeling and Habit 123 

Change 124 

Contrast 126 

Relativity 127 

Pleasure and Pain 128 

CHAPTER II.— SOURCES OF FEELING AND RELATION 
TO MENTAL PROCESSES. 

Classes of Elementary Feelings. >■ 132 

General Sensations 132 

Special Sensations 134 

Mental Images and Feeling 135 

Feeling of Activity 136 

Feelings and Intellectual Processes 138 

Relation between Cognition and Feeling 139 

CHAPTER III.— EMOTIONS. 

Nature and Varieties 142 

Fear and Anger 143 

Love and Sympathy, . . , , 144 

Feelings of Self , .... 146 

Self-consciousness 147 

Esthetic Feelings 148 

Intellectual Feelings 151 

Moral and Religious Feelings 152 

Desires 155 

Classification of Emotions 157 



PAET III. 

WILL. 

CHAPTER I. 

Control of Mental and Motor Activities 159 

Nature and Functions of Will 159 



CONTENTS. 

Control of Intellectual Activities 163 

Efficiency of Will 164 

Control of Feelings 164 

Control of Movements 166 

How Voluntary Motions are made 166 

Learning New Motions. ... 16'.> 

Making Familiar Motions 174 

Learning to Write, Draw, etc 175 

Kinds of Movements 178 

Development of Voluntary Motion 181 

CHAPTER IL— ACTIONS. 

Action Distinguished from Movement I84 

Ideas as Stimuli to Action 184 

Impulsive Force of Ideas. 186 

Attention and Action 188 

Deliberation and Inhibition 189 

Basis of Individual Differences in Activity 191 

Types of Decision , 193 

Desire, Decision, Resolution, Action 194 

Actions and Rules or Commands 195 

Strength of Will 195 

Freedom of Will 197 

Relation of Intellect, Feeling, and Will 201 

Conditions Favoring Vigorous Volition 203 

Development of Will 205 



INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY, 



CHAPTER I. 
INTEODUCTIOK 

DEFII^ITION AND SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

Name five different subjects of study and state what 
kind of facts each one deals with. Name five different 
occupations and state what kind of acts are performed 
and materials dealt with. What is a science ? Consult 
a dictionary and compare the definition with what you 
know of the use of the word. Name four sciences and 
state what kind of things each one deals with. Name 
some of the most exact sciences and state why they are 
exact. 

Just as other sciences are concerned with a certain 
order of facts, so is psychology. In one respect its 
scope is broader than that of any other science, for it 
treats of the mind, by which all subjects are studied, all 
industries carried on, and all sciences developed. 



INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 



METHOD. 



General Method. — In psychology, as in other sciences, 
we must observe with a view to classify the countless 
facts that go to make up the sciences into a compara- 
tively small number of groups, then by further obser- 
vation, experiment, and inference determine general 
truths, i.e., those that are true not merely for one thing 
but for all things — a class. The more general truths 
discovered and the more it is possible to predict what 
will take place under given conditions, the more exact 
the science. 

In psychology, however, there is an important source 
of error. Any number of persons may observe a half- 
dozen plants or animals that are to be classified, or 
witness an experiment in chemistry or physics, and each 
may correct or verify the observations of the others, and 
thus insure accurate results. Is this true in psy- 
chology? Notice your own thoughts and feelings as 
you read a few lines in this book. Can anybody else 
observe them ? Can you observe directly the thoughts 
and feelings of any one else ? Is it ever possible for 
more than one person to observe directly the same 
thought or feeling? This fact may be much more 
pleasant for us, but is it favorable to the development 
of an accurate science of mind ? 

Indirect Observation. — Although we cannot directly 
observe what is going on in the mind of another, do we 
not observe the thoughts and feelings of others in an 
indirect way, by continually inferring from various signs 



INTRODUCTION. 13 

the thoughts and feelings of our friends ? Give some 
specific examples of how you have inferred the thoughts 
and feelings of individuals, stating the exact basis of 
your inference. 

You can then observe the results of muscular contrac- 
tion, in the form of attitude, expression of face, and gest- 
ure ; and changes in circulation in the form of variations 
in color; but you cannot directly perceive a thought or 
feeling. Do you absolutely know that other people 
have thoughts and feelings any more than has a steam- 
engine or other complicated machine, or is it an infer- 
ence based on the fact that you have thoughts and feel- 
ings, and express them by such signs ? If you had 
never experienced a feeling of embarrassment, could 
you infer the feeling from noticing the heightened 
color, the trembling, and the awkward movements ? Can 
you infer anything in the mind of another that is not 
like or similar to something experienced by yourself? 
Analyze very closely all cases in which you seem to be 
able to do so before accepting them. 

Probability of Psychological Inferences. — Notice the 
variations in certainty in the different examples that 
follow. Can you understand the thoughts and feelings 
of a cannibal or an Indian as well as you can those of a 
man of your own race and state of civilization; of a 
murderer and thief as well as you can one of your own 
disposition; of an artist or scientist as well as one of 
your own ability and culture ; of an infant or aged person 
as well as one of your own age ? In all of these cases 
the bodily form, the nervous system, and all the means 
of expressing thought and feeling are nearly the same; 



14 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

but the surroundings, the state of development, and the 
history are different. 

Again, we believe that animals have thoughts and 
feelings, and we think that we can interpret those of 
the higher mammals, as the horse, dog, or monkey, and 
in a less measure those of birds, such as the crow, par- 
rot, or hen. The first have forms, nervous systems, and 
means of expression different, yet similar, to our own, 
and the latter a nervous system much the same. In the 
case of reptiles there is some similarity of nervous struc- 
ture, but we do not claim to know much about the 
thoughts and feelings of an alligator, a snake, or a frog. 
Still less do the form and nervous system of insects 
resemble our own, and we hesitate to infer anything as 
to the feelings and thoughts of a fly, a beetle, a butterfly, 
or a worm. Still less can we affirm about the mental 
life of an oyster, and we may even doubt that a sponge, 
a coral, or an amoeba has any consciousness, for they 
have no brain and no distinct nervous system of any 
kind. 

Again, we ascribe no thought to the rustling leaves 
and growing grass, or to machines, as we watch the 
complicated movements of the threshing-machine or the 
printing-press. 

From these examples are we not justified in saying 
that one basis of our belief that other human beings have 
thoughts and feelings like our own, which they express 
in a similar way, is their similarity to ourselves, and 
that the probability of inferences in regard to the 
thoughts and feelings of men and animals is proper- 



INTRODUCTION. 15 

tional to the similarity in nervous structure and in 
history ? 

This may seem an unsatisfactory basis for psychologi- 
cal inferences, but is it not the same basis as that used 
in other sciences ? The probability of the inference 
that other plants will fade or die, if deprived of sun- 
shine or water, after the same period as the ones tested, 
will be proportional to their similiarity to them in kind, 
age, and condition. Give other illustrations and from 
other sciences. 

So far we have not counted language as a means of 
gaining knowledge of the mental states of others. 
Would it be possible to convey to another by means of 
language a true idea of an experience different from any 
that person has ever experienced, e.g., the sensation of 
the color red to a blind man or the note C flat to a deaf 
man ? On the other hand, if men did not have similar 
thoughts and feelings, would it be possible for a number 
of them living together to develop a language and com- 
municate with each other ? 

The Subjective Method of Studying Psychology. — 
It is evident that each one can observe his own thoughts 
and feelings, classify them, and determine the relations 
existing between them. Since in doing this he makes 
himself the subject of study, turning his attention with- 
in, we call this the suljective or introspective method. 
This is the most direct method that there is, but it pre- 
sents some difficulties. Try to observe just how you 
feel when you are very angry or very happy; just how 
your mind works when you are attending closely to a 
lesson, trying to understand an explanation or working 



i6 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

a problem. Now state the difficulties that you meet 
with in trying to make your observations accurately.' 
For similar reasons it is difficult to make experiments 
and observe results. Notice, however, how memory may 
help in making such observations. 

Even if the observations are accurate, and we correctly 
determine and classify the relations of the various phe- 
nomena of our own mind, does it follow that they 
were the same when we were children, or will be when 
we get old? Again, are we justified in inferring that 
the phenomena of other minds and the laws governing 
them are the same as for our own ? Give reasons. 
Notice what comes into your mind when any word, as 
"hat,^^ is spoken, and ask others what they think of 
upon hearing the word. From what has already been 
said it is evident that what we find true for our own 
mind is true for other minds only so far as their in- 
herited organization, history, and age are the same. In- 
trospective study of one^s own mind, however, forms the 
basis of all study of psychology. It should be used first, 
then supplemented by other methods of study. 

The Indirectly Subjective Method of Study. — We may 
study psychological facts in an indirect manner. We may 
take the recorded results of subjective study by a num- 
ber of different individuals, compare them, determine 
what is common to all and what is not. Have a num- 
ber of persons describe what comes into their minds 
when several numbers are named — the size of the 
figures (if visual), their color, distance, position, etc. Pro- 
nounce to a group of persons the names of several sound- 
producing objects and find out in what proportion of 



INTRODUCTION. 17 

cases visual images are called up, in what proportion 
auditory, and in what proportion none at all. 

Again, ask a number of individuals to recall the ap- 
pearance of the breakfast-table this morning and say 
whether the image is distinct as to form, coloring, bright- 
ness, etc._, and whether the mental images of the voices 
of companions is as distinct as of their faces. Do you 
find that what you thought true for all minds is true 
only for your own and perhaps a few others ? May not 
this method be used to correct the inaccuracies of the 
purely subjective method ? 

There is a difficulty in this use of the method, how- 
ever, due to the fact that the words used may not mean 
the same. When speaking, of external objects we can 
point them out to another and name them ; thus, " this 
is a chair," " that is a tree," " this movement is walking," 
etc.; but in describing mental states this cannot be done 
so readily. Thus, if one says to you, " the pain I feel 
now is an ache," " this mental act is a conception," " that 
a sensation," that does not mean much to you ? Can 
you observe what is in his mind so as to know exactly 
what he means ? The classification of mental phenom- 
ena in accordance with the language of the different 
observers may therefore be very inaccurate. 

This may be made clear by asking a number of in- 
dividuals to describe similar experiences, as, for instance, 
their feelings when lost, or "turned around." It will 
probably be found that various words will be used to 
describe the same feeling, and that the same word proba- 
bly does not always mean the same feeling. 

Another form of -the indirect method sometimes gives 



i8 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

more reliable results. Instead of taking the observations 
and opinions of various individuals and tabulating them 
according to the terms they use, we may ask the person/? 
tested to express their ideas or feelings by descriptions, 
drawings, or in other way? (perhaps without letting them 
know the purpose) ; then we judge for ourselves what 
ideas or feelings they have, and choose, in tabulating 
the results, our own descriptive terms. Thus, instead of 
taking an individuaFs opinion as to the clearness or 
vagueness of his mental images, have him describe or 
draw, and judge from that. So far as an individual's 
power of expression corresponds to his power of thought, 
this will give accurate results. It will probably always 
give more accurate comparative results than classifying 
according to the judgment and language of the various 
individuals, for there will be one instead of many stan- 
dards of judgment. The mental image called by one 
" distinct " may be less clear than the one called " vague '' 
by another, for each judges by comparison with the 
mental images he is used to having. 

Can the writings, paintings, and manufactures of any 
person or people be used in this way as material for 
psychological study ? Illustrate. 

Still more exact results may be obtained by experi- 
ments in which there is some objective measure of the 
mental activity, as, for instance, when the time required 
to perform a certain mental operation, as pressing a key 
when a red light is shown, learning a verse of poetry, 
solving a problem, etc., or the number of repetitions 
necessary to learn a list of words, or the smallness of 
difference between two lines, two colors, two sounds, or 



INTRODUCTION. 19 

two weights that can be detected every time or a certain 
proportion of times. Such experiments as these, most of 
which are included in the portions of psychology known 
as psychometry and psychophysics have given the most 
reliable results, and offer now the most promising field 
of investigation. 

The fourth form of the indirectly subjective method 
is the one most used in every-day life. The attitude, 
expression of face, movements, and tone of voice are the 
objective basis by which we continually observe in- 
directly the mental states of others. Illustrate this fact. 

Why is this method of study called " indirectly sub- 
jective ? " Giv eexamples of the use of the various forms 
of this method in the school-room and the advantages of 
being able to use them. 

The Objective Method. — There is another method 
which has been of much use to psychology in the past 
few years, although some have denied that such study is 
properly a part of psychology. Both men and animals 
have nerves, a brain, and muscles. Without nerves they 
would be incapable of receiving sensations of pain, 
color, sound, or, in short, of being affected in any way 
by objects. If there were nerves, but no brain to which 
they might go, feeling and thought would be impossible. 
Without muscles motion would be impossible, and with- 
out motion there could be no expression of thought by 
language, gestures, or change of countenance. The 
nervous and the muscular system may be looked upon 
as a very complex machine. Much time has been spent 
in studying the structure of the nerves and their end. 
organs — the brain, and the muscles and the nerves con- 



20 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

necting them witli the brain — with the yiew of determin- 
ing the function of each and the relation of each to the 
others. Such a study is a part of physiology and may 
be carried on without any more thought of the thoughts 
and feelings that accompany the activity of the various 
parts of the nervous system than has the botanist in 
studying the functions of the different parts of a plant, 
or a mechanic studying the workings of a complex 
machine. While this is true, and. one with a good nervous 
and muscular system maybe able to think and act, or call 
all the parts into activity, without any knowledge of the 
structure of the apparatus Avith which he works or of the 
parts employed in each activity, yet it is clear, from cases 
of injured or defective nervous systems, that the perfect- 
ness of mental activity is limited by the perfectness of 
the nervous system, which is the organ of that activity. 
The distinctive character of physiological psychology 
will be more clear if we spend a moment in distinguishing 
between a psychical and a physical fact. Were the top 
of the skull of a person removed you could see or touch 
his brain, but not his mind. If a door were slammed near 
him he would hear a sound, but you would not see that 
sensation of sound which he experiences ; you would 
see only a slight change in the circulation of the blood 
in a certain portion of the brain. A test with a delicate 
instrument might show also a slight change in tempera ■ 
ture, the result probably of chemical change. The 
phenomena of the brain that you observe are physical 
facts, the phenomena of mind that he ex|)eriences are 
psychical facts. There is reason for believing that for 
every physical fact there is a corresponding psychical 



INTRODUCTION. 21 

fact, and vice versa. Physiology is concerned primarily 
with one set of facts and psychology with the other, and 
the comparison of the two orders of facts in physiologi- 
cal psychology is a great help to the science of psychol- 
ogy, throwing light on disputed questions, and making 
conclusions already obtained more definite and precise. 

Summ^arize briefly the three methods of studying 
psychology, distinguishing between them. 

DiyiSIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

In psychology, as in other sciences, we must look for 
common characteristics in the great variety of facts to 
be studied, in order that we may classify them and study 
one kind of facts at a time. At first thought it seems as 
if the states of consciousness are so various and change- 
able that a classification is not possible. A careful an- 
alysis of our states of consciousness at any moment, 
however, will show that they all possess one or more of 
three distinctly different characteristics. For instance, 
I feel cold — I know that the fire is going down, and I 
decide to put in some wood. Again, I hear a sound at 
the door that I know to be the postman — I feel a desire 
to know what he brings, and decide to go and see. In 
these instances we have manifested the knowing, cogni- 
tive, or intellectual power of the mind, the capacity of 
feeling, of experiencing an emotion, and the ability 
to will to exercise volition. Sometimes one of these is 
most prominent, and sometimes another, or all may be 
nearly equal; but every mental phenomenon possesses 
the characteristic of being an act of feeling, of know- 



22 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

ing, or of willing. It is therefore convenient to classify 
mental facts into three divisions, and treat of them 
under the heads of intellect, feeling, and will. We treat 
of them separately, not because they are separated from 
each other in experience, but because it is easier to study 
one kind of fact at a time. Be prepared to give not less 
than five examples illustrating each of these powers of 
the mind. 

The distinction between them will become clearer by 
discussing the following questions : Is there ever cogni- 
tion without feeling ? Can there be feeling without any 
cognition ? Is will necessary to cognition or to feeling ? 
Does it have any effect upon them? AYould will be 
possible without intellect? Would action be possible; 
if so, would you call it willing ? Do we ever will with- 
out feeling ? If we had no sensibilities could or would 
we ever will to do anything ? 



GENERAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 23 



CHAPTER 11. 

GENERAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

If one is asleep or has received a severe blow on the 
head, we say that he is unconscious, which indicates 
that we know in a general way what is meant by con- 
sciousness. One of the distinctions we make between 
the movements of a man and a machine is that the man 
is conscious of his actions. This consciousness of our 
own movements, our thoughts, and the effects produced 
upon us by surrounding objects, is the necessary condi- 
tion of intelligence, feeling, and will; and, in fact, it is at 
every moment one or more of these. We may look upon 
it as the elementary or, rather, the unspecialized form 
of intelligence, which may assume a variety of forms, 
both simple and complex, and be intensified in various 
degrees. Just stop for a little while and note down all 
of the things of which you are conscious at the present 
time. Are you ever conscious of what is going on in 
your own mind and entirely unconscious of what is 
going on around you ? Are you ever conscious only of 
the effect outside things are producing upon you ? Are 
you at the present time conscious of all that you know ? 



24 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. ' 

Were you once ? Can you be so again at will ? If you 
cannot, do you know it ? 

ATTElS^TIOiq". 

Nature. — When you named the various things of 
which you were conscious, you found that the senses of 
sight, of touch, and of hearing were being affected all of 
the time by various surrounding objects, that your 
bodily condition was affecting consciousness, and that 
various thoughts were flitting through your mind. All 
of these things were occurring simultaneously; but, as 
you named them, was your consciousness of them equally 
intense, or were you distinctly conscious of one, then of 
another, as you named them ? When you are observing 
very closely the chair before you, do you not become 
almost entirely unconscious of all other things that are 
affecting your senses ? This intensification of con- 
sciousness upon fewer, or but one of the many, things 
that are affecting it, is called attention. Show that it 
may be to an external object or to a thought in the 
mind. Attention is quite analogous to the focusing of 
the eye upon a single object at a time. Indicate as many 
points of analogy between the two as you can. 

Limits. — Looking upon attention as an intensification 
or concentration of consciousness upon one of the things 
present to it, it is evident that it may be of all degrees. 
The minimum degree would be mere consciousness, with 
the slightest possible intensification upon one object; 
and the maximum, consciousness of nothing else but the 
one object of attention — not even of self and surround- 



GENERAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 25 

ings. Have you ever been attentive in the maximuDi 
degree ? Have you ever known any one else who was ? 

In determining the limits of consciousness as to 
number of things or mental processes that can be at- 
tended to at once, we should use the subjective and the 
first three forms of the indirectly subjective method. 
The following experiment will help in making the ob- 
servations, and also offer an objective test. 

Have a friend throw down several similar objects, 
while you attempt to state the number instantly without 
counting or grouping them. With how many objects 
can you do this correctly every time ? This indicates in 
a- measure how many external things you can attend to 
at once. 

Now, in order to find how many mental processes you 
can attend to at once, try the following experiments; 
repeat a poem and work a simple problem in arithmetic 
at the same time. Notice whether you attend to both 
processes at once, or your attention flits from one to the 
other. As a further means of determining this question, 
find liow long it takes to repeat the poem alone, how 
long to work the problem alone, then how long to do 
both at once. In order to make this test fairly it may 
be necessary to take another problem equally difficult 
but involving different combinations. For further tests 
try working a problem mentally while solving another 
on paper, repeating one poem while writing another, or 
writing a sentence with one hand, another with the 
other, while performing an arithmetical operation or 
repeating a third poem. In any of the above experi- 
ments is there a saving of time by doing two or more 



26 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

things at once ? Is there in any of the common 
tasks ? 

If two processes can be done in the time required for 
one, does this prove positively that they are both at- 
tended to at once ? Must it not mean that, or else that 
one of them is performed without attention ? Which 
do you think it means ? Give your reasons. 

What kind of acts can best be done at the same time 
others are being done — new or habitual acts ? Can two 
acts that are similar or two that are different best be 
performed at the same time, e.g., repeating a poem and 
adding, or repeating one poem and writing another ? 

The explanation seems to be as follows: If two 
similar processes can fuse into one complex process, as 
getting thought and pronouncing words, playing, or 
singing, they can be done together with advantage; but 
if they cannot, the tendency of the mind to act as a 
whole — to unify the states of consciousness — causes the 
two processes to be confused. If the processes are very 
different the tendency is not so strong but that it may 
be prevented. 

Wherever consciousness is more intense in one direc- 
tion than in others we truly say that there is attention, 
but there is reason for believing that consciousness as a 
whole varies in intensity. When one is half asleep, or 
even passively interested in what is going on, does not 
the intensity of consciousness as a whole seem much less 
than when one is actively and keenly interested in what 
is being said and done ? It is sometimes assumed that 
the intensity of attention decreases with increase in the 
number of things affecting consciousness, but this is 



GENERAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 27 

probably true only under certain circumstances. An 
orator addressing an audience or a teacher before a class 
has many more things affecting consciousness and re- 
quiring attention than when considering facts and argu- 
ments in the quiet study, yet often they think more 
clearly and intensely in the former instance. The addi- 
tional stimuli seem to stir the mind as a whole to 
greater activity, so that the intensity in several directions 
is greater than in one when the mind is less active. A 
friend of mine can write better on the train, amid the 
noise, than in a quiet room. Give other illustrations, if 
you can, from your own experience and observations. 
Try working a problem while some one reads to you, and 
notice whether the additional stimulus, instead of excit- 
ing the mind as a whole to greater activity, diverts it 
from the task being performed. This is the usual effect 
also of trying to attend to more than one thing when 
the two sorts of activity cannot be unified. In these 
cases increase in the number of things attended to does 
decrease the intensity of attention. Give other illus- 
trations of this. 

Importance of Attention and its Selective Character. 
■ — Since of all the objects that are affecting our senses 
and of all the thoughts that are passing through 
our minds, we can attend in a degree above the mini- 
mum to but very few, it follows that much of what is 
potentially within the sphere of our mental life is actu- 
ally almost non-existent. There are individual differ- 
ences as to the number of things attended to and the 
intensity of the attention. Would it be safe to say that 
the amount of knowledge acquired by any individual is 



28 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

directly proportional to the degree and extent of his 
attention ? Can you trace any analogy between plants 
and men as to what they take in of their surroundings ? 
What observations have you made upon pupils showing 
difference in knowledge corresponding to difference in 
attention ? Which is the more important, that a pupil 
should be supplied with plenty of books and objects for 
study and should be given good explanations regardless 
of what his attention might be, or that he should be 
kept attentive to whatever is presented, however little it 
may be ? Which is the more important, that the sub- 
ject should be presented to a class completely and logic- 
ally, or that the attention of the class should be secured 
to whatever is presented ? 

It is not possible, and probably not desirable, to attend 
to everything affecting us (do you think it would be ?), 
but the question of what kind of things we attend to is 
a matter of considerable importance. How many of you 
can tell the number of steps in the stairs or the number 
of windows in a room of a public building with which 
you are familiar ? This illustrates the truth of the 
statement made above. Give others. 

Now, from -your own thoughts and observations, give 
examples of individual differences as to the things at- 
tended to. Suggestion: notice men of different occupa- 
tions when observing or reading the same thing. Notice 
differences between yourself and your companions, be- 
tween men and women, children and adults, as to which 
sense, eye or ear, is used most and what classes of objects 
are most noticed. Would it be possible for two individ- 
uals surrounded by the same things and thoughts. 



GENERAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS'. 29 

brought up in the same way, to acquire a different stock 
of knowledge and develop a different character because 
of a difference in attention ? Illustrate and give reasons. 

Themes for writing : " Importance of Attention ; " 
" Individual Differences as to the Things Attended To." 
. Kinds of Attention. — As already indicated, attention 
may be either to external things or to internal thoughts. 
In either case the attention may be with or without 
effort. If effort is necessary in order to keep the atten- 
tion upon the object or idea, we say that the attention 
is voluntary, but if the object or idea by its intensity or 
peculiarity excites and holds the attention, then we des- 
ignate it as non-voluntary or involuntary attention — non- 
voluntary when no will is used to attend or not to attend, 
and involuntary when it is difficult or impossible to turn 
it to other things. Give three examples of each of these 
three kinds of attention in your own experience. What 
proportion of your attention to the things around you 
is non-voluntary ? When not studying what proportion 
of your thoughts are voluntary ? 

Be ready to indicate what part pleasure and pain, 
novelty of the thing presented, and natural susceptibility 
to certain impressions play in non- voluntary attention. 
Whatever excites attention may be called a stimulus to 
attention. What is the relation of intensity of stimuli 
to attention ? Of two stimuli differing only in intensity, 
other things being equal, which will attract the non- 
voluntary attention, the stronger or the weaker, e.g., a 
loud or a low sound, a bright or a dim light. Illustrate 
further. 

Voluntary Attention, — Whenever any effort is made 



so INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

to direct or hold the attention it is to that extent volun- 
tary. Hence voluntary attention may enforce non- 
voluntary, or it may oppose it, deciding which of two 
equally attractive objects shall be attended to, or even 
produce attention to an unattractive object. Give the 
best example of strong voluntary attention that you can 
conceive of. Give the best within your own experience; 
within your own observation. Give your opinion of the 
value of the power of voluntary attention. 

What is the relation between attention and interest ? 
Is voluntary attention ever the result of immediate in- 
terest in the thing attended to, or is some derived in- 
terest always necessary to voluntary attention (or, in 
other words, some reason in the way of results why we 
should attend to the thing in hand) ? 

How long can you attend continuously to one subject 
of thought ? How long can a child of three, of five, of 
ten, attend to one thing ? Give illustrations, from your 
observations or reading, of long continued attention to 
one thing. After you have attended to one thing for a 
long while do you ever find it difficult to attend to 
something else ? Do people that have the power to 
attend to one thing for a long while often lack the 
power to quickly change their attention from one thing 
to another ? Which of these two powers is most valu- 
able, and under what circumstances ? Write out your 
ideal of the kind and power of attention one should 
possess. 

Conditions Favoring and Means of Developing Power 
of Attention, — Non-voluntary and voluntary attention 
are very closely related, and the latter must be devel- 



GENERAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 31 

oped out of the former. - Illustrate the fact that non- 
voluntary attention frequently leads to voluntary, also 
that voluntary may change to non-voluntary or even 
involuntary. Do you continue to exercise your will after 
you become interested in your lesson ? Do you ever find 
yourself unable to stop thinking about it ? 

Find how long you can attend to a simple point 
or line without thinking of anything else, simply by 
determining to do so. Can pure voluntary attention be 
maintained for more than a few seconds ? 'Now try the 
same experiment again, asking yourself questions about 
it — its size, shape, color, distance from other lines or 
points, etc. In the latter case there is a frequent 
change in the mental attitude, and this change excites 
non- voluntary attention, which makes it possible for 
voluntary attention to be maintained much longer. 
How long can you get a child to attend to a piece of 
chalk by simply telling him to study it ? How long by 
asking him questions about it and having him state 
what he sees. Would this be a safe statement : " No 
one can attend to one thing for more than a few mo- 
ments unless the thing itself changes or he changes his 
mental attitude toward it — thinks of it in a different 
way or in relation to other things ? " 

In order to understand more fully what is involved 
in attending to a thing, make this experiment: Count 
all of the " m^s " on this page ; then count all of the 
" a's ; " then both at once. What mental images, if any, 
were in your mind in these two cases ? If present, is it 
possible for you to count rapidly or accurately without 
them ? Why is it, if you are hunting for a lost thing, 



32 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

yon want to know how it looks ? Is it necessary to have 
some kind of a mental image of a thing to be observed 
in order to voluntarily attend to it? Is forming the 
mental image the necessary and important part of the 
act of attention ? 

Is some knowledge of a subject necessary to attention 
to it ? Have you observed children inattentive because 
of want of knowledge of the thing being presented ? 
Eeferring back to the question of change in mental atti- 
tude as necessary to continued attention, is considerable 
knowledge necessary to change of mental attitude ? 
Notice what knowledge is required to ask many ques- 
tions about chalk. Is extensive knowledge a favorable 
condition for attention ? 

Illustrate the fact that novelty is favorable to atten- 
tion. Now what is the relation of novelty of the thing 
presented to a child and his knowledge of something 
like it, to the degree of interest and attention it secures 
from him ? Should it be all new, all familiar, or partly 
new and partly familiar ? Give reasons. 

How may the attention of a class be secured, and how 
may power of attention be developed in children ? 
Which is the easier to attend to, words already written, 
or words the teacher is writing? pictures or maps that 
are already drawn, or those being drawn? Why? 
Which will develop attention most, asking a class 
such questions as, " What are three times four, three 
times two," etc., or asking them to tell " What three 
times each of the following numbers is: three, four/' 
etc. ? Why ? Which is the most favorable to the 
maintenance of attention, asking a question and then 



GENERAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. S^ 

calling on a pupil, or calling on a pupil and then asking 
a question ? What is the effect of expectancy or a belief 
that something new or important is about to be pre- 
sented ? How may expectancy be excited ? 

Can you count ten lines without giving continuous 
attention till the task is completed ? Will the doing of 
anything, whether play, work, or study, that requires 
continuous attention in order to do it successfully de- 
velop power of attention ? Name a number of things 
that do, and also that do not require continued atten- 
tion. Where there is little power of attention, as is 
often the case with young children, it must be excited, 
i.e., must be non-voluntary mainly, until the pupil has 
gained more power to control his attention himself. 
As an application of the truth just learned, illustrate 
how attention may be excited. 

Attention and Movement. — Eelax all your muscles, 
then attend intently to one thing. Can you do it ? 
When you wish to attend intently do you always move 
or make some muscles tense ? Is such muscular con- 
traction a necessary part of the act of attention, so that 
assuming an attitude of attention is a help in giving 
attention when it is difficult to do so ? 

Notice what movements, if any, or feelings of move- 
ment, are made when you change your attention from one 
object to another in the room; when you change from 
looking at something to listening to a sound; when you 
change from attending to exterior things to a mental 
image in the mind, or to your own mental processes. 
Do you think it possible for attention to change with- 
out a change in muscular contraction ? Is it possible to 



34 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

maintain continuous attention while making irregular 
movements ? while making regular motions ? Do either 
ever help any one to maintain attention ? 

Signs of Attention. — Muscular contractions produc- 
ing attitude expression of face and movements of head, 
eyes, or limbs, together with changes in the brightness 
of the eyes, produce the external signs of attention. 
Observe these closely in audiences, classes, and individ- 
uals under various circumstances, until you are able to 
read the signs of attention; and state what they are. 
Give as many as you can now. 



SPECIAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 35 



CHAPTER III. 



SPECIAL INTELLECTUAL POWEKS. 

In" tlie preceding chapter we studied about the gen- 
eral intellectual powers, while in this and the two fol- 
lowing chapters we shall study the special intellectual 
powers. The diiference is largely one of degree, but 
consciousness and attention are necessary to all intel- 
lectual operations, and are such an important element 
in those operations that they may by comparison very 
properly be designated as general. 

DIVISIONS. 

The three principal divisions of the special powers 
are illustrated by the following example : I go to a city 
I have never visited before, pass through its streets, 
and observe closely all of its buildings. That is, I am 
cognizant of what is present to my senses. I go home 
perhaps thinking of other things, but when the name 
of the city is mentioned there comes up in my mind 
a mental picture of it just as it appeared when I was 
looking at it. That is, I am cognizant of a represen- 
tation of what has previously been presented. Then 
perhaps I begin to compare the city with others that I 



S6 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

have seen, classify its different buildings, think of their 
uses, try to determine why it should have so many of 
one kind, etc. That is, I use my cognitive powers in 
comparing what is represented with representations of 
what I have seen at other times and places, i.e., I think. 
We have illustrated by this example three different 
powers of the mind (which we shall see later include 
several others), viz : presentative, or the power to know 
objects actually present; representative, or the power 
to represent objects previously known but not now 
present; tlmiking, or the power to compare, classify, 
and reason about things presented and represented. 
All of these powers may be and in fact usually are exer- 
cised together, yet they are, to a considerable extent, 
different. We perceive what is present, we represent or 
form a mental image of what is not present, and we 
tliink about things perceived and represented. Give 
examples of the exercise of each of these powers. 

THE PKESENTATIYE POWERS. 

Sensation. — I hold up this book and you perceive it; 
but if you had no eyes you would not know of its pres- 
ence unless I let it fall, and of that you would not be 
conscious if you were deaf. I place it in your hand 
and you perceive it, but if, as is sometimes the case, you 
were unable to feel it, then you could not perceive it in 
that way. If it had no taste and no odor you could not 
perceive it unless it should be by the resistance it offered 
to the movement of your hands. Would it not be to 
you as if it were non-existent; and is not the same true 



SPECIAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 37 

of every other object ? Could you represent and think 
about things you had previously seen, heard, felt, etc. ? 
Could you gain new knowledge ? You might know 
something of your own bodily state, whether sick or 
well, tired or rested, hungry or satisfied, etc., but could 
you know anything of your surroundings ? Your mind 
might be just as ready for action as ever; but if the 
sense organs, the eyes, ears, and the little nerve-endings 
in the skin, mouth, and tongue were destroyed, or the 
nerves, connecting them with the brain were cut, no 
stimulus from the outside world could reach your brain 
to call the presentative powers of your mind into action. 

Yet a perfect sense organ and a nervous impulse pass- 
ing to the brain is not all that is necessary to produce a 
sensation, for -if one is unconscious, as when asleep, no 
sensation is produced by the sound waves falling upon 
the ear, or by a pressure upon the hand. It is the effect 
produced upon consciousness by the incoming nervous 
impulses that constitutes a sensation. The effect is, in 
fact, more in the nature of a feeling, but the intellect 
cognizes the existence of the feeling, and by means of 
the various sensations makes us acquainted with the ex- 
ternal world. 

The simple sensations given by the special senses are : 
color and variation in light and shade, by the eye; 
sounds of different pitch and intensity, by the ear; heat, 
cold, and contact, by the skin; sweet, sour, bitter, and 
salt, by the tongue; a variety of odors, by the nose; and 
movement, by the muscles and joints. It seems at first 
incredible that by means of these few elementary sensa- 
tions we can become acquainted with the infinite num- 



38 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

ber of objects and qualities of the external world, yet it 
is not more strange than that hundreds of thousands of 
words are made from twenty-six letters, and all material 
things from about seventy elementary substances. A 
moment's thought will show you that the picture before 
which you stand entranced is the result of a change in 
color and shading of a uniform white surface, and that 
all the objects in nature known to you by sight are so 
known only by variations in color and brightness. Find 
illustrations of a similar truth for the other senses. 

Besides these special sensations there are certain gen- 
eral sensations coming from various parts of the body, 
not always definitely located, which give knowledge of 
bodily conditions, but tell us nothing of the external 
world, and so are of little intellectual value. 

Discrimination. — If all objects wxre exactly alike 
there would be no chance for the intellect to distinguish 
between things; we could learn nothing. If the intel- 
lect had not the power to distinguish between objects 
that differ, knowledge would be impossible. The power 
by which I single out one thing for notice and distin- 
guish it from others, as a book, among a number of 
other things on a table, is discrimination. If it were 
exactly like the surface of the table and on a level or 
continuous with it, I could not single it out for notice ; 
or if it were not, but the light were very poor or my 
vision defective, the same would be true. That is, there 
must be some discrimination or difference before the 
object can be singled out for notice, and still further 
noting of difference before it can be distinguished from 
other similar objects. The essential element, then, in 



=\ 



SPECIAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 39 

discrimination is the power to cognize difference. This 
implies also the cognition of non-difference or simi- 
larity. If this last statement does not seem clear to 
you, ask yourself when it is you say things are alike. 
Is it not when you can see no difference ? 

The singling out for notice is an act of attention 
brought about by a recognition of a difference. The 
two processes of singling out for notice or recognition 
of a difference, and that of noting the character and 
amount of difference, may be illustrated by doing both 
for these two figures. The first glance 
shows that they differ, but a longer time |— 
is required to note the nature and L 
amount of the differences. Give illus- | 
trations from your own experience of 
ability to tell that two things differ without ability to 
tell in what way they differ. Also of ability to see dif- 
ference after it has been pointed out but not before. 

It is often noted with surprise that children see re- 
semblances unnoticed by adults; and it is asserted that 
they see resemblances more quickly than adults. Have 
you ever noted the fact that strangers see family resem- 
blance more quickly than members of the family : 
Have you ever met two brothers or sisters that you 
could scarcely tell apart at first, but after becoming in- 
timately acquainted with them you could see but little 
resemblance ? All Indians look alike to one who is not 
used to seeing them, but not to those who have been 
much with them. Do these facts throw any light upon 
the apparent readiness with which children note general 
resemblances ? Can you give any farther explanation ? 



40 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

Since the power to recognize difference is such an es- 
sential part of all intellectual activity, it has been 
thought that the smallness of difference that can be de- 
tected may serve as a measure of intellectual power. 
In the branch of psychology known as psycho-physics, 
a great many experiments have been made upon the 
discrimination of differences in sensations. Sensations 
differ in kind or degree. Blue and red differ in kind, 
light and dark in degree. Give other examples. The 
experiments have been made mainly with reference to 
discriminating difference in degree with a view to deter- 
mining the relation existing between the amount of 
the difference between the two stimuli or causes of the 
sensations, and the two sensations that are experienced. 

Find how much two lines must differ in length in 
order that you may detect the difference. It is best 
to show but one at a time, and record the number o| 
correct and incorrect judgments as to which is longer. 
Try it with both long and short lines. Find how much 
the height from which a marble is dropped upon the 
table must vary in order that you may detect the 
difference in the intensity of the sound. Find how 
much two weights must differ in order that you may 
detect the difference. Try it for both light and heavy 
weights, as for long and short lines, so as to determine 
whether the least perceptible difference is a fixed quan- 
tity or a ratio. You will thus reach the essential truth 
of the psycho-physical law. If the least observable dif- 
ference is twice or thrice as great for lines two or three 
times as long, then it is a ratio; but if it is the same for 
all lengths it is a fixed quantity. 



SPECIAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 41 

Inferring Differences and Resemblances — Without 
the power of perceiving differences directly felt, knowl- 
edge wonld be impossible. Without the power of infer- 
ring differences not directly felt, knowledge would be 
possible but very difficult of attainment, for a very large 
proportion of the differences we note are inferred in- 
stead of actually cognized. Looking at two biscuits I 
say that one is better than the other. I discriminate a 
difference in their visual appearance and infer a differ- 
ence in their taste. I look at two cubes and say that 
one is heavier than the other. I discriminate a differ- 
ence in size and infer a difference in weight. I see that 
the mercury in the thermometer is lower and I infer that 
it is colder. Give a half-dozen other examples of differ- 
ent kinds of inferred differences and resemblances, indi- 
cating what is discriminated and what is inferred. 

If this were a world of chance such inferences would 
be impossible, but it is a world of law in which things 
vary in a fixed and definite way. Hence, if we have re- 
ceived a visual sensation and a tactile sensation from 
the same object, and another object gives us that same 
visual sensation, we infer with certainty that it will give 
us the same tactile sensation as the previous one, and 
vice versa. 

Perception. — Defining perception in the simplest 
manner possible, we say it is the power of recognizing 
sensations or objects affecting the senses. Try a num- 
ber of experiments in recognizing objects by the use of 
but ore sense in perceiving, e.g., to recognize wood or 
metals by touch or by sound. N'otice that in every case 
you receive one kind of sensation, attending to it and 



42 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

discriminating it from all others, and that yon call np 
mental images of other sensations that have been experi- 
enced with that one, and then yon recognize those as 
the characteristics of a certain class of objects. You 
can make the observation best when you have some 
difficulty in recognizing the objects, for ordinarily the 
process is so quick that it is impossible to analyze it. 

To recognize an object means that we know its quali- 
ties and the class to which it belongs. That is, we are 
receiving from it one sensation, and from our previous 
experiences we are able to infer the other sensations 
that we can get from it by using the other senses. I see 
a white substance and infer that if I were to put it in 
my mouth I would experience a sensation of sweetness, 
and I know that these are the qualities of a kind of 
substance known as sugar. The moment I come to 
know this I have recognized or perceived the substance 
before me. 

I receive a sensation of sound that in previous experi- 
ence was associated with a visual sensation of an object 
with rough edges moving through wood, and these qual- 
ities enable me to recognize or perceive it as the sound 
of a saw. Learning to know objects — to perceive them 
— is simply learning what sensations the different classes 
of objects are capable of giving, and to know when one 
sensation is given us by an object what others it can 
give us, and thus to classify or recognize it. The real 
nature of the process will become clearer if you will 
consider the following questions : Until you have both 
seen and tasted an entirely new substance would it be 
possible to tell from its looks how it would taste, or from 



SPECIAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS, 43 

its taste how it would look ? Would it be possible to 
know the song of a bird and to know the bird by sight 
but not to know its appearance from hearing the song, 
or to know the song from seeing the bird, providing you 
had never seen and heard it at the same time ? Could a 
man cured of blindness know from the visual appear- 
ance of objects how it would feel until he had had some 
experience in comparing visual and tactile impressions ? 

Notice if the following are essential elements of every 
perception: a sensation, discrimination, more or less 
definite location in S23ace, mental images of other sen- 
sations that have been associated with the one now 
experienced, and classification of the object more or less 
definite. 

In perceiving qualities^ as red, sweet, etc., we do not 
call up images of other kinds of sensations, as in per- 
ceiving objects, but of sensations like that now experi- 
enced. With adults there is no pure sensation, for 
every sensation calls up mental images of others like it 
or experienced with it, and so the effect of the stimulus 
is modified and a perceptional element introduced into 
every sensation. 

Our percepts may be more or less definite, varying 
with the conditions under which we perceive the per- 
fectness of our sense-organs, and our power of discrimi- 
nation, the amount of attention we give to the object 
and our knowledge of such objects. Ear ahead in the 
road I see an object, then as I come closer and note 
more characteristics I perceive that it is a living thing, 
then a person, — a boy, a school-boy, coming home from 
school, — a boy that lives next door to me. My percept 



44 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

becomes more and more definite as I note new charac- 
teristics and classify the thing perceived into smaller 
classes. Two persons with unequal powers of eyesight, 
other things being equal, perceive objects with cor- 
responding degrees of definiteness. Again, two men 
notice a flower by the wayside: one perceives merely 
that it is a flower, the other that it belongs to a certain 
family genus and species, and that it is a large speci- 
men just ready to fruit. Give other illustrations of 
varying degrees of definiteness of perception. 

Definite and accurate perception does not depend 
wholly upon the number of characteristics noted, but 
upon what ones are noted. The unscientific observer 
may note a score of characteristics of a plant being ex- 
amined and the botanist but two or three, and yet the 
latter perceives much more definitely because he notes 
essential qualities. Learning to perceive involves learn- 
ing what are essential characteristics, and forming the 
habit of attending to them. In science /orm is generally 
a more essential characteristic than color. Notice what 
characteristics are noted by children and how they rec- 
ognize things. Did you ever see a child recognize a 
word by its position instead of its form ? Give other 
■'illustrations of attention to non-essentials in perceiving. 

Illusions. — Defined briefly, illusions are false percep- 
tions. Thus, upon entering a physical laboratory I see 
before me a bouquet, but upon reaching out to touch it 
I find nothing there. This is an illusion; for what my 
visual sensations lead me to infer is not verified to my 
sense of touch. Inquiry reveals the fact that the place 
where the bouquet seems to be is the focus of a concave 



SPECIAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 45 

mirror in front of wliicli there is a bouquet. The rays 
of light coming from that point produce just the same 
sensations that they would if they came from a real 
bouquet at that point, and so in perceiving a bouquet 
there my sense of sight is not at fault, and my mind 
acts in the habitual way. The cause of the error is that 
the conditions under which I perceive are different, so 
that the influence which under the usual conditions 
would be verified is not found true. Explain the illu- 
sion of a stick appearing crooked in the water; also the 
illusion of your train seeming to move when it is one on 
the track beside you that is moving. Cross the fingers 
and roll a pea or large shot with them. Explain the 
illusion that results. 

Another type of illusion is illustrated by this ex- 
ample. A meadow-lark arises in front of a chicken- 
hunter; he thinks it a chicken and fires at once. In 
this case the mental image of a chicken is already 
present in his mind, so that an object only slightly 
resembling it is perceived as a chicken. 

Such allusions as this usually disappear upon closer 
observation because the sensation which at first is so 
much modified by the mental images in the mind that 
it seems to be a different sensation is soon correctly dis- 
criminated. Grive other illustrations of illusions of this 
type. 

Sometimes when there is no stimulation of the sense- 
organ objects seem to be seen, heard, or felt. In this 
case we have what is called an hallucination. 

Apperception. — In studying attention we found that 
what things or characteristics of things any one noticed 



46 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

depended largely upon his previous knowledge and 
habits of thought. In studying perception we found 
that every object had to be classed more or less definitely 
with a group of similar objects with which the indi- 
vidual is already familiar. In every percept we found 
two important elements — a sensation coming from with- 
out and mental images of sensations and knowledge of 
classes from within. Apperception concerns especially 
the latter element. It would not be an exaggeration 
to say that in reality we attend to and perceive with all 
that we have previously attended to and perceived. 
This process of noting the characteristics of any object 
presented to the senses and bringing it into relation 
with things already known is called apperception. It 
is the process of perception carried a little further, so 
that the object is not only classed with a group of simi- 
lar objects, but the relation of this thing to various 
classes of things is noted, so that it is brought into rela- 
tion with all previous knowledge. An important ele- 
ment in both perception and apperception is a calling 
up in the mind images of similar things. When a new 
object is presented we immediately begin to think of 
what we have seen like it, and what that is depends 
upon our previous experience. As soon as we have 
classed it we think also of what we know about that 
class, and thus more fully apperceive it. Ideas as well 
as objects are apperceived by being brought into relation 
with old ideas and understood by means of them. 

For examples of apperception recall how different 
your thoughts of certain places were after you had vis- 
ited them from what they were before ; the different 



SPECIAL INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 47 

ideas the names of certain subjects called up after you 
studied those subjects. Recall your earlier experiences 
as to how new things impressed you. Reflect upon the 
different meaning a flower has to a botanist or a machine 
to a mechanic from what they have to the uninformed. 
Notice how children are impressed by new things, how 
they relate them to something familiar and, to them, 
similar. Notice in recitation how some pupils are better 
able to understand because of their apperceptive knowl- 
edge. Write an essay upon the educational importance 
of apperception. 

Perception of Space and Time.— So far we have 
spoken only of perception of things, but a moment's 
thought shows us that all objects are perceived in space 
and time. Not only is this true, but we may be said to 
perceive space and time as well as material things, for 
we are able to judge of amounts of each, and this power 
grows with experience. The subject, however, is too 
difficult for treatment in a brief elementary work. 



48 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 



CHAPTER IV. • 

THE EEPEESEISTTATIVE POWEKS. 

Divisions. — The mind not only has power to cognize 
the objects affecting the senses and its own activities at 
any time, but also to re-present or represent these expe- 
riences, and also to arrange them in different ways. 
Looking at the exercise of this power from various 
points of view, we find that it involves the formation of 
mental images the use of imagination, association, aiid 
memory. 

The mental images as the result of sensation and per- 
ception are retained in memory, recalled by means of 
association, and variously arranged by the imagination. 
A little consideration will show that several of these 
activities are necessary in perception and in appercep- 
tion. See if you can point Out for yourself what ones. 

MEI^TAL IMAGES. 

The representative power of the mind is shown in its 
simplest form in the production of mental images. The 
representative power is good just in proportion as the 
mental image approaches in vividness and completeness 
the original sense perception. If it is fully as distinct 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS. 49 

and complete, the two differ only in the fact that in 
perception the sense-organs were affected by the object 
while in the forming of the mental image they are not. 
The nervous process in the brain and the activity of the 
mind are almost the same. Very rarely, however, is the 
mental image nearly as distinct as the original impres- 
sion. How is it in your own case ? 

Leaving out of account general sensations, how many 
different kinds of mental images may there be? In 
your own case which are the most numerous ? Which 
are the most vivid ? In trying to answer these questions 
notice in what way you think of most things, — as they 
look, as they sound, as they taste, etc., — and which kind 
of mental image is the most vivid. Test the vividness 
of your own visual images and of others by presenting 
an object, then removing it and having it described or 
imitated. 

There are great individual differences, but in the 
majority of cases the visual images are both more vivid 
aud more numerous, and the auditory and motor next. 

Why should the visual be more numerous ? As a 
help in answering this notice, what senses are affected 
by the greatest variety of objects; also what ones are 
affected most continuously. 

Can deaf men form auditory images, or the blind 
visual ones, if they lost hearing or sight late in life ? 
Can they if they were always deaf or blind? Can you 
form a mental image of an entirely different kind from 
anything you have ever perceived ? 

Notice that a mental image may be of a single sensa- 
tion of a single object, or of a whole landscape; but in 



50 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

either ease it is merely a representation of what has been 
experienced, without change, except in yividness and in 
connection with other objects. 

Imagination. — This is the typical representative 
power. The simple mental images of which we have 
been speaking are the basis of it, and are identical with 
what is known as reproductive imagination. We may 
look upon the simple mental images as the material 
out of which the imagination may construct new and 
more complex mental images. 

Picture to yourself a two-story white house 22 X 26 
feet, facing the east, and about 25 feet from the street, 
which is bordered by elm trees 10 inches in diameter 
and 8 feet apart. Notice how you construct the mental 
image, out of material already in the mind, according 
to directions or descriptions. In doing so you exercise 
the co7istructive imagination. Any modification of the 
size, shape, or color of simple mental images is an exer- 
cise of the constructive imagination; e.g., imagine a 
book ten times as large as this, four times as wide and 
no thicker, and colored blue; or one sixth as large every 
way, and green. 

The representation of any change in the relation of 
things, as of the furniture in this room, a building 
turned around or placed on another street, exercises the 
constructive imagination. Give a description of some 
building or place you have seen. In doing so you exer- 
cise your reproductive imagination. Those who are 
listening to you form mental images of each of the 
things as you name them, and exercise their construc- 
tive imagination in putting together the simple mental 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS. 51 

images so as to form the complex image you describe, 
and which they have never seen. 

The child who can represent the appearance of a 
word with the last letter changed exercises the visual 
constructive imagination. The one who can sound to- 
gether two syllables that he has never sounded together 
exercises the auditory constructive imagination. The 
cook who can represent the taste of apples, meat, vine- 
gar, raisins, and sugar combined together in certain pro- 
portions exercises the gustatory constructive imagina- 
tion. Give other illustrations, and illustrations for the 
other senses. Mediated perceptions, i.e., perceptions of 
things not present to the senses by means of models, 
pictures, drawings, designs, or descriptions, exercise the 
constructive imagination. Illustrate this, and show 
that we are dependent in such cases upon previous 
perceptions. 

Show the use of constructive imagination in the study 
of history, reading, and geography. 

Draw or write a description of a house or landscape 
different from any that you have ever seen. In doing 
this you will use your reproductive imagination in form- 
ing mental images of parts of houses or landscapes, and 
your constructive imagination in combining them to- 
gether; but you combine them together in your own way, 
and not according to the directions and descriptions 
of another. You therefore use a higher form of the 
imagination, known as the creative. This exercise of 
one's own judgment and taste and ingenuity as to how 
the elements shall be combined into the complex mental 
images is what distinguishes creative from constructive 



52 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

imagination. What kind of imagination does the novel- 
ist nse ? What kind does the reader of the novel use ? 
What kind does a traveller use in his descriptions ? 
What kind do his readers use ? W^hat kind does the 
the composer of music use; the artist who paints an 
ideal scene; the cook who invents new dishes; the child 
who makes a new design in drawing or writes an ideal 
story ? Give other examples of the creative imagina- 
tion. 

One's imagination is vivid when he can form vivid 
mental images. With some children the images are so 
vivid that they have difficulty in distinguishing them 
from real perceptions, and so may be unjustly accused 
of lying. In other cases the power of forming distinct 
.mental images is lacking and needs cultivation. Find 
illustrations of these statements. 

Some have good reproductive imagination hut cannot 
readily imagine anything different from what they have 
seen, either with or without direction as to how it is to 
be changed, while others readily make such changes, 
delight in it, and sometimes are so much inclined to use 
this power that they are almost unable to give true de- 
scriptions of things. Such children delight in fairy- 
tales and day-dreams, but the others have more need of 
such mental exercise. 

He who can reproduce vividly and accurately has a 
good reproductive imagination; he who can construct a 
thing according to description has a good constructive 
imagination, and he who can create an object in accord- 
ance with the laws of nature or of good taste (as the 
inventor and poet) has a good creative imagination. 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS. 53 

Give illustrations that you liave gained, from reading or 
from observation, of good imagination of each kind. 

Association. — Notice as you look at this book that you 
are conscious, not merely of the book, but to a greater 
or less extent of the book as in your hand or on the 
table, as in front of you, in this room, in this building, 
in this city, and perhaps of other things. Conscious- 
ness is a unity, and the object of attention is the central 
and most vivid portion of that unity. When any por- 
tion of that unity of experience is reproduced, is it not 
true that the rest tends to be reproduced also ? Is not 
the same true of experiences that occur in immediate 
succession ? Illustrate the fact that the sight or thought 
of one thing tends to produce mental images of other 
things seen or thought of at the same place or at the 
same or nearly the same time particularly if the two 
have been attended to in immediate succession. 

This is the general principle of Association, IN'otice 
what is suggested to you by certain words, as flag, robin, 
house, bell, or the sight or thought of certain objects or 
persons. Every mental image and idea that comes into 
your mind is probably called up by association with a 
sensation, a mental image or idea. Verify this by stop- 
ping yourself at any moment and noting what you are 
thinking of and what you thought of just before that. 

Perhaps the word "sleigh-ride" makes you think of 
only one particular sleigh-ride, although you have taken 
hundreds of them; and the word " gold " of a particular 
ring, though you have seen hundreds of gold objects. 
Why were these particular things suggested rather than 
the others ? Ask yourself this question about the vari- 



54 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

oils tilings suggested to you in the experiment named 
above, and see in how many instances yon can find it to 
be due to (a) recency of the experience or association, 
(b) intensity, (d) number of repetitions. In most all 
associations you will find that one or more of these three 
factors determine absolutely what shall be suggested. 
Sometimes there is more than one thing helping to sug- 
gest the idea that comes, as when twelve is suggested to 
a boy, not by three times four, but by three times one, 
three times two, three times three, and three times four. 

Give other illustrations. May one^s general bodily 
and mental condition have any effect in determining 
what shall be suggested by experiences or words ? Find 
an answer by noting or recalling the ideas suggested to 
you by the same thing when you are in different health 
or in a different mood, or differently engaged. 

The general principle of contiguity, that any sensa- 
tion or idea tends to suggest others experienced at the 
same or nearly the same time, holds for all associations, 
but the various ways in which this is done leads to the 
naming of several different kinds of associations. Pick 
out and name what seems to you different kinds of asso- 
ciations in the experiment tried above, then compare 
with the following: 

When the thought or sight of a place suggests some 
experience connected with it, as the thought of a 
town suggests a friend met there, the association is said 
to be of place. Give examples of association of place. 
Where the recurrence of a certain date or the thought 
of it suggests something experienced at that time, as 
the above suggests a visit with other friends that imme- 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS. 55 

diately followed, the association is said to be one of 
time. Illustrate this. Which of these two kinds of 
associations is most prominent in description; in narra- 
tive; in history; in geography? A less important*kind 
of association (really one form of time and place asso- 
ciation) is where a part suggests the whole, or the whole 
a part, as wheel, a wagon; house, windows. Illustrate 
further. 

A very important kind of association is that in which 
an object or idea suggests something that has never 
been associated with it before, but with something like 
it. The sight of a strange face may make me think of 
a distant friend I have not seen for years, because of 
the general resemblance in feature; or because of one 
peculiarity of feature, attitude, gesture, or manner of 
walking. This is known as association by similarity. 
Illustrate it. This kind of association, with the help of 
attention, gives great variety to the mental activities, 
because when the attention is fixed upon one charac- 
teristic something having that characteristic is sug- 
gested, and when it is fixed on another quality something 
having that quality is suggested; hence this kind of 
association does not confine the mind to the repetition 
of former experiences as occurring in time and space, 
but presents an infinite variety. You can illustrate this 
by naming as many things as you can that are like 
some simple object, say a pencil, in some respect. As- 
sociation of similarity is the important association in 
scientific classification and reasoning, and it is also im- 
portant in poetry and other literature. 

Where one thing suggests another similar in quality 



56 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

but different in degree, as high, low; rich, poor, the as- 
sociation is one of contrast. Illustrate this and its use 
in rhetoric. 

If we notice a swelling on a horse's leg we wonder 
what produced it and what will be the result, even 
though we have never seen such a swelling produced or 
the results. This is known as association by cause and 
effect. Illustrate it. The tendency to associate in 
this way is perhaps partially natural and partially the 
result of previous experience in noting successions of 
events. One who has a strong tendency to this kind of 
assoi.iations usually does a good deal of investigating 
and reasoning. 

There is an association which is only one form of 
association of time or place, but it is so much used that 
it is worth special mention. It is that of sign and thing 
signified. In learning language, either oral or written, 
this is the kind of association used. Indicate the asso- 
ciation that a child must make in learning to understand 
oral language; in learning to read. 

There are great individual differences as to the kind 
of association most used. Illustrate this from your own 
observation, if possible. If pupils are required to notice 
only the time relations in the study of history, will they 
not get in the habit of forming that kind of associa- 
sions only ? May they be led to form in that study asso- 
ciations of place, cause and effect, and similarity and 
contrast ? Illustrate further how certain habits of asso- 
ciation may be formed. 

Memory. — We usually think of memory as the power 
of retaining impressions or experiences of any kind 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS. 57 

and reproducing tliem; but tecliiiically this is not the 
distinguishing characteristic of memory. Is it not 
equally true that there is no activity of imagination 
without the reproducing of past experiences ? 

In imagination do we need to know what impressions 
were originally associated with the mental image now 
in mind ? Are we not also at perfect liberty to put it 
with any other mental image we choose ? In memory, 
howeyer, must it not be recognized as having been at 
some past time associated in our experience with some 
other fact or experience ? If. you read a descrix^tion of 
a battle, you probably form mental images of men, 
horses, guns, flags, hills, smoke, etc. ; but do you recog- 
nize the men, horses, guns, etc., as those seen at any 
particular time or place ? If not, then your mental 
images of them are not memories. You do not speak 
of remembering what " dog," " tree," " white," mean as 
you do of v/ords you have heard or seen but a few time's, 
or new Latin words, because what is frequently experi- 
enced becomes free from any definite associations and 
cannot be located; hence it is not, properly speaking, a 
memory, for it lacks the distinguishing characteristic of 
definite location or recognition. 

Eecognition may be of all degrees of definiteness. 
Thus there come to my mind the figures 124.22, and I 
recognize that I have seen those figures as expressing 
some fact, but I do not know what. A little more 
thought and I recognize those figures as the average 
amount of money possessed per capita by the people of 
some country, I think the United States. I know I 
read it about two days ago in my own room in either 



53 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

the daily paper or the Revietv of Reviews^ but do not 
know the authority, or the article in which it appeared. 
Give illustrations from your own experiences of varying 
degrees of recognition. 

It is evident from the foregoing that there are three 
factors in memory, retention, recall, and recognition. 
The study of memory can be simplified by studying 
each of these separately. 

1. The retention of a percept means the retention of 
one or more of the six different kinds of sense impres- 
sions, so we may say that we have six different kinds of 
memories. Which kind of impressions do you retain 
best ? Eecall some experience in which several senses 
were used, and notice which sensory images are recalled 
first and most distinctly. 

Most ideas are symbolized by a word or group of 
words which are visual or auditory impressions (or if 
spoken or written also motor impressions), hence we 
may inquire as to what kind of words are best retained. 

Which do you think you can remember best, what 
you have heard or what you have read ? Eecall past 
experiences. In order to test this further, have ten 
unconnected letters or figures read to you at the rate 
of one every two seconds; then have them, or better, 
another similar list, shown to you at the same rate. 
Find in which case the most are remembered (regardless 
of order, for that is a question of association). Eepeat 
the experiment several times. To test the matter 
further, find how much time or how many repetitions 
are necessary to learn a verse of poetry by hearing it 
read, and the same for a similar verse by reading it 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS. 59 

silently. Be very careful to have the exercise equally 
difficult in each case. 

In order to find what influence the motor impressions 
have, perform the above experiments, either repeating 
or writing the letters, figures, or words. 

In performing the above experiments notice whether 
when you see words you think of the sound, and when 
you hear them you think of how they look, and whether 
in the first case you recall them as sounds, and in the 
second as visual characters. If you do, then you do not 
use the same sense in storing that you use in acquiring. 
Some use the visual sense only in storing, translating all 
sensory experiences into visual terms, and retaining 
them as visual images; while others use the auditory 
sense only. Some writers hold that it is best to use one 
sense only in retention — the one that is most natural 
for the individual — while others think it best to use all 
equally. State all of the advantages and disadvantages 
of both methods that you can think of. 

The retention of an experience is accurate and per- 
manent in proportion to the intensity of the experience 
and the number of times it is repeated. The intensity 
varies with the feeling accompanying, or interest in the 
experience and the degree of attention. Give illustra- 
tions of the fact that one or a few intense repetitions 
of an experience will cause it to be retained better than 
many repetitions with a slight degree of intensity. Is 
a student gaining in power as a student when he can 
substitute intensity for many repetitions in acquiring 
knowledge ? Is teaching ability measured in a similar 
way ? How much time could be saved in our schools, 



6o INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

by decrease of repetition, and drill work if presentations 
were always clear and forcible and pupils attentive ? 

Is there any reason for believing tliat retention is 
affected by the physiological conditions during and 
after acquisitions, as regards health, fatigue, etc. ? Illus- 
trate. 

Even when all the conditions for acquisition and 
retention are the same, it is a well-known fact that the 
perfectness of retention varies with different individuals 
very greatly. The difference seems to be a natural 
physiological differencOj and in some cases to be almost 
as great as that between the sand and a granite rock. 
Often, but not always, the one who is slow in acquiring 
retains well. Eeport any such individual differences 
that you have observed. There is good reason for doubt- 
ing whether there is any psychical means of increasing 
this general power of retention except through increase 
in the general power of attention, by means of which the 
Impressions are made more intense and the perceptions 
more accurate and vivid. This would improve the re- 
tention of what one tries to learn, but not of impres- 
sions received incidentally. As bearing on this question, 
try to determine whether you retain impressions re- 
ceived incidentally better than you did when a child; 
whether adults generally do better than children, and 
educated adults better than uneducated. 

2. The recall of any impression depends very largely 
upon the associations formed between it and other things. 
The certainty of recall will vary, as we found in the study 
of association, with the number of things with which it 
has been associated, the number of times it has been 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS. 6i 

associated with those things, the recency, and the inten- 
sity of the associations. Things are associated together, 
not so much by being together in consciousness or in 
immediate succession, as by being attended to together; 
and the intensity of the association varies with the de- 
gree of attention. Illustrate how the ability to recall 
varies with variations in these factors. State some of 
the advantages and disadvantages of associating a fact, 
say in history or geography, with many other facts rather 
than a greater number of times with only a few other 
facts. Take into account the value of the fact in the 
two cases and the habit of mind formed as well as the 
certainty of retention. 

Does association with objects, pictures, diagrams, or 
vivid descriptions help in remembering facts in natural 
history, history, geography, and mathematics ? Where 
associations do not make the knowledge gained any more 
clearer or vivid, or more convenient for use, but are 
made simply to aid in. recalling, we say that the associa- 
tions are artificial. Such associations are systematically 
used in mnemonics to " improve the memory.^^ 

What would be the effect of the continued and exten- 
sive use of such associations upon the thought power of 
any individual ? Would it be compensated by the in- 
creased power to remember particular facts, providing 
there is any such increase ? 

State how you would group the following things in 
your mind if you were required to get them: thread, 
coffee, gloves, steak, three yards of blue ribbon, tea, two 
yards of point lace, ten pounds of lard, oatmeal, sausage, 
bleached muslin. The thread should be white; you are 



62 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

to get two pounds of coffee; the lace must be four 
inches wide; five pounds of steak and six of oatmeal are 
wanted; the ribbon is to be f in. wide; and of the tea 
you are to get only ^ lb.; and you must get two pounds 
of sausage; it is the nine-cent muslin that is wanted, 
and you are to get ten yards; the thread must be No. 
36, and the gloves No. 8. What would be the advan- 
tage of grouping them ?- Can you get from this any 
general principles as to Jioiu to group things ? 

One of the experiments in remembering words, fig- 
ures, or letters should be repeated, noting how many 
more repetitions are necessary to remember them in 
order, and how much this is helped by grouping them. 

This experiment should also be tried : Have seven fig- 
ures or letters read to you until you can repeat them all 
in order; then have fourteen read in the same way 
until you can repeat them in order (not grouping them), 
and see whether they must be read more or less than 
double the number of times that the seven were. What 
bearing has this upon increasing the length of a lesson 
or the amount to be learned at one time ? 

Notice for yourself what kind of association you use 
most frequently and effectively, and also report any 
observation made on others in this regard. 

Is a thing recalled best by being seen many times and 
recalled once, or by being seen once and recalled many 
times? Which student, other things being equal, will 
recite best — one who reads a lesson through continuously 
three times, or the one who reads it once and recalls it 
twice without looking at the book, except occasionally ? 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS. 6t, 

What theoretical reason can you give one way or the 
other ? What facts of your own experience ? 

In voluntary memory attention and will are promi- 
nent factors, while in spontaneous recall the laws of as- 
sociation work almost uninfluenced by them. Can you 
tell just how you voluntarily recall what you wish to 
recall ? You can do this best, perhaps, in recalling a 
forgotten name. Just how does your will affect the 
laws of association so as to bring into your mind what 
you want ? Can you do anything more than attend to 
that in consciousness which is associated with what you 
want, or can you exercise direct control over what is not 
in consciousness ? Mention instances where the thought 
and perception of one associate of a forgotten thing will 
not bring it to mind but of several will. 

If you recalled all of your mental experiences of the 
past hour, how long would it take you ? Would it be 
an advantage to remember everything, or is forgetting a 
condition of a serviceable memory ? 

Notice how the dropping out of the less intense im- 
pressions leads to closer association between the more 
prominent, so that experiences separated hours or days 
from each other are thought of as occurring in immedi- 
ate succession; and also how this recalling intensifies 
and makes more intense those that are recalled. 

Are these individual differences as to classes of things 
best remembered as well as to kind of impressions and 
kind of associations. Illustrate. Can this difference 
often be accounted for by a difference in interest and at- 
tention ? This will not entirely account for the greater 
ease with which one learns a certain kind of facts after 



64 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

he has become used to learning them, even though he 
tried just as hard to learn others. If yon will tell why you 
can more easily learn about the location of several articles 
in a familiar room or places in a well-known city than 
in a strange room or city, you will get a suggestion of 
the reason. Can you not, in the first instances, from 
your knowledge of the room or city locate the things 
named after their relation to one or two things is given, 
both with reference to all other things in the room and 
with reference to each other; while in the second in- 
stance you must learn all of those relations ? When 
one has a large number of facts closely associated, 
is not a new fact of the same kind, when learned and 
associated with one or two of them, in effect, associated 
with all of them ? Again, when one has learned a great 
many facts of a certain kind, is he not likely to use im-. 
proved methods of associating facts of that kind which 
he wishes to learn ? 

3. Recognitimi, as already indicated, is the distinguish- 
ing characteristic of memory, and hence is very im^Dor- 
tant, though much of our most useful and familiar 
knowledge has not that element, or has it in a very 
slight degree. Oftentimes one's knowledge enables him 
to recognize correctly where he otherwise would not be 
able to do so; as, when one thinks: '''My friend told 
me he walked at the rate of ten miles an hour for four 
hours." Then: "No, that cannot be; it must have 
been four miles an hour for ten hours.'' Give other in- 
stances of correction or supplementing of memory by 
means of knowledge. Does knowledge ever lead to mis- 
takes in memory, as when telling about something- which 



THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS. 65 

is usually true, as what we did or said at a certain 
time? 

Give instances of the recall of facts that you are not 
able to locate either by means of your knowledge of 
such facts or by recalling the associations in which it 
was learned. Give also illustrations of instances in 
which you are not able to recall a name, the features of 
a person, or the facts in a lesson when you try to do so, 
but can recognize them as soon as given, seen, or recited 
by some one else. Which is more frequently lacking 
with you, the power to recognize or the power to recall ? 
Eeport any observations you have made upon others in 
this regard. Is it well to practice exact recognition, as 
recognizing the source of all facts — the book and au- 
thor, etc. Is it sufficient sometimes to know where cer- 
tain facts can be found instead of learning them, i.e., to 
recognize without recall ? 

Sum up the important conditions for remembering, 
state the means of improving memory, and write out 
your ideal of a good memory. 



66 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 



CHAPTER V. 

THiNKma. 

Nature and Divisions.— Notice what comes into your 
mind when such words as tree, chair, dog, horse, are 
seen, and what the words signify to you. The word 
horse, for instance, signifies (whatever mental image it 
calls up in your mind), not any particular horse, but a 
class of animals possessing certain qualities, whatever 
their color, size, or breed. That is, you have a general 
notion of what is signified by the word horse and repre- 
sented, perhaps, by a mental image of its form, and per- 
haps, also, its size and color. This general notion is 
called a concept, and the power or process of forming 
such a general notion is called conception. The mean- 
ing a word has to you is in every case your concept for 
that word. If you think horses are useful you are 
forming a judgment in regard to them. If you think 
that because they are useful they must be valuable, you 
are reasoning. TliinMng is a general term used to 
designate these three processes of conceiving, judging, 
and reasoning. It is specially distinguished from the 
processes we have been studying by being concerned 
with classes and qualiies instead of particular things 
and sensations. 



THINKING. 67 

CONCEPTION. 

Concepts and Percepts.— Perception and conception 
are similar and mutually dependent processes. Per- 
cepts are tlie material from which concepts are formed; 
and yet, as we have already found, the process of per- 
ceiving is not complete until the thing perceived is 
referred to a class of similar objects, or, in other words, 
recognized as an individual included in one of our con- 
cepts. Suppose a child who has seen but one horse and 
has learned to recognize it. Now that horse does not 
present the same appearance to him every time he sees 
it, for it is viewed from different positions, at different 
distances, and perhaps in different attitudes (standing 
running, lying down), yet his several percepts of it are 
sufficiently similar to enable him to recognize it as the 
same. The mental image of what is common in these 
percepts, and what distinguish it from any other per- 
cepts he may have, enables him to recognize the horse 
whenever he sees it. Now suppose another horse is 
brought before him. If it is very like it, he may think it 
is the same, unless the two are shown at once. If they 
are different and not too dissimilar he will still notice the 
similarity, and the same tendency to group and identify 
similar impressions that led him to identify his various 
percepts of the one animal will cause him to group the 
two or more similar animals into a class. He thus forms 
the concept of the group of animals that we designate 
by the word horse. This concept changes somewhat as 
the child sees more and different kinds of horses. His 
concept is enlarged so as to include more individuals, 



68 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

and it is made more definite, so that he is not likely to 
make the mistake which he perhaps made at first of call- 
ing a mule, a zebra, or possibly a hornless cow a " horse." 

The word now means to him not any particular horse 
but a class of animals of various sizes and colors, yet 
having certain general characteristics that distinguish 
them from any other class of animals. Although the 
process by which he comes to recognize the horse in 
various positions and with more than one sense is quite 
similar to that by which he comes to recognize a class 
of animals, though the individuals of the class differ in 
many respects, yet the difference in degree is so great 
that we say in one case he has a percept and in the 
other a concept. In the first an object must affect the 
senses, while in the second it need not. Illustrate this. 
In the first case it is a particular thing liaA^ing its own 
peculiar qualities that is perceived, while in the second 
it is a class of things having qualities peculiar to the 
class that is thought. My percept "pen" is the foun- 
tain-pen I now hold in my hand, having peculiarities 
that enable me to distinguish it from all others; my 
concept " pen," as I think it, is a class of small pointed 
objects used for making marks, whether wood, steel, 
quill, or gold. Give other illustrations of the difference 
between percepts and concepts. 

Concepts and Mental Images — A mental image being 
a reproduction of a sensation or percept by means of 
association, without direct sensory stimulation, differs 
from a concept in much the same way as does a percept, 
except in the one particular of sensory stimulation. 
Notice what mental images, if any, are formed when 



THINKING. 69 

names of common objects, as box, city, stones, flax, 
wagon, etc., are seen or heard. Notice whether the 
mental images have any definite size or color, also 
whether they are of particular things. Now think a 
moment as to whether these mental images are all that 
these words mean to you. It seems as if mental images 
of some kind are necessary to concepts, just as sensa- 
tions are necessary to percepts. In the less general con- 
cepts, such as tree, house, etc., the mental image is an 
important element of the concept, while in the more 
general concepts, such as plant, structure, etc., it is a less 
important element. With such concepts as organism, 
substance, etc., mental images are in little or no degree 
element of the concepts. Yet in order to form and hold 
such general notions with any degree of definiteness a 
mental image of some sensory experience is necessary 
with which the general characteristics of the class can 
be associated. With man this is usually an auditory or 
a visual symbol known as a word. Animals can doubt- 
less form concepts in which mental images are promi- 
nent elements; but the more general notions are not 
possible to them or to men without language. 

The part that mental images plays in the thinking of 
different individuals varies greatly, as you will readily 
see by noticing the definiteness of the mental images 
called up in the mind of different individuals by com- 
mon words. Some think almost wholly by means of 
words, others in mental pictures. 

Degrees of Definiteness of Concepts — In order to 
form concepts of sufficient definiteness for the practical 
purpose of distinguishing between the various classes of 



70 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

objects, it is merely necessary to discriminate that one 
class differs from another class. It is not necessary that 
one shall be able to state the points of difference that 
distinguish one class from others. Test some children 
only a few years old and see if they are not in some 
cases able to distinguish one class of objects from an- 
other readily and to state points of difference only after 
thought or not at all. Or in your own case, you per- 
haps can readily distinguish a German from a native of 
this country; but can you tell just in what way they 
differ ? Is a child learning to read ever able to distin- 
guish between two words as wholes but unable to tell in 
what way they differ ? In your own case, can you tell 
the exact difference between the second and the fourth 
letters of the alphabet and the letter p without looking 
at them ? Give other examples. 

Where one can generally distinguish objects of a class 
from objects of another class, or knows what kind of 
objects is denoted by a word but is unable to state the 
qualities that distinguish that class from others, his con- 
cept may be said to be in the first stage of definiteness. 
Where he can name one or more of the distinguishing 
characteristics we may say that his concept is in the 
second stage of definiteness. If he can name the charac- 
teristics common to all of the objects of the class and not 
possessed by objects of other classes, or, in other words, 
state the distinguishing characteristics, his concept is 
of the third degree of definiteness, or perfect. This is 
true only when he can give a scientific definition. 
Would the ability to recognize and state the difference 
between a white oak and a hickory-tree mean that one 



THINKING. 71 

haa a perfect concept of a hickory ? Would it neces- 
sarily follow that he could distinguish a hickory from 
a pecan tree ? Why ? Of what degree is your concept 
tree ? Parallelogram ? Name three of your concepts 
of each degree of definiteness. 

Extension and Intension of Concepts. — Which in- 
cludes the most things, figure or parallelogram, oblong 
or square, animal or vertebrate, mammal or horse ? 
Which of these has the most distinguishing qualities ? 
Notice in giving a definition that besides naming the 
distinguishing qualities of the class we indicate that it 
is a member of another larger class; e.g., a parallelogram 
is a four-sided plane figure whose opposite sides are par- 
allel. That is, we affirm it has all the characteristics of 
the figure and three more that distinguish it from other 
figures. In general, what may we say is the relation be- 
tween the number of things or the extension of a general 
term, and the number of distinguishing qualities or its 
intension f Give illustrations. We also speak of the 
extent of a general term, and the content of the term to 
any individual; and we speak of what things may be 
denoted by a word, and what qualities are connoted by 
it. This is illustrated by the questions, "What people 
are called teachers;" "What does it mean to be a 
teacher ? " ^ Give other illustrations. Are proper nouns 
ever used except to connote ? 

Modification of Concepts. — In forming concepts 
something of the same relation between extension and 
intension may be noted as exists between less and more 
general classes. For example, a little girl two and one 
half years old had seen radishes and learned the name 



72 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

for them. They were red, and when some white ones 
were placed upon the table she asked what they were. 
When she understood that they were radishes also, her 
concept was evidently broadened as to number and vari- 
ety of things included, but the distinguishing charac- 
teristics were for her decreased. Grive other examples. 
Notice that the decrease in the number of characteris- 
tics recognized as distinctive means, not that the concept 
is less perfect, but that it is more definite and precise. 
Sometimes a distinguishing characteristic is" added, and 
thus the number of things to which the term can be 
applied is decreased, as when one learns that the word 
square can be applied only to plane figures. Illustrate 
further. 

All of our concepts that have not reached the third 
stage of perfectness are subject to change with increased 
acquisition and experience. Have your concepts been 
modified by your study of psychology ? What ones, and 
in what way ? Without new experience or special study 
are concepts ever modified by the way in which we hear 
or see words used ? Illustrate. In what proportion of 
cases has your knowledge of the meaning of words been 
gained by direct association with experience ? By 
means of a definition or description ? By the way in 
which you have heard the words used in connection 
with words you already understood ? Is there any other 
way of modifying concepts than these three ? 

Note this point and illustrate it : To be able to name 
all the qualities of a class, or, in other words, to give a 
perfect definition, does not mean that the concept is 
perfect unless the individual is also able to recognize 



THINKING. 73 

those qualities in the objects he sees. In which case will 
it most likely be perfect — where he has learned the defi- 
nition, or where he has made it himself ? Which is the 
more valuable — to be able to give the definition of a 
prime number, or to be able to recognize it instantly ? 
to define a verb, or to recognize one ? Is a concept per- 
fect until one is able both to recognize and name the 
qualities that distinguish it ? Which do you think 
should usually be gained first — the power to recognize, 
or to define ? 

Analysis, Abstraction and Abstract Concepts.— I 
look at the book before me and, disregarding all other 
qualities, fix my attention upon its color. I look at a 
flower and notice its color, its shape, the number and 
position of its stamens, its odor, without thinking of the 
other qualities when attending to the one. I perhaps 
compare the color of the flower with that of the book 
and other objects. Now this singling out for notice 
one of several qualities or the parts of a whole is analy- 
sis, and the thinking of the quality as abstracted from 
or unconnected with those with which it was perceived 
is abstraction. Give other examples of analysis. Bet- 
ter take some object before you. Notice in doing so 
how attention is involved in the process. After having 
seen a number of red objects I can form a mental image 
of the quality redness without thinking of any particu- 
lar red object. This is an abstract concept. Such an 
abstract concept as this, being representable, could be 
formed without language, while the more abstract con- 
cept color would not easily be formed without a word to 
serve as a mental image, and such a one as virtue proba- 



74 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

bly could not be formed with any degree of definiteness 
without a word with which the quality could be associ- 
ated. State which of the following are class and which 
are abstract concepts: building, liquid, swiftness, num- 
ber, honesty, machine. Name others of each kind. 

Can you remember any difficulty you had when a 
child in forming abstract concepts, e.g., in determining 
the meaning of the word " large " by the way people 
used it ? Have you observed any such difficulty in the 
case of children ? In pupils in school, e.g., difficulty in 
forming a sufficiently distinct concept of divisor, divi- 
dend, and quotient to clearly understand principles in 
which those terms are used abstractly ? Give other ex- 
amples from your experience and observations in the 
school-room. 

The distinction between class and abstract concepts is 
that the one is of things, the other of qualities. A very 
general class concept is abstract, however, in the sense 
that it is not concrete — is far removed from sense per- 
ception. To be able to think of dogs or trees without 
thinking of any particular dog or tree in any particular 
place involves abstraction just as much as thinking of 
white without thinking of any particular white thing. 

In forming abstract concepts, analysis and abstraction 
are necessary from the first; but in the early stages of 
forming class concepts they are not. Could one form 
class concepts of the second stage of definiteness with- 
out performing acts of analysis and abstraction ? Why ? 

Classification. — The formation of concepts is group- 
ing together a class of similar objects, or the formation 
of a class, while perception is the placing of an object 



THINKING. 75 

in a class already formed; lience botli processes involve 
classification. 

As a child^s concepts become more definite lie per- 
ceives or classifies more accurately, for he has a better 
idea of the distinguishing qualities of the chiss, and dis- 
criminates more perfectly the qualities of the objects 
perceived. Where one gradually in the course of experi- 
ence forms concepts of classes of objects, as of different 
kinds of apples, we do not generally designate the pro- 
cess by the term classification; but when a number of 
objects are examined, we usually try to arrange them in 
groups on some basis of similarity. This rapid and in- 
tentional grouping of the objects according to certain 
common characteristics is called classification, though it 
is in no way essentially different from the gradual and 
incidental grouping made by the child in forming class 
concepts. Classify the following lines : 







ITotice that to make a logical classification you must 
choose some one characteristic as a basis, and classify 
all the lines according to that basis. Can you make 
more than one logical classification of these lines ? 
Classify all the houses in a city in several different 
ways. Do the same for the things in your room. 



7^ INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

Notice that in doing so you must analyze sufficiently to 
note similarities that serve as the basis of classification, 
and that you must overlook many differences and note 
certain similarities very carefully. Which is the more 
difficult— to take a heterogeneous lot of things and de- 
cide upon a basis for classifying them, or to put objects 
in a class the characteristics of which have already been 
determined ? Why ? Which do you do in parsing; in 
classifying plants ? Which was done by those forming 
the sciences of grammar and botany ? 

Since objects possess many qualities, it is evident that 
after one has formed numerous class and abstract con- 
cepts, he can classify an object in various ways, accord- 
ing as one quality or another is taken as the basis of 
classification. I can classify my pen as an instrument, 
as a metal, as a pointed thing, as a small thing, etc. 
Classify a piece of paper in as many different ways as 
you can; a piece of meat. In theso cases yow are put- 
ting objects in classes already formed, ^nd, in general, 
your practical needs, decide how you shall classify 
things; thus, wood is a thing that will burn, that will 
float, that will bear a weight, according as I need warmth, 
.1 means of crossing a river or a support for some heavy 
object. Illustrate further. 

Generalization — I look at a number of script letters 
and make the general statement that right curves are 
used in all of them. I find in multipiying a^ by a' that 
the exponents are added, and make the general state- 
ment that in all multiplication of similar quantities the 
exponents are added. To make these statements I must 
generalize. The power, then, to detect similarity com- 



THINKING. 77 

mon to a group of objects or to form a new class with 
the characteristics observed in one or a few individuals 
is generalization. Give examples. 

A moments thought will show that in order to form 
concepts or classes we must generalize. For instance, 
when I see that all the lines given above have the quality 
of direction — some horizontal, some vertical, and others 
slanting, I am generalizing. Varied experience with 
objects leads one gradually to a knowledge of common 
characteristics, but we do not usually speak of the pro- 
cess as generalization unless it is performed intentionally 
upon examining a number of objects. 

When a class is formed from an examination of but 
one or a few specimens, by picking out the essential 
characteristics of those objects and making them a basis 
of classification, the process is slightly different. G-ive 
examples of where that is done in this book, also other 
illustrations. Eecall, for instance, how many examples 
of a certain kind in arithmetic are required before 
children can discover the essential characteristics and 
arrive at the general principle, or the number of verbs 
that must be given before they get the general idea of 
the class verbs. Notice also how many particular illus- 
trations are necessary before you get the general notion 
of what generalization is. This last form of generali- 
zation, as will be seen later, is practically the same as 
induction. 

JUDGMEKT. 

I say that lead is heavy or is a metal, or that this 
object in my hand is lead. In the first case I assert 



78 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

that a certain quality is characteristic of lead, in the 
second, that the class of things known as lead belongs 
to the class of things known as metal, and in the third 
case that this particular object belongs to the class of 
things called lead. Give examples parallel to the 
above, noting what is being compared in each case — 
objects, classes, or qualities. Every one of these state- 
ments expresses a judgment in the form of a proposi- 
tion. All perceiving and all thinking involve judg- 
ments, either positive or negative; and if the judgment 
is explicitly stated it must be in the form of a proposi- 
tion having a subject and a predicate. In ordinary per- 
ceiving and thinking the judgment it made so quickly 
that we do not realize that there is any such act of the 
mind, but whenever there is doubt as to the nature of 
the object perceived, the relation between two classes of 
objects, or as to the qualities of any class, the act of 
judging is distinctly present. Give examples. 

Basis and Accuracy of Judgments.— I look at two 
lines and say that one is longer than the other. The 
basis is the perce^^ts of the two lines, and the accuracy 
depends (1) upon my general power of discriminating 
differences, (2) upon my special power of visual discrim- 
ination, (3) upon the amount of practice I have had in 
judgiug the extension of lines of that length in that 
position. If I say this line is longer than the one I 
made yesterday, the basis is my percept of one line and 
my mental image of the other. If I say the line I drew 
the day before yesterday was longer than the one I drew 
yesterday, the basis is my mental images of the two 



THINKING. 79 

lines. In these cases, upon what does the accuracy de- 
pend ? Give other examples. 

Give examples in which a particular object, present 
or not present, is said to belong to a class, samples of 
which are and are not present, stating the basis of the 
judgment and upon what its accuracy depends, e.g., 
this is an oak-leaf : object, present ; basis, percept of 
the leaf and concept of an oak-leaf; accuracy, dependent 
upon correctness of percept and concept, and ability to 
correctly compare the two. Do the same where one class 
is judged to be included in another class. 

What is the basis and what determines the accuracy 
of judging of qualities, as: this cloth is a bright red; 
this leaf is parallel-veined; this child perceives well; 
these children are attentive ? Does it follow that be- 
cause a person has good judgment in regard to some 
things that he has in regard to all ? Illustrate and give 
reasons. 

Make some general statement as to the relation of 
number and definiteness of concepts of a certain kind 
to judgments of certain facts. 

The relation of feeling to judgments should also be 
noted. Do feelings influence the individual judgments 
of those who observe articles at a fair; listen to a decla- 
mation contest; or the report of a trial ? Give other 
illustrations and make a generalization. 

EEASOl^IN'G. 

Nature and Kinds — " That is a good apple for it is 
red and mellow." " Corn will be high-priced because it 



8o INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

is scarce/^ In these propositions one thing is asserted 
to be true, not because the truth is directly cognized, 
but because something else is known to be true. In alj 
such cases reasoning is involved to some extent. Ana- 
lyzing these propositions, we find that they each imply 
three distinct judgments, viz. : 

This is a red and mellow apple; 

All red and mellow apples are good; 

Therefore this apple is good; 

Corn is scarce this year; 

Whenever corn is scarce the price is high; 

Therefore the price will be high this year. 

We are constantly making such inferences as these, 
and in every case such inferred judgments may be 
analyzed into three judgments, one of which is the ex- 
pression of a general truth. 

Make the analysis in several instances, pointing out the 
general truth. Oftentimes in making such inferences 
we are not conscious that we are inferring, as when we 
say to a child, " That stove will burn you if you touch 
it;" Yet we are asserting what we do not immediately 
perceive. By experience we have come to a knowledge 
of a certain general truth (viz., that a hot stove will burn) 
that we expect will be verified in this particular instance. 
If the general truth is consciously recognized in mciking 
such inference tve are reasoning. 

In the examples given above, a general truth is 
already known, and it is applied in a particular case so 
as to give us knowledge that we cannot directly cognize 
about that particular thing. This is known as deduc- 
raesoning, the truth of the last proposition being 



THINKING. 8i 

deduced from the general truth and what is known of 
the particular thing in regard to which the inference is 
made. Point this out in several examples. 

There is another kind of reasoning which is illustrated 
by this statement of a boy: "I have found out this year 
that melons are ripe when the curl is dead." Analyzed, 
this statement would be: All melons that I have ob- 
served with the curl dead were ripe. What is true of 
those I have observed is true of all melons. There- 
fore all melons with a dead curl are ripe. In such 
cases as this, where truths are observed in regard to 
particular things, which things are thought to be typi- 
cal of this class in this respect, so that the same truth 
may be affirmed of all objects of the class, we have an 
example of what is known as induction or inductive 
reasoning. In this kind of reasoning the general truth, 
instead of being the basis of the inference, is the conclu- 
sion or what is inferred. Give examples of inductions 
and analyze them into three propositions. 

Sources of General Truths. — In adult life most of 
our reasoning is deductive, and hence dependent upon 
the large number of general truths that we know — 
principles, maxims, laws, etc. A very large proportion 
of these general truths has been gained by induction; 
not many of them, perhaps, by a distinct act of induc- 
tive reasoning, but gradually gained by experience. 
Thus a boy in the period between eighteen months and 
two years frequently placed toys in a box turned upside 
down, and it was only gradually that he came to know 
the general truth that all unsupported bodies fall. 
Give other illustrations of general truths acquired grad- 



82 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

ually by experience, and also of some you have gained 
quickly by a distinct act of inductive reasoning. State 
also some general truths that you have accepted upon 
the authority of some one else. Can you think of any 
other source of general truths ? If not, how many 
sources of general truths are there for those that have 
become known to mankind in general ? How many for 
each individual. 

There are certain natural tendencies of the mind to 
act in certain ways so strong that they have sometimes 
been designated as innate or intuitive truths, but there 
is no reason to believe that they exist as truths previous 
to experience. Of these there is one, irresistible and 
universal, which lies at the basis of all inference and 
reasoning. It is that what is true of one thing is true 
of others like it under like conditions. This is the 
basis of the deduction that what is true of a class of 
objects is true of an object like those objects, i.e., of the 
same class; and of the induction that what is true of a 
particular object is true of other objects like it, i.e., of 
the same class. Mistakes in reasoning are made, not in 
applying this truth, but in deciding that an object is a 
member of the class or that an object is typical of a 
class. 

Reasoning and Inference.— Animals and young chil- 
dren may infer from one particular to another without 
analyzing to find the basis of inference and the general 
truth involved, but this is not reasoning in the stricter 
sense of the word. The father of a two-year-old girl 
blew upon one of two little dolls he had just given her, 
making a noise. She at once held up the other for him 



THINKING. 83 

to blow upon, eyidently inferring that if blown upon 
the same effect would be produced. This was a mere 
inference based upon experience. In reasoning the 
complex whole is consciously analyzed, and what one has 
found true of objects possessing certain characteristics 
is said to be true of all objects possessing those charac- 
teristics, and that truth is affirmed of any object found 
to possess such characteristics. 

In the above example, analysis of the complex thing, 
the doll, would show it to be provided with an opening 
of such a form that when blown upon it always produced 
a sound, and the induction could be made that all dolls 
having such an opening would sound when blown upon. 
When the second doll is examined, if the same kind of 
an opening is found the deduction could be made that 
this doll, if blown upon, will sound. (In the above in- 
stance there was no such opening in the second doll.) 
Give other examples of inferences by children and ani- 
mals. 

I could infer from experience that upon a cold morn- 
ing a piece of iron will feel colder than a piece of wood 
of the same temperature, or I could reach the same con- 
clusion by reasoning in this way • " Of cold bodies, good 
conductors of heat feel the colder; iron is a better con- 
ductor of heat than wood, therefore it will feel the colder." 

If the water in a glass pitcher freezes solid, what will 
be the result ? Give a reasoned answer. 

AVhen a cat has learned to open a screen door by put- 
ting its paw on the latch, has it performed an act of 
reasoning ? What would be necessary to make it an 
act of reasoning? 



84 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

Give other examples of inferences, and show when" 
they are reasoned, and when they are mere inferences 
based on experience. Note that there are all gradations, 
from a simple inferred judgment to the most exact rea- 
soning, the difference being largely an increased con- 
sciousness of the general truth and intentional analysis 
to find the exact element to which it applies. 

Relation of Analysis and Synthesis to Reasoning. 
— Primarily analysis means separating into parts, and 
synthesis putting together. Give examples of mental 
processes of these two kinds. Since in induction the 
particular things and conditions must be analyzed in 
order to determine what ones are the basis of the uni- 
versal affirmation, that kind of reasoning has been called 
analytic. In deductive reasoning two things are put 
together, and what is known to be true of one is affirmed 
of the other; hence that kind of reasoning is often called 
synthetic. In reality, however, the words analytic and 
synthetic should not be applied to reasoning at all. 
Analysis is necessary in induction, but its function is 
ended when a thing is separated into its parts; and the 
inference that what is true of the thing possessing these 
characteristics will be true of all things possessing those 
characteristics, is an induction, and, properly speaking, 
analysis has nothing to do with the reasoning phase of 
the process. Analysis plays almost as essential a part 
in deductive reasoning as in inductive, for the object 
must be analyzed to determine whether it possesses the 
characteristics of the class; hence calling inductive rea- 
soning analytic reasoning tends only to produce confu- 
sion, with no corresponding advantage. Besides, analy- 



THINKING. 85 

sis and synthesis are involved in all mental operations, 
and is only a little more active and conscious in reason- 
ing, and in one kind not much more than in the other. 
Compare analysis and synthesis with association and dis- 
association, pointing out the parallelisms. 

To illustrate the inductive method of reasoning and 
of presenting a subject, let us solve this problem. Find 
ii method of determining the square of the sum of two 
quantities. Take the example (a-\-dY: {a -{- by = 
{ci -{-i) X (a -\- b) — a' -\- 2ab + b\ I analyze the an- 
swer and find that I have in it the square of a, the square 
of b, and two times the product of a and b, and that 
they all have the plus sign. I know this to be the true 
result for these two quantities, and I might find it true 
for a number of others, and so conclude that it would 
be true for all quantities. I could not be sure of it, 
however, without some better basis for my conclusion 
than the fact that it is true in a number of cases. I 
therefore examine the problem more closely. I see that 
the first two terms must be multiplied together, and that 
the result will be the square, since they are the same, 
no matter what the numbers or quantities in the prob- 
lem are. I perceive the same for the second term. I 
perceive also that the first term must be multiplied by 
the second and the second by the first, and hence that I 
must have, no matter what quantities are used, the 
square of the first term, the square of the second, the 
product of the first by the second, and the second by 
the first. I see also that since the sign of both terms is 
plus, all the quantities of the product will have plus 
signs. Thus, by analyzing the problem and applying 



86 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

the definitions of the terms sum, square, etc. and cer- 
tain general principles already learned about them, I 
am able to decide with absolute certainty that what has 
been found true of these two quantities will be true for 
any and all quantities. We might have said at-the be- 
ginning, let a and d represent aiiy two quantities, but 
we cannot do this unless we can see that in all essential 
characteristics they are like all other quantities, so that 
they may represent them. 

In deduction we must analyze the statement and apply 
it to the particular problem. Thus in the example 
[{x^ + y"") + (4fl^^ — Z>' + c')Y I have two quantities, and 
they are connected by the plus sign, so I have the sum of 
two quantities, and this is the kind of problem to which 
the theorem applies. IsTow the theorem says that I will 
have the square of the first, that would be {x^ -j- y^y ; 
the square of the second, that would be (4«^ —b^-\- c^Y; 
twice the product of the first by the second: the product 
would be (x^ + y"^) (Aa^ — d"^ -{- c*), and twice that would 
be 2(x^ + ?/°) (4<2° — Z>' + c*); and the signs are all plus, 
so my answer must be {x^ -j- y'^Y -\- (4a'' — i^ -}- c'Y + 
2(ic' + y"") {^a^ - 2>' + c'). 

The rigidly inductive method is shown in the above 
to involve almost as much knowledge of definition and 
general principles as the deductive, and the deductive 
to require almost as close analysis as the inductive; and 
so the two kinds of reasoning are very similar and closely 
related in all inferences. 

In teaching, when particulars are given the pupil 
and he is led from an examination of one or more of 
these to the general truth, the method is said to be in- 



THINKING. 87 

ductive, while if the general truth is given first and 
then applied to particulars, the method is called deduc- 
tiye. Illustrate both methods in the teaching of topics 
in several common-school subjects. 

Kinds of Induction. — Inductive reasoning in mathe- 
matics is more closely related to deduction and the con- 
clusions more certain than in the natural sciences, for 
the concepts in mathematics are not gained directly 
from observation (e.g., square, right angle, circle), but 
are made by putting together in the definition certain 
simple characteristics that are already known, while in 
the natural sciences the essential characteristics of any 
class of things are determined by observation and experi- 
ment, and may be changed at any time by examination 
of other specimens. F.or example, the views of scien- 
tists as to what constitutes the essential characteristics 
of plants and animals have been changed several times. 
It is comparatively easy to know whether a truth in re- 
gard to a particular example is true for the whole class 
of figures or problems in mathematics, for you can 
know whether the characteristics upon which the truth 
depends are the characteristics of the class (though 
pupils in geometry do sometimes make the mistake of 
trying to prove for all triangles what is true only of 
equilateral or right-angled triangles). In natural sci- 
ence, however, one cannot readily determine whether 
what is true of one plant, animal, or piece of wood or 
stone is true of all of the same class. If it is found true 
for many and lacking in none, the probability increases. 
The real basis of assurance in all such cases is a belief 
in the uniformity of nature, so that the same elements 



88 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

and forces will always under the same conditions pro- 
duce the same results. If we are sure of the elements, 
forces, and the conditions, we have no doubt as to the 
conclusions. Number of instances, however great, can 
never give that assurance unless they cover all possible 
variations of conditions. A very few instances, under 
varying conditions, may warrant more positive induc- 
tions than a large number under one condition. 

The certainty is also very much increased if the 
fact can be connected with some law of more general 
application. Thus the induction that a certain kind of 
soil will always produce wheat better than another kind 
is made very much more certain by finding that it con- 
tains a substance (j)hosphorus) needed in the wheat that 
is not found in the other soil. The certainty that winds 
or ocean currents will continue to move as they have in 
years past depends not so much upon the number of 
years they have been observed to move in that direction, 
as upon the determination of the laws governing their 
movement. 

Where there are many conditions and it is impossible 
to note the effect of the presence or absence of that ele- 
ment in individual cases, it is necessary to use statistics 
to discover how much the general results differ with 
variations in certain elements; as, determining the effect 
of city life upon physical development, or the effect of 
education upon memory. 

"Where two classes of objects are similar in a few or 
many respects the induction is often made that they are 
similar in other respects. Thus a nervous impulse and an 
electric current are similar in many respects, and at one 



THINKING. 89 

time they were thoiiglit to be identical, but the discovery 
of the great difference in their rate of transmission caused 
that idea to be abandoned. Now since light and electric- 
ity have been proven to travel at nearly the same rate, and 
to obey the same laws of reflection and refraction, it is be- 
lieved that they are alike in other respects, and perhaps 
identical in their essential nature. This is reasoning by 
analogy, and is not a very accurate mode of reasoning, 
except when the things are very similar and the charac- 
teristics essential ones. Thus, though there are many 
points of similarity between a current of water and a 
" current '' of electricity, a physicist would hesitate to 
affirm that what is true of one will be true of the other. 
The reasoning of unscientific people, however, is very 
frequently in the nature of analogy, certain characteris- 
tics being observed and others inferred to be present be- 
cause they were in some other individual of the class, 
or are in some other class; e.g., "this man is from the 
same state, and has the same-shaped nose as the man 
who swindled me last year, so he also is a swindler.^' 

Conditions Favoring Success and Accuracy in Rea- 
soning. — In our general discussion we found that analy- 
sis is one of the important things distinguishing reason- 
ing from mere inferences, and we have just now found 
that it is necessary to success in both inductive and de- 
ductive reasoning. A great number and variety of 
examples are favorable to the perception of the charac- 
teristics and conditions upon which an induction is 
based, but often a single case thoroughly analyzed gives 
a more reliable induction than a hundred uncritical ob- 
servations. In mathematics a single case is generally 



90 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

all that is needed, while in natural sciences there must 
be enough to determine the truth under all possible 
conditions and to allow for errors of observation. 

We see also that a knowledge of the characteristics of 
the things being considered (a clear concept of them, 
the power to define them scientifically) and a knowl- 
edge of the general truths about them are necessary in 
reasoning. We may say, then, that the more clear con- 
cepts one has and the more general truths with which 
he is familiar, the greater his power to reason, other 
things being equal; and his power to reason on any par- 
ticular subject will depend upon the number and defi- 
niteness of his concepts of all things included in and 
connected with it. Do you know of individuals who are 
good reasoners upon some subjects and not upon others ? 
If so, does this help to explain such instances ? Can 
the supposed inability of children to reason correctly be 
accounted for in a similar way ? Explain. 

Will all conditions favoring accuracy of judgment 
favor accurate reasoning ? Why ? 

Add to the above the power of attention to follow 
closely a line of thought, and we have the main qualities 
required in following a chain of reasoning given by 
another. 

To reason independently with success requires all 
these and more. One must be able to analyze and have 
the sagacity to seize upon the right characteristic — to 
conceive of the thing in the right way. We found that 
things may be classed in a variety of ways according to 
the characteristic made the basis of the classification. 
In the instance of reasoning about wood and iron, they 



THINKING. 91 

might have been classed in various ways, but only when 
they were conceived of and classed as conductors of 
heat could there be any successful reasoning upon the 
question to be solved. When this was done any one 
who was familiar with the general truth that iron is a 
better conductor than wood could readily reach the 
conclusion. Give other illustrations. 

Another power, and one upon which the preceding is 
partially dependent, is necessary. If, when one thing is 
presented we had no tendency to think of other things 
like it, independent reasoning would be impossible, how- 
ever much knowledge one might have. A tendency to 
association by similarity is, then, one of the most im- 
portant conditions of successful independent reason- 
ing. Can you give any observation illustrating this 
point ? 

A tendency to associate by similarity, though a neces- 
sary condition of reasoning, does not insure accuracy. 
When the similar thing is called up there must be abil- 
ity to discern whether the similarity is an essential 
characteristic about which some general truth is known, 
otherwise analogies may be taken for proofs. Again, 
one who associates by similarity may note similarities 
and overlook differences equally important. He is es- 
pecially apt to omit negative cases, e.g., he observes that 
it storms when the moon changes, but fails to note the 
cases when it does not. In order to make an accurate 
induction he must record all cases, both positive and 
negative. Many false opinions upon various subjects 
are formed because of failure to do this. Scientific 
men, when they have a theory to prove, often continu- 



92 • INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

ally find evidence of its truth and none of its falsity. 
Why? 

A tendency to associate by similarity, however, is not 
even a characteristic peculiar to the reasoning type of 
mind. It is equally characteristic of the poet. With 
the poet, however, it is usually a subtle analogy of things 
as wholes, while with the reasoner it is a similarity in 
the elements discovered by analysis. Verify this by 
examining a form and an argument or demonstration. 



HABIT. 93 



CHAPTER VL 

HABIT. 

Notice in regard to anything that you have done fre- 
quently, and see if you cannot do it more easily, and with 
less thought, also, if you do not do it in the same way 
every time. Observe the same in regard to others, their 
peculiarities in sitting, standing, walking, gesturing, 
performing duties that they have frequently performed. 
Report specific examples of what you have observed in 
this line. Are you not able sometimes to recognize 
a friend by some such little peculiarity? Have you 
also noticed that some persons always observe cer- 
tain things rather than others, always think of certain 
things under certain circumstances (as a story, when a 
certain subject is mentioned), and always express them- 
selves in a characteristic way ? If you could observe as 
well would you not find the mental characteristics of an 
individual just as marked as the physical movements? 
— his thoughts just as characteristic as his penmanship ? 
Is it not true that each one has his own peculiar habits 
of perceiving, imagining, associating, remembering, con- 
ceiving, judging, reasoning, feeling, and willing ? Illus- 
trate from observations upon persons or upon the style of 



94 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

different authors. In this chapter we are to inquire into 
some of the principal causes of these peculiarities. 

Nature of Habit. — You have already noted the fact 
that an act often repeated is more easily performed. 
Suppose that this were not the case, would any educa- 
tion whatever be possible, or would one always remain in 
the infant stage both as to movement and intelligence ? 
As it is, however, every movement and every thou{;ht, 
every physical and mental activity, leaves an effect in the 
way of an increased power and an increased tendency to 
perform that act. In the muscles there is also an in- 
crease in size, and in the brain, which is the organ of 
mental activities, the same is perhaps true, to a less ex- 
tent. In both thinking and movement, nervous im- 
pulses pass from one part of the brain to another, and 
along the spinal cord and a nerve to the muscles. When- 
ever a movement is made a certain portion of the brain 
is active, an impulse passes along a certain course to 
certain muscles, which are contracted. The result is, 
that when the same conditions recur there is a tendency 
for the same parts of the brain to become active and for 
the impulse to take the same course. Point out the 
analogy between this and the flowing of water; also give 
other analogies. In the case of the nervous and muscu- 
lar system, the activity u^es up energy which comes 
from the tearing down of the complex chemical com- 
pounds in the brain and muscles. The increased power 
to perform the act comes from the building up that 
takes place afterwards in excess of what has been torn 
down. The increased tendency comes from this fact, 
and probably also from the fact that the resistance to the 



HABIT. 95 

passage of the nervous impulse along that "path" is 
less. The increase of power through exercise depends 
upon the first; and the more exercise the greater the in- 
crease in power, providing the building up is in excess 
of the tearing down. This will be the case when 
enough and not too much exercise is taken at one time 
and a sufficient interval of rest follows. Illustrate, then, 
the importance of each individual determining for him- 
self the amount and the kind of exercise most favorable 
for him to develop in the highest degree his physical 
and mental powers. 

Habit depends partly upon the development of the 
nerve cells and muscles concerned in the activity and 
partly upon the decrease in resistance to the passage of 
a nervous impulse along a certain path, so that when 
the impulse is originated again under the same condi- 
tions it takes the same course. The question arises. 
How many times must an act be performed before it 
becomes a habit ? Is it a habit after one performance ? 
Is it a habit when* the tendency to do that act under 
those conditions is greater than the tendency to do any 
other ? or is it not until the act is performed uncon- 
sciously ? In one sense the habit is begun with the first 
performance, and when the tendency to do that act has 
become stronger than the tendency to do any other act 
it may very properly be called a habit; yet common usage 
would probably restrict the term to acts that can be per- 
formed with little or no direction by consciousness. 

Laws Governing the Formation of Habits. — What 
statement can you make in regard to the number of rep- 
etitions of an act upon the resulting power and tendency 



96 



INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 



to perform it ? Analyze your statement very carefully 
to see just what it means and to make it accurate. 
State and illustrate the law in regard to the effect of in- 
creased intensity upon the tendency. By intensity is 
meant emotional accompaniment of the act or degree of 
attention to it. 

Is the tendency developed most strongly and made 
most permanent by regular or by irregular repetitions of 
the act ? Illustrate and give reasons why it should be 
so. Indicate some of the practical applications of the 
truth you state to exercise study. 

What effect does recent performance of an act have 
upon the tendency to perform it ? Illustrate. 

Other things being equal, does the first performance 
of an act produce greater or less eifect than any subse- 
quent performance ? Illustrate. Does the third pro- 
duce more or less effect than the thirtieth ? Which of 
the following diagrams would best express the truth in 
regard to the increase of tendency to perform acts with 
additional repetitions ? 




Is it easier to form a new habit or change an old one ; 
e.g., to learn a new word or to change the pronuncia- 
tion of one already learned ? Give other illustrations. 



HABIT. 97 

How many times, other things being equal, must a word 
be pronounced correctly after being spoken incorrectly 
ten times before the tendency to pronounce it one way is 
equal to that to pronounce it the other way ? How many 
more times before the tendency becomes as great to pro- 
nounce rightly as it was to pronounce wrongly ? What 
is the practical application of this to ourselves and in 
teaching ? Can yon give any example where you seem to 
have changed a habit with but few repetitions ? Have 
you ever, in such instances, long after the change, per- 
formed the former act upon occasion, e.g., take a cer- 
tain route or go to a certain part of a room for an article ? 
Consciousness and will are important factors in changing 
habits, adding to the intensity of the new act; but if 
they are occupied with something else the old habit will 
manifest its existence even after a long disappearance. 
What practical suggestion, then, do you get in regard to 
first impressions and forming of habits ? Have you 
ever spent more time in correcting a mistaken notion 
than in learning a new one ? How much time is wasted 
in our schools in correcting wrong ideas and ways of 
doing things ? 

Effects of Habit. — As was indicated in the introduc- 
tory discussion, the result of habit is a decrease in the 
consciousness accompanying the performance of an act 
and greater rapidity and ease in doing it. Give specific 
examples illustrating each one of these points. In 
regard to the last two points, decide and give your 
evidence as to whether saving of time generally or uni- 
versally means saving of energy, and vice versa. 

We now inquire as to the source of the saving of time, 



98 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

Does an act or task require a shorter time with repeti- 
tions merely becanse the nervous impulse moves more 
rapidly as the resistance decreases, so that the movement 
or mental act takes place more quickly ? In answering, 
notice whether in doing a new manual task you ever 
waste time more than in an habitual one by stopping 
between motion^ or by making movements that do 
not contribute to the doing of the task. Which of 
these is the most important factor in the saving of 
time in habitual acts, particularly with persons who 
became expert and rapid w^orkers ? In purely mental 
tasks is there a similar saving of time through a better 
direction of attention? Illustrate. For an experi- 
mental illustration turn to a new page and, giving a 
value of one to consonants and of two to vowels, add the 
first twenty letters and multiply the sum by the sum of 
the fii'^t two. Eepeat the experiment five times, having 
some one time you accurately each time. Also try it five 
times, taking a new page each time. Indicate as nearly 
as you can the principal reasons why you can do it 
quicker the fifth time. 

Analyze in a similar way to discover why energy is 
saved in performing a task after it has become habitual. 
Of the various factors, is decrease in the voluntary at- 
tention necessary to perform the task a minor or an 
important factor ? 

Does habit usually increase the power and tendency 
to do similar as well as the same kind of acts and tasks ? 
Illustrate. Use the second part of the above experiment 
as one illustration; also try the experiment giving other 
values to the letters. Theoretically, in §o far as the same 



HABIT. 99 

parts of the muscular and nervous system are used, in- 
creased powers would have been developed, and this would 
of itself probably produce some tendency to activity. The 
course of nervous impulses would, however, probably be 
somewhat different in the similar acts from what they 
are in the same. This effect of a habit upon other pro- 
cesses than the ones performed may be spoken of as a 
tendency of a special habit to become general. . Illus- 
trate this tendency and discuss the wider effects of 
forming habits of punctuality, order, neatness, and accu- 
racy in school. Also of the extent to which forming- 
habits of attention, observation, and reasoning in one line 
helps in others. What is the comparative value of the 
habits gained in school to the knowledge gained there ? 

Intellectual Development and Habit — If you work a 
new problem in mathematics you develop your mathe- 
matical power. Now suppose you continue working 
the same problem over and over, will you continue to 
get intellectual development ? If you work problems 
similar to this you will get intellectual development, 
but after you have worked hundreds or thousands of 
problems involving that principle, will you continue to 
develop mathematical ability by working such problems ? 
Illustrate from industrial business and professional life 
the effect of confining one^s self to a regular round year 
after year. 

New experiences or the finding of new relations are 
necessary to intellectual development, the one involv- 
ing the activity of new parts, the other new paths for 
nervous impulses. Habit can give neither of these, 
but can only preserve what has been gained, make it a 



loo INDU-CTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

permanent part of oner's self, and prevent the loss of 
time and energy in the various activities. The ques- 
tion then arises: Should any acts be made so habitual as 
to be almost automatic; and why ? If so, what ones ? 
In general, is it those that are to be performed rarely 
or those that must be performed frequently ? Name 
specifically some physical and mental processes that 
should be made almost automatic, particularly some 
that are used in the school, and in different subjects in 
the school. How much time would be saved if they 
were ? What is the object of drill-work — intellectual 
development or increased ease and rapidity of use and 
permanency of retention ? Is intellectual development 
possible except in the first few presentations ? Is the 
shortest way of learning a thing necessarily the best 
way if we desire intellectual development ? Why ? 

Habit and Heredity.— At birth both animals and 
men have tendencies to various kinds of acts. The per- 
formance of acts may increase natural tendencies, may 
decrease them by acts in opposition to them, or may 
develop new tendencies. In which are these natural 
tendencies most prominent — in men or animals ? In 
ansv/ering, compare a young babe, as to what it can do,' 
with various young animals. In which may natural 
tendencies be most modified and new tendencies de- 
veloped by habit, or, in other words, experience, educa- 
tion, or training ? In answering this, compare the adult 
with the young of the same species as to what they can 
do, and have tendencies to do; and also the educated and 
trained individual with the uneducated and untrained. 

All natural tendencies that are common to all Individ- 



HABIT. loi 

uals of a species are instincts (thougli there is some rea- 
son for looking upon them as habits of the race devel- 
oped through the experience of many generations.) Nat- 
ural tendencies not common to the species, but possessed 
only by certain individuals or families, are known as in- 
herited characteristics, in the narrower meaning of the 
word inherited. The individual peculiarities spoken of 
at the beginning are partly inherited and partly the re- 
sult of habit; and so all that any person is in body and 
mind, in disposition, character, and actions, may be sup- 
posed to be due to these two factors. The educator has 
power over but one of these faoiors — habit — and is con- 
cerned with the other only so far as a knowledge of in- 
herited characteristics enables him to better direct the 
formation of habits, so as to produce the desired modifi- 
tion. 

Is it true that people in the same surroundings and 
subjected to the same educative influences often develop 
in entirely different directions, mentally and morally ? 
If so, why is it ? Is it due entirely to difference in in- 
herited tendencies which were very great at the begin- 
ning, or could it be explained on the ground of little or 
no differences in inherited tendencies ? Take into ac- 
count all of the principles learned in regard to the for- 
mation of habits, especially as to the effect of earlier 
repetitions of an act in deciding this questioii. Notice 
to what extent a like or dislike for certain subjects is 
the result of experience, especially early experience, in 
connection with those subjects. Is it possible for two 
individuals to be developed in different directions by 
being under the same rules ? by the same subject ? by 



I02 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

tlie same lecture or sermon ? by the same book or work 
of art ? Illustrate in eacli instance. JSTotlce in apply- 
ing the general principles of habit to particular cases 
that the important thing to find out is what activities 
or feelings are being exercised, then we can know what 
tendencies are being developed. 

Habits and Ideals. — Men have ideals of what they 
wish to be and try to work toward them; animals prob- 
ably do not. Give reasons for believing this statement, 
if you believe it. A teacher has ideals of what he 
wishes the child to become, and directs the formation 
of his habits toward the attainment of that ideal which 
the child may or may not know. When one has ideals 
himself, and directs the formation of his habits toward 
the attainment of those ideals, he is educating himself. 
The teacher may help a pupil by leading him to form 
good habits, saying nothing about ideals; or he may 
direct most of his effort to forming in the mind of the 
pupil ideals — teaching him to know and appreciate 
what is valuable and right. The question, " Which is 
the most important, to form right ideals or right hab- 
its ? ^' is a good one for discussion. Which is the best 
system of education, that in which everything is so ar- 
ranged that habits of punctuality, neatness, order, accu- 
racy, and conformity to all political, social, and moral 
laws are developed, while no special attention is paid to 
the ideals the children are forming, or that in which 
care is taken that pupils form correct ideas of these 
things and are led to appreciate them highly, but no 
particular attention paid to the formation of fixed hab- 
its of any kind ? Discuss the question with reference 



HABIT. 103 

to yarions concrete cases. Notice whether habits ever 
influence ideals as well as ideals habits. Also which 
comes first in the life of the child, which method of 
education produces the highest type of character when 
well carried out ? 



I04 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 



CHAPTER VII. 

CHILD STUDY. 

It is now recognized more than ever before that the 
only way to determine what is the best system of educa- 
tion is by studying children to find out their natural 
tendencies, and the effects upon them of the various 
educational forces that may be used. This means that 
children must be studied scientifically, just as are plants 
and animals, and that the general truths thus discovered 
shall be used in planning courses of study, Just as the 
general laws of plant and animal growth are used in 
agriculture and stock-raising. Accordingly, many facts 
are now being collected by individuals, associations, and 
schools for the purpose of establishing general truths in 
regard to child nature. 

It is also being recognized more and more by practical 
educators that a teacher cannot possibly direct the men- 
tal and moral development of pupils intelligently, un- 
less he knows the peculiar characteristics, tendencies, 
and attainments of each pupil. It is just as necessary 
for him to know the condition of the pupil's mind as it 
is for the doctor to know the condition of the patient's 
body. Many teachers, without attention being called 
especially to it and without help, study their pupils 



CHILD STUDY. 105 

and come to know tliem quite thoroughly; others will 
never do this of themselves, and all may be helped by 
suggestions. The following suggestions have been 
found very helpful to normal students who were engaged 
in practice-teaching, and in observation of class-work. 
It is believed that they will be helpful to all teachers 
who wish to know their pupils better and teach them 
more intelligently. It is best to take only a few points 
under one topic at first, then a few more, and so on, un- 
til one has formed the habit of observing in regard to 
all the points suggested. 

ATTENTION. 

I. The Class as a Whole. 
1. Are they attentive — 

a. To what the teacher says and does. 

b. To the recitations of the members of the class. 
3. State specifically what you observed in — 

a. Motions, attitude, or expression of face, 
&. Answers to questions or attempts to follow directions 
that led you to infer that they were or were not atten- 
tive. 
3. Try to discover as many causes for their attention or inatten- 
tion as possible, taking into account — 
a. The nature of the subject-matter. 

6. The knowledge and mental powers possessed by the 
pupils, 

c. (1) The order of presenting the subject matter. 

(2) Clearness of language and illustrations used. 

(3) The movements and tone of voice of the teacher. 

To what extent is the subject-matter new, and to what extent 
familiar? Are they able to comprehend the new and see its rela- 
tion to something in which they are already interested? 



io6 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

Is what is presented sufl&ciently difl&cult to require strict at- 
tention ? Is one part dependent upon another, so that continued 
attention is required ? 

Does each pupil feel the responsibility for what is presented, 
and that his knowledge is likely to be tested at any moment ? 

In what way is he led to feel this responsibility, or how may he 
be led to feel it ? 

II. Individual Pupils. 

1. Is the pupil less or more attentive than the others? 

2. Is this difference permanent ? If not, under what circum- 
stances is he attentive ? If inattentive all the time, determine (a) 
whether any of the points mentioned above apply to him in an 
unusual degree ; (b) whether defects of eye or ear or unfavorable 
position for seeing and hearing are the cause. If the inattention 
seems to be merely a habit, try to find out how that habit can be 
broken up. 

PERCEPTION AND APPERCEPTION. 

I. The Class as a Whole. 

1. Note whether — 

a. The conditions (light, distance, angle of vision, size of 
object or letters, etc.) are favorable for seeing and 
hearing. 

6. The class is attentive. 

2. Note whether — 

a. The thing being examined is perceived as a whole or its 

elements noted. 

b. Essential or non-essential characteristics are noted. 

c. How the pupil's attention is or could be drawn to essen- 

tial characteristics. 
Whate-er is presented can be apperceived only by means of 
knowledge already possessed by the pupils. 
1. Note, therefore — 

a. Whether the matter being presented is like or related 
to anything experienced by the pupils ; 



CHILD STUDY. 107 

h. Read or heard by them ; 

c. Taught them in school in the same or other subjects. 

2. Note: 

{a) Whether the teacher expressly calls up this knowledge 

in presenting the subject-matter. 
(5) Whether, if she does not, they show that they have 

done so themselves, 
(c) Which of the three classes of knowledge indicated in 

(1) they most frequently and pleasurably call up. 

3. Notice whether in apperceiving the new by means of the old, 
they discriminate differences as well as similarities ; or whether 
they incorrectly ascribe characteristics of the old to the new. 

II. Individual Pupils. 

1. Does your pupil perceive more or less perfectly than the rest 
of the class ? 

2. If less, determine whether — 

a. It is due to defects of eye or ear. ' 

&. Unfavorable position for seeing or hearing. 

c. Want of attention. 

d. Unusual slowness in perceiving. 

e. Want of some knowledge possessed by others. 

3. If more, determine whether it is due to — 

a. Closer attention and better discriminative powers, or, 
h. Better or more apperceptive knowledge. 

4. In either case, note carefully — 

a. Extent. 

b. Kind of apperceiving knowledge. 

c. The tendency to call it up himself manifested by the 

pupil, and determine how far this accounts for unu- 
sual good perception, or suggests how imperfect per- 
ception may be improved. 

IMAGINATION. 

I. The Class as a Whole. Note : 

1. What kind of mental images the lesson requires the class to 
form. 



io8 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

2. Wlietlier tlie pupils probably have the materials with whicli 
to form them. 

3. Whether they are required to use reproductive, constructive, 
or creative imagination, and how well they succeed. 

4. What means (pictures, diagrams, descriptions, comparisons, 
etc.) are or could be used to help them to correct and vivid men- 
tal images. 

5. How these mental images will help to a more perfect com- 
prehension of the subject. 

6. What valuable training of the imagination is given by the 
exercise. 

II. Individual Pupils. 

Determine whether your pupil has more oi* less power of imag- 
ination of any kind than the others. If he seems to have more, 
note : 

1. Whether he ever becomes more interested in his own fancies 
than in his lessons. 

2. Whether it ever leads him to perceive or relate things inac- 
curately. 

3. Whether he seems to realize more vividly than others scenes 
and events described, 

4. Whether he remembers better than others what is asssoci- 
ated with diagrams and word-pictures, and less perfectly what is 
not. 

5. Whether he remembers the picturable part and not the more 
important truths associated with it. 

6. Whether— 

a. He can readily reproduce drawings from memory. 

b. He can draw what is described. 

c. He can make new designs. 

7. Whether— 

a. He can readily reproduce narratives and descriptions. 
6. He can write imaginary ones. 
If he seems to lack imagination, note deficiencies in any of the 
above points. 



CHILD STUDY. 109 

In either case try to determine what methods may best be used ; 

1. In imparting information. 

2. In training the imagination — 

a. To reproduce accurately. 

b. To construct correctly. 

c. To create complex things in accord with the laws of 

nature or good taste. 

MEMORY. 

A perfect act of memory requires that we shall retain, recall, 
and recognize previous mental experiences. 

I. Retention depends mainly upon the intensity of the impression. 

1. Hence all of the conditions affecting attention and percep- 

tion during acquisition will affect retention, and they 
should therefore be noted. 

2. In addition, you should determine, as far as possible, («) what 

kind of mental images are used ; (6) whether the number of 
things to be remembered is too great ; (c) whether the rep- 
etitions are numerous enough. 

II. Recall depends mainly upon association. Note, therefore, 

when the pupils are learning : 

1. The order in which the facts are associated. 

2. Whether they are («) grouped around some central fact ; {b) 

associated with, an object, picture, diagram, or vivid word- 
picture. 

3. Whether the facts are associated either with tlie pupil's own 

experience or with other facts. 
When the pupils are recalling, note : 

1. Whether they give the facts in the same order in which they 

learned them. 

2. If not, do they give them haphazard or connectedly. 

3. If connectedly, what kind of association predominates : {a) 

time and place ; (&) cause and effect ; (c) similarity and con- 
trast. 

III. Recognition means that a fact when recalled or presented 



no INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

again sliall seem familiar, and tliat some facts or fact asso- 
xiated with it in tlie original acquisition shall be recalled 
with it. Note, therefore : 

1. Whether the pupils correctly recognize the facts they recall. 

2. Whether they ever recognize accurately, when stated, what 

they themselves are unable to recall. 

3. If so, is the inability to recall it because {a) the question was 

not asked in a suitable way, or (6) they have not associated 
the facts in such a way as to know how to recall them, or 
(c) they have not practised recalling them. 
In any case, what suggestion can be given that will aid in more 
perfect recall and recognition ? 

CONCEPTION. 

Be continually on the watch to discover what words mean to 
tne pupil, and how that meaning is changing for them, 

1. Determine whether the probable source of his concept is — 

a. Direct association of the word with the thing or experi- 
ence signified. 

h. Study of description or definition. 

c. Hearing the word used with other words. 
3. Determine whether his concepts are correct or incorrect, and 

whether they are too narrow or too broad, including what 

that should be excluded from the class. 

3. Are his concepts of the first, second, or third degree of defi- 

niteness, and to what extent can he recognize characteris- 
tics that he can name, and vice versa ? 

4. In forming new concepts, notice how many and what variety 

of examples are necessary before he can discover the essen- 
tial characteristics so as to know the basis of classification 
or the definition ? 

5. In classifying, notice whether the mistakes are due to imper- 

fect discrimination of the qualities of the thing being clas- 
sified or want of knowledge of the essential qualities of 
the class. 



CHILD STUDY. iii 



REASONING. 



1. Notice whether the pupil has a tendency to make inferences • 

and if so, whether it is mainly in applying general truths 
already learned or in making general' statements from one 
or more particulars. 

2. The basis will always be some kind of apparent similarity : 

note therefore — 
a. What the seeming likeness is. 
6. Whether it is essential. 
c. Whether the general truths about the class having those 

characteristics are correctly rclae'ted. 

3. Notice whether defective reasoning is due to — 

a. Imperfect concepts. 

b. Want of accurate discrimination of characteristics. 

c. Want of power of attention to hold two or more things 

in mind. 

d. Lack either in knowledge of general truths necessary to 

the inference or in the tendency to recall them. 

For the study of pupils outside of school and the col- 
lection of facts that may be of scientific value, the fol- 
lowing general outlines may be used with advantage : 

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF CHILDREN. 

I. GrENERAL FACTS. 

(a) Name of observer ; (&) name of child ; (c) sex ; (d) age ; (e) 
birthplace (state or country) ; (/) birthplace of father ; (g) of 
mother ; (h) occupation of father ; (i) education of father (common- 
school or college ; (j) of mother ; (k) ages of brothers and sisters, 
if any ; (I) other inmates of the family ; (m) intimate companions ; 
(n) number and kind of books, papers, and magazines in the home ; 
(o) portions of life spent in (1) city, (3) village, (3) country ; (p) 
journeys taken ; (q) amount and kind of instruction given (1) at 
home, (2) in kindergarten and school ; (?*) other important en- 
vironments or influence, including natural scenery and social 
organizations. 



112 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

II. Physical Characteristics. 

1. Description of Body and Features : (a) large or small for 
age ; (b) slender or stout in build ; (c) color, amount, and charac- 
teristics of hair ; [d) color, size and brightness of eyes ; (e) hair- 
line high or low on head ; (/) forehead, high or low, bulging, 
straight or sloping, wrinkled or smooth ; {g) eyebrows, scanty or 
fall, arched or straight, meeting or separate ; iji) nose, large or 
small, thin or broad, pointed or pug, straight, or curved ; nostrils, 
large or small ; (^) lips, thick or thin, curved or straight, equal or 
unequal in size ; {f) mouth, large or small, character of wrinkles 
about it ; {k) teeth, large or small, white or colored, regular or ir- 
regular, sound or decayed; (?) chin, large or short, pointed, blunt 
or dimpled, point on a line with mouth, in front, or back of it ; (w) 
character of curve from lip to point of chin ; {rC) eyes, deep set or 
well forward, full or hollow under them, smooth or wrinkled 
around them, lashes numerous or scanty, long or short ; {p) cheek- 
bones high and prominent or not, cheeks round, full, or hollow ; 
(j)) shoulders, broad or narrow, round or square, stooped or 
straight ; (g) body, fiat or round, straight or bent, chest depressed 
or full ; (r) describe any other physical peculiarities. 

2. Measurements of Body and Head: (a) Height (1) standing, 

(2) sitting ; (&) weight ; (c) reach (arms extended) ; {d) distance 
around head just above the eyes ; {e) distance from the opening of 
one ear to that of the other, (1) straight over head, (2) in front 
just at hair line, (3) in rear over greatest prominence, (4) in front 
just above eyes, (5) around point of nose, (6) across the chin ; (/) 
distance from hair line (1) to occiput, (2) to central part between 
eyes, (3) to point of the nose, (4) to point of the chin ; {g) circum- 
ference of neck; Qi) (1) height of ear, (2) width ; {i) distance (1) 
from right ear to central point between eyes, (2) to point of nose, 

(3) to' point of chin ; (j) distance from left ear to points 1, 2, and 3, 
above ; ijk) remarks. 

3. Attitude and Mo'oements : {a) Position and characteristic 
movements of (1) head, (2) eyes, (3) body, (4) arms and hands, 
(5) legs and feet ; (&) frequency, regularity, grace, rapidity, accu- 



CHILD STUDY. 113 

racy of movements in work and play and in special tasks or tests ; 
(c) expressiveness of face. 

III. Mental Charactekistics. 

Observe and report as vnsinj facts as you can bearing upon the 
following points : 

1. General : Evidences of influence of special environment or 
of independence of it. 

2. Interests and Attention : Extent to wbich lie is interested in 
games, occupations, objects, reading matter and kinds of each 
most liked ; kinds of things most attended to ; length of time at- 
tention is given to one thing ; power of voluntary attention. 

3. Senses : Perfection or imperfection of sense organs ; power 
of discrimination with each ; which most used. 

4. Perception and Apperception : Rapidity and accuracy of per- 
ception ; tendency to call up things that are being perceived ; 
readiness in noting relations. 

5. Imagination : Vividness and accuracy of his reproductive 
and constructive imagination ; tendency to use creative imagina- 
tion and character of creations. 

6. Memory : Readiness in acquiring retentiveness, accuracy ; 
kind of facts learned best ; kind of mental images used ; relative 
goodness of memory for words, for ideas and for experiences ; in- 
equality of power to recall and to recognize. 

7. Association : Kinds most prominent in thinking ; logical con- 
sistency of ideas. 

8. Conception : Definiteness of concepts ; modification of them ; 
tendency to generalize and accuracy of generalizations. 

9. Reasoning : Tendency to reason inductively or deductively ; 
basis of reasoning, accuracy. 

10. Habits : Readiness in forming ; permanency ; power and 
tendency to change them ; similarity of actions from day to day ; 
order and system in doing things ; neatness in personal habits. 

11. Sensory Feelings : Sensitiveness to pleasant and painful sen- 
sations, general and special. 

13. Feelings of Activity : Evidence of feeling experienced in 



114 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

motion, in perceiving, in using tlie different kinds of imagination ; 
in memory ; in classifying things ; in forming general notions and 
in reasoning. 

13. Self-feelings : Existence and prominence of self-conscious- 
ness, bashfulness, confidence, pride, fear, anger, regard for self. 

14. Sympathetic : Sympathy for persons, animals, or things ; 
sense of humor. 

15. Sentiments: Love of truth, appreciation of beauty; regard 
for the right. 

16. Social Tendencies : Desire for companionship ; tendency to 
lead or follow ; regard for pleasures of companions. 

17. Disposition : Cheerfulness, evenness, tractableness. 

18. Imitation : Power to imitate accurately ; tendency to imi- 
tate. 

19. Self-control : Power of self-control ; tendency to control. 

20. Will : Tendency to direct own actions, to follow example, 
suggestion, or command ; relative prominence in willing of im- 
pulses or of ideals of the proper thing to do ; relative importance 
of near as compared with remote good or ill as motives to action ; 
rapidity of decision as to course of action ; time elapsing before 
acting ; perseverance in carrying out a plan ; firmness in adher- 
ing to a plan once adopted. 



IPARX IL 



CHAPTER I. 

FEELINGS IN GENEEAL. 

Nature and Variety of FeelingSo — Everyone knows 
what feeling is by experience better than it can be known 
by means of any definition. When we observe onr own 
states of consciousness we find that feelings are a more 
or less important element in all our mental operations, 
and a moment's reflection shows us that those states of 
consciousness are ours by virtue of the feeling element 
in them. Yon may say "I am perceiving the objects in 
this room," "I am imagining the objects in the next 
room," " I am remembering the appearance of a room at 
home," " I am reasoning about the cost of those in this 
room." It is because feeling is an element in these 
mental operations that you can say "/" am doing this; 
and it is for the same reasons that you can know that 
you are perceiving objects in this room instead of im- 
agining them, remembering them, or reasoning about 

115 



Ii6 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

tliem. You know which you are doing because these 
various operations /ee/ different. In all mental processes 
we feel that it is toe who are being affected, 'we who are 
active, and the more prominent the consciousness of 
self, the stronger the feelings. Notice how differently 
you are affected when yon are called on to recite from 
what you are when another is, or when yon observe your 
own failure or success rather than that of another. 
Notice, also how differently you are affected by the same 
items of news when they refer to strangers, to friends, 
to near relatives, or to yourself. Give other illustra- 
tions of increase of feeling with increase in closeness of 
relation to self. 

The personal nature of feeling becomes still more 
evident when we reflect upon the fact i'-at we can im- 
part to others our ideas, but not our feelings; also, 
tha;. any number of persons can go through the same 
intellectual operations and each may know that the 
others have done so: but as to the feelings experienced, 
they may differ widely, and each person knows only his 
own. Knowledge is more universal, feeling more indi- 
vidual. If a dozen persons go into a room, look at cer- 
tain objects, and listen to certain sounds, they all acquire 
practically the same knowledge ; but the feeling experi- 
enced in acquiring that knowledge is peculiar to each 
individual and makes the knowledge Ids. It is true 
that knowledge takes various forms, according to the 
ideas already in the mind of the individual acquiring it; 
but knowledge has a universal element in it, while feel- 
ing is in its very nature individual. 

Since feeling is an element in every state of conscious- 



FEELINGS IN GENERAL. II7 

ness, the varieties must be infinite. Feeling results 
from the universe of external things affecting us through 
the senses in countless ways, and from our own activities, 
which are almost equally various. The feelings are the 
self-^side of all experience,, and hence are as various as 
the experiences. Most of them are in a greater or less 
degree agreeable or disagreeable to us, or a mixture of 
both; but some feelings, such as astonishment, are 
strong, but not especially agreeable or disagreeable. It 
is therefore entirely too narrow a view of feeling to say 
that its distinguishing characteristic is pleasure or pain, 
even though we give a broad meaning to those words. 
It were better to say that any conscious modification of 
the self is feeling, and that the varieties are as great as 
are the modifications. 

Importance of Feeling — Feeling is the interesting 
side of all consciousness. E"otice if feelings present or 
expected are not the standard by which all things are 
measured. Ask yourself what any material thing is 
worth, as apples, iron, horses, gold, pictures, and follow 
the questions back to the ultimate source of value and 
see if you do not come to a feeling. Do not feelings pro- 
duce our economic, artistic, and social needs, and serve 
as the ultimate standards of value in those spheres ? 
Ask yourself why any subject of knowledge is valuable, 
and see if its value depends upon feeling. Ask a sim- 
ilar question as to why one should ooey moral and re- 
ligious rules. E'otice also, and illustrate, how feelings 
in fluence learning and action, determining what shall 
be learned and what shall be done. 

Methods of Studying Feeling — Yon can assert posi- 



Ii8 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

tively that a person with normal senses will, when 
placed where you are now and under the same condi- 
tions, see and hear what you see and hear; but can you 
assert with equal assurance that he will experience the 
same emotions ? If a man asserted that he did or did 
not experience a certain feeling under certain conditions, 
could his statement be shown to be false — as it could if 
he asserted that he did or did not hear a certain sound ? 
It is evident from this and from the fact that feeling is 
in its very nature subjective that feeling must be studied 
largely by the subjective method. The nerves and 
muscles concerned in expressing emotions may be stud- 
ied objectively, but the feelings themselves cannot be 
studied by this method. The indirectly subjective 
method can, however, evidently be used. 

From the recorded results of subjective study of feel- 
ings can we get as many and reliable general truths in 
regard to feelings as we can in regard to intellectual 
processes ? You can answer this by answering the fol- 
lowing minor questions: (1) Are individual differences 
greater or less in feeling than in intellect ? (A proverb 
says, ^'' There is no accounting for tastes.^') (2) Which 
can be most perfectly expressed in words — feelings or 
ideas ? (3) Can the feelings be tested by other forms 
of expression and by experiment, as can the intellectual 
powers ? Almost the only important result yet gained 
from the use of experiment, in the study of feeling is the 
general truth, that a cross is most agreeable to the 
majority of persons when the horizontal line is a mean 
proportional to the two parts of the vertical. It is pos- 
sible that more general truths may be obtained by ex- 



FEELINGS IN GENERAL. 119 

periment; yet if any individual should assert that a 
different proportion is more agreeable to him, his state- 
ment would be final. He could not be proven in error 
as he could if he asserted that the longer part of such a 
cross is the shorter, nor could we assert that he is men- 
tally defective. 

As to the study of feelings by means of external signs, 
it is evident that many facts may be gained by inferen- 
tial observations. Can facts be gained in this way in 
regard to feeling more or less readily than in regard to 
the intellectual operations ? Illustrate. Is it of much 
advantage to a teacher to be able to study the feelings 
of pupils in this way ? Why ? 

Signs of Feeling. — Mention some of the more com- 
mon signs of feeling. Are the signs for all the stronger 
emotions, such as anger, fear, sorrow, plainly percepti- 
ble? Is it not probable that there are signs for every 
emotion, even the slightest, though not easily perceived, 
as are those of the stronger feelings ? One fact bearing 
on this is that an instrument suited for measuring blood- 
pressure shows a variation in pressure when only a very 
slight emotion is experienced. Give your reasons for 
believing that there is or is not a sign for every feeling. 

Are some of the signs of feeling universal — common 
to all men ? You may get an answer to this question by 
noticing whether you can interpret the signs of feeling 
manifested by strangers, and those represented by artists, 
sculptors, novelists, and elocutionists. Mention specifi- 
cally some instances where feelings can be " read " by 
means of such signs. Are there some signs peculiar to 
certain individuals, so that a stranger to the person is 



I20 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

liable to misinterpret them ? Illustrate. Are signs of 
feeling the result mainly of habit or of natural tenden- 
cies ? In answering this, notice whether children make 
the appropriate signs of feelings more or less perfectly 
than adults, and whether any one has to learn how to 
correctly express an emotion that he feels. Mention 
some signs of feeling that are natural and some that 
are learned. Which do you think are most largely the 
result of habit — the universal or the individual signs ? 
Why? 

Connection between Feelings and their Expression. 
— Experiment by assuming the attitude and expression of 
various feelings, as pride, anger, shame, joy, sorrow, and 
notice whether after a time the corresponding feelings 
are experienced in any degree. Try also assuming the 
signs of any feeling, as humbleness, while trying to feel 
another, as pride^ When you are experiencing a certain 
feeling, as anger, what is the eifect of giving expression 
to it? What is the effect of refusing to give expression 
to it — inhibiting the signs ? If one were to continue to 
give expression to one kind of feeling, as the pleasant, 
and to refrain from expressing the opposite, would one's 
disposition be modified in any degree after a few months 
or years ? Is producing or inhibiting signs of feeling an 
important means of controlling and developing feeling ? 

It is generally recognized that men in the army often 
develop what is called a military type of character. Is 
it probable that the movements and attitude of military 
drill are important factors in producing such a charac- 
ter? Could the military type of character be developed 
if everything in army life were the same, except that 



FEELINGS IN GENERAL. 121 

the movements were graceful instead of precise? Do 
the movements in any systenl of physical culture have 
any effect, when long continued, upon the feelings and 
character ? Is the effect great enough so that it should 
be taken into account in choosing a system of physical 
culture or gymnastics? Have you ever been able to notice 
any correspondence between a person^s movements and 
his mental characteristics ? It is probable not only that 
the connection is closer than has usually been supposed, 
but that in the future movements will be recognized as 
an important means of developing feeling and intellect. 
The principle is already recognized by some instructors 
in physical culture and manual training. 

Some think that the relation between feeling and the 
signs of feeling are still closer. They hold that not only 
are there signs for every feeling, but that neither the signs 
of a feeling nor the feeling itself can exist separately. 
It is held, on the one hand, that if a feeling is experi- 
enced it will be expressed in spite of any attempt to con- 
ceal it, and that a sufficiently skilled observer could per- 
ceive the signs and infer the feeling. Do you believe 
this ? On the other hand, it is held that producing the 
signs of a feeling produces the feeling. The older teach- 
ers of elocution ignored these views. They held that 
there are certain universal signs for each feeling which 
the student of elocution must learn, then when a cer- 
tain emotion is to be expressed he must assume the atti- 
tude, expression of face, tone of voice, and gestures that 
are the signs of that emotion. The training was princi- 
pally in imitating the signs of the various feelings. The 
modern elocutionists have an entirely different theory. 



122 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

They hold that every feeling naturally results in the ap- 
propriate signs and hence after one has got rid of un- 
natural habits of expression and exercised all the muscles 
so that they are free and responsive, all that is necessary 
is to enter into the spirit of the selection and feel the 
emotion to be expressed and the signs expressive of the 
emotion will result. It is probably true that most good 
elocutionists and actors feel the emotions they are trying 
to express. Eecall any instances that you know of, also 
your own experience in reading or reciting, in conforma- 
tion or opposition to this last statement. 

Prof. James holds that the bodily changes accompany- 
ing an emotion are the causes of the emotion, not the 
result. That the perception of a frightful object, for 
instance, produces bodily changes in the way of move- 
ments, cries, quickened or slowed breathing and heart- 
beat, etc., and that these bodily changes produce the 
feeling of fright. Without them there might be the in- 
ioWQciudl perception of danger, but no feeling of fright. 
The fact that some persons can express very perfectly 
the signs of a feeling without experiencing the feeling 
in the slightest degree, and that with most persons the 
repression of the signs of certain feelings not only docs 
not repress the feeling, but often increases it (as refrain- 
ing from laughing when amused or, sometimes, refrain- 
ing from crying when grieved), seems against this 
theory. However, it is not necessarily so, for the bodily 
changes accompanying a feeling are of two kinds — ex- 
ternal and internal. The external changes in the form 
of attitude, expression, gestures, and tone of voice can be 
observed; but the internal or visceral changes in heart. 



FEELINGS IN GENERAL. 123 

lungs, and intestines are felt by the individual, and 
cannot be observed readily by others. Usually, it seems, 
the external and the internal changes correspond, and 
the production or inhibition of one produces or inhibits 
the other. They may be separated, however, and prob- 
ably are, in the actor who has learned to produce the 
external signs of a feeling without expressing it. When 
one inhibits the external signs of a feeling, sometimes 
the internal changes instead of being inhibited are made 
all the greater; hence the result is an increase instead of 
a decrease in the feeling. 

The part that attention plays in these instances should 
not be ignored. If one keeps the attention fixed upon 
the amusing thing, the frightful thing, or the object of 
anger, will he not experience the feeling even though he 
inhibits the external signs, and if he turns the attention 
to other things will not the feeling disappear ? Illus- 
trate from your own experience. If this be true, then 
may it not be that producing or inhibiting the signs of 
a feeling influences the feeling mainly because it helps 
to keep the attention on the cause of the feeling or helps 
to turn it to something else ? If this be admitted, how- 
ever, the importance of control of the signs of feeling as 
a means of influencing the feeling is in no way lessened, 
is it ? 

Feeling and Habit. — We have already seen that there 
is some feeling accompanying every mental process; and 
now the question arises as to what change if any takes 
place in the feeling if the act or process is repeated over 
and over again. Does it remain the same or decrease? 
Compare the feelings you now experience with those 



124 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

first experienced in the following instances : reciting in 
class, talking to certain persons, going to certain places, 
performing common tasks, as writing, knitting, winding 
a watch. Can the feeling become so slight that it will 
not be great enongh to make us conscious of the act ? 
Illustrate. Where there is strong feeling of pain or 
pleasure at first performance, does it ever become less 
as repeated, then change into the opposite ? Illustrate. 
If that should be the case, what would be the effect of 
continuing to perform the act for many years ? Would 
the second feeling decrease after many repetitions of the 
act, so that there would finally be little feeling accom- 
panying the act ? 

In the above we were talking about the effect of per- 
forming the same act, mental or physical, again and' 
again, upon the feelings that accompany it. We are 
now to consider the effect of calling forth the same kind 
of feeling again and again, the object calling forth the 
feeling varying. What is the effect of calling forth, fre- 
quently the feeling of anger ? Sympathy ? Pride ? 
Shame ? Do those feelings become more prominent and 
more easily called forth ? Illustrate. State in words 
the two general laws in regard to feeling suggested in 
this and the preceding paragraph. The first might be 
called the law of accommodation, the second of develop- 
ment. Sometimes these two laws seem to ojopose each 
other, as in the experience of a physician who has much 
to do with suffering, and the resulting effect upon the 
feelings is uncertain, so that he may grow more sympa- 
thetic or less so. 

Change. — The general questions to be considered are: 



FEELINGS IN GENERAL. ^ 125 

Can feeling result from the continuance of the same 
conditions or causes of feeling, or must there be cliange 
to produce feeling ? and, Do the feelings vary in inten- 
sity with the amount of change ? Does one enjoy wealth 
who has never known anything else; or one who has 
never had luxuries^ to know what they are, suifer for 
the lack of them ? Eecall some things that gave you 
great pleasure when you first came into possession of 
them, and notice whether the possession of them now 
causes any pleasure (only as you contrast in thought 
your former experience without them). 

Consider sensations of various kinds, and notice 
whether those stimuli that continue constant or change 
very gradually produce any feeling or even conscious- 
ness. Do you feel the ring on your finger or the collar 
around your neck (when you do not move)? If a room 
becomes warm very gradually will you know it ? Have 
some one pour water or sand very slowly in a small ves- 
sel resting on your hand (you closing your eyes) and 
notice whether you can feel the increase in pressure. 
Are you afiected by the ticking of the clock and other 
constant sounds ? Has it ever become quite dark in 
your room because the sun has gone down, or a lamp 
gone out without your knowing it was getting dark for 
some time ? Which is the most favorable condition for 
the unconsciousness of sleep — when the light, sounds, 
and temperature of a room remain the same, or when 
they change suddenly and irregularly? If it were pos- 
sible for every stimulus to the senses to remain constant 
for five minutes, could one remain conscious, or is change 
jiecessary to consciousness ? A boy who had lost all 



126 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

sensation except in one eye and one ear usually went to 
sleep very quickly if they were closed. 

Mention instances showing how change produces at- 
tention or intensification of consciousness. Think out 
a^ many applications of this principle of change in edu- 
cation as you can. 

Contrast. — Mention a half-dozen pairs of sensations 
and emotions that are contrasts of each other. Is the 
feeling stronger when one of the pair is experienced 
immediately after the other than under other circum- 
stances ? Illustrate. What is the reason ? You will 
get a partial answer if you define contrast in terms of 
change and then apply the general truth in regard to 
amount of change and intensity of feeling. 

There is an old saying that "If you laugh before, 
breakfast you will cry before night," which implies that 
after having experienced one feeling there is a tendency 
to experience the opposite. Can you give any evidence 
of the truth of this ? Fatigue is probably partially the 
reason. An illustration in the realm of sensation may 
be obtained by looking fixedly at a red spot till the eye 
is fatigued, then looking at a gray or white surface. 

The use that is made of contrast in literature and 
oratory is very marked. Did you ever hear an address 
that was humorous all the way through, or one that was 
pathetic from beginning to end ? Have you ever no- 
ticed a speaker passing from one to the other? Do you 
know of many stories or plays in which all the characters 
are very good or all very bad ? Mention some instance in 
literature in which contrast is used effectively. Make a 
list of twenty words that are frequently used in contrast. 



FEELINGS IN GENERAL. 127 

Relativity. — Will the same stimulus produce the 
same effect every time ? For instance, will a weight of 
an ounce produce the same feeling when added to an 
ounce weight on the hand as when added to a ten-pound 
weight ? a scratch of a pin when the hand is being 
stroked as when a hand is being amputated ? a piece of 
candy after a spoonful of syrup and one after a spoonful 
of vinegar? Give other illustrations. Will the same 
cause of an emotion always produce the same emotion ? 
For example, will the loss of a dollar produce the same 
feeling when a man has but five, as when he has five 
hundred ? Will an appeal to one^s sympathies when 
one is engrossed in business or study have the same ef- 
fect as when one is unoccupied and has recently experi- 
enced similar sufferings ? If you wish to excite a cer- 
tain feeling in another do you choose your time ? Give 
other illustrations. Do you think the same cause of 
feeling ever produces exactly the same feeling twice, or 
does the feeling always vary with the condition of con- 
sciousness at the moment when the cause affects it — the 
present feelings or those that have recently been expe- 
rienced ? Do you think that we may say that the effect 
anything produces upon consciousness is not fixed and 
absolute, but variable and relative to present and imme- 
diately preceding states of consciousness ? Give evi- 
dence to prove that the effect of any stimulus or idea 
upon consciousness varies with the kind, amount, and 
suddenness of the change it produces in consciousness ? 
You will find some by referring to the examples given 
in studying change and contrast. 

Kecall the psycho-physical law. Is that anything 



128 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

like the law of relativity ? Is it not simply one phase 
of the general law of the relativity of all mental 
states ? 

Kecall also what you have learned about apperception. 
In studying that, you found that ideas gained from any 
presentation varied with the ideas already in mind. Do 
you not now see that feelings vary with feelings previ- 
ously experienced ? 

Pleasure and Pain. — From the earliest times at- 
tempts have been made to formulate some general law 
in regard to what is pleasurable or agreeable and what 
is painful or disagreeable. That and the purposes of 
pleasure and pain are the most important questions that 
can be asked in regard to them. Touch your hand very 
lightly with a pencil, then press the pencil gently 
against the hand, and then very hard. Does the sensa- 
tion go through three stages — the first slightly disa- 
greeable, the second agreeable, and the third painful ? 
Experiment and recall your experience with other sensa- 
tions when slight, moderate, and intense stimulations 
are used, and notice which degrees of stimulation are 
pleasurable and which painful. Move your arm around 
in a circle just as slowly as you can, then with moderate 
rapidity, then as fast as possible, noting the character of 
the feeling in each case. Recall also your experience 
with other forms of physical activity and also with the 
various forms of mental activity. Is there sufficient 
ground for saying that all activity, including that of 
the sense organs when stimulated, is pleasurable when 
moderate, and painful when very slight and when ex- 
cessive? Are there any exceptions — some activities 



FEELINGS IN GENERAL. 129 

that are more painful in every degree than no exercise 
whatever of this power, would be ? Illustrate. 

Some say that the statement of the general truth in 
regard to pleasure and pain is more correctly expressed 
by saying that all activities (including those of the 
sense organs) that are for the present good of the 
organism (heighten the tide of life, increase the life 
forces at the time), are pleasurable. The later effects, 
such as result from the use of stimulants, is not here 
considered. Would this law correspond with the pre- 
ceding so far as degree of activity is concerned ? That 
is, are the moderate degrees of activities usually good for 
the organism and too slight or excessive activities injuri- 
ous ? According to this law, however, there may be vari- 
ous kinds of activities (or rather of objects exciting activ- 
ities, particularly those exciting the organs of taste and 
smell) that even in a moderate degree are not pleasurable 
and it asserts that such are not good for the organism. 
Aristotle said that all normal and natural activities are 
pleasurable; and this, though vague, probably expresses 
the essential truth of the two laws just stated, for few 
would say that they would hold true of persons in an 
abnormal or unnatural statC; as the lesult of inheritance, 
sickness or habit. It expresses confidence in natural 
tendencies, which is now, perhaps more than ever be- 
fore, felt by people generally. Physiologists are more 
than ever before inclined to say. Let children (and older 
people too) eat what they like best, and permit the child 
to exercise as he chooses. They affirm that the desire 
for sweet in children expresses a real physiological need, 
and the tendency to physical activity if allowed free 



I30 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

scope will produce the best physical development. Edu- 
cators and moralists also are beginning to believe that 
those studies which are pleasurable to the child are the 
best for his intellectual development, and that what ex- 
cites pleasurable feelings is, generally speaking, better for 
the moral development than what excites painful feel- 
ings. Children are being studied to-day in the belief 
that if we can find what they naturally like to learn 
and do, we shall then be able to improve our courses of 
study by putting in them the subjects and exercises 
that the children enjoy. The chief difficulty, however, 
is in determining what is natural and normal, and what 
is the result of habit or is abnormal. 

There is a common saying, that " One can get used to 
anything;" and some are so much impressed with the 
power of the law of accommodation that they think the 
feelings are determined more by it than by natural 
tendencies. They hold that if anything is eaten, per- 
ceived, thought of, or any action performed frequently 
and for long enough time, that one will finally find it 
more pleasant than something else, though it were ever 
so painful at first. Give some specific examples. Pris- 
oners after long confinement sometimes find freedom 
unpleasant, and ask to be readmitted. Give other illus- 
trations of this principle. Some who hold to this view 
broaden it by looking upon instinctive tendencies as 
habits of the race developed by the surroundings in 
which the ancestors of the species or race have lived, 
and say that animals and men take pleasure in the acts 
they tend to perform, whether those tendencies were 
developed by the action of ancestors or by those of the 



FEELINGS IN GENERAL, 131 

individual. Notice how far the law stated in this form 
corresponds with the other two, and point out the dif- 
ferences. 

It differs from common belief in asserting that we 
take pleasure in what we tend to do instead of tending 
to do what will give pleasure. It makes pleasure the 
effect instead of the cause. This seems a beneficent 
arrangement, that we should come to take pleasure in 
what we do, but offers no explanation of the purpose of 
pain. In the view that pain and pleasure are causes of 
action it may be claimed that pain tends to prevent us 
from performing acts that do not lead to the highest 
development and ultimately to the greatest happiness. 
There is good reason to believe that there is truth in 
both views; that according to the law of accommodation 
pleasure is the effect of long continuance of the action 
it accompanies, and also that pain and pleasure may 
modify action and thus act as causes. If conditions ad- 
mit, there is modification of actions; if not, accommo- 
dation to them, so that they finally become pleasurable. 



132 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 



CHAPTEK II. 

SOUEOES OF FEELING, AND EELATION TO 
MENTAL PEOOESSES. 

Classes of Elementary Feelings.— The most impor- 
tant sources of feeling are sensations. Just as they are 
the fundamental sources of knowledge, so they are of 
feeling; but the relative importance of the general and 
the special' sensations is reversed, the former being more 
important to feeling. Give examples illustrating the 
truth of this. The second important source of feeling 
is mental images of sensations in which feelings were 
prominent and mental images of things incidentally asso- 
ciated with strong feelings. The third important source 
of feeling is the feeling of activity. The feelings ac- 
companying the various intellectual processes, we shall 
see later, may be traced to these three or four sources. 

General Sensations. — The common greetings " How 
are yon,'^ " How do you feel," probably refer prima- 
rily to the general sensations being experienced, and 
indicate the importance of those sensations. Our 
health and happiness depend very largely upon them, 
and by them we know whether we are sick or well, tired 
or rested, languid, or vigorous, weak or strong, hungry, 
thirsty, and chilly or satisfied and comfortable. When 



SOURCES OF FEELING. I33 

you are in perfect health and bodily wants satisfied, do 
you notice those feelings much ? Do you when sick ? 
Are they prominent when health has just been re- 
covered ? Is it likely that they are present all the time 
in health, only not noticed after health has been the 
same for some time ? Are one^s thoughts and moods 
modified by the bodily condition through these general 
sensations ? Illustrate by individual examples, and also 
by examples of differences in the mood of a company on 
different days or different times of day. Is it important 
morally and intellectually that pupils should be com- 
fortable in school ? Is one's disposition modified if cer- 
tain bodily conditions continue for a long time ? Il- 
lustrate. 

If the general sensations are always present, may we 
not consider them as important elements in maintaining 
consciousness, and that they serve as a sort of background 
to the field of consciousness ? If so, then since the effect 
of anything upon consciousness varies with the condi- 
tion of consciousness, we should expect not only that 
it would vary with changes in those general sensations 
in any individual, but also that the sensations being 
different for different individuals they should be affected 
differently by the same things. Is it not probable, then, 
that temperament or (disposition depends primarily upon 
the character of the general sensations ? Since these 
sensations are always present from the very dawn of 
conscious life (and the most prominent in early life), is 
it not probable that they are important elements in giv- 
ing an idea of self as a permanent existence ? This view 
is favored by the fact that sickly children usually de- 



134 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

velop self-conscionsness early, and by the fact that a 
patient suffering from great bodily disorder sometimes 
thinks that he is a different person. 

The Special Sensations.— Every sensation has in it an 
element of feeling, and is also a source of knowledge. 
Which is the most prominent cognition or feeling: when 
one is smelling of a rose in the garden or of a chemical 
substance in the laboratory ? serving as a tea-taster or 
drinking tea at the table ? searching for a match in the 
dark or passing the hand lightly over soft velvet ? look- 
ing at a display of fireworks or looking at a star to de- 
termine to what constellation it belongs ? listening to the 
playing of a musical artist or trying to identify a certain 
locomotive whistle ? Give other illustrations of the use 
of each of the senses as a means of gaining knowledge, 
and as a means of gaining feeling, not counting those 
instances in which the feeling is not the immediate re- 
sult of the sensation, but the result of ideas suggested 
by the sensation, as when the sight or news of a friend 
brings up pleasant memories. Which ones of the special 
sensations are most like the general sensations, and most 
closely connected with the bodily welfare ? Which ones 
of the special senses are most used in gaining knowledge, 
and relatively least used in experiencing feelings ? In 
which does feeling most predominate ? State whether 
the diagram given below correctly represents the rela- 
tive prominence of feeling and cognition in the several 
senses, and give your reasons. Do you think it would 
be possible to develop the feeling or the cognitive ele- 
ment in any one of the senses until that element should 
become relatively more important than the others. 



SOURCES OF FEELING. 



135 



thougli usually it is least important, e.g., to make taste 
largely an intellectual sense ? Give reasons. 

Laying aside for the moment the question of the rela- 
tive prominence of feeling and cognition, consider the 
question as to which sense is capable of producing the 
most pleasant or unpleasant sensations. Are there any 
colors as pleasant or unpleasant as are some sounds ? 
Compare also the most pleasant and unpleasant odors, 
tastes, and skin sensations, and state which you think 
most intense. Compare now the different senses as to 
the number and frequency of pleasant and unpleasant 
sensations experienced through 
them. Now make a generaliza- 
tion as to which sense is the most 
important source of pleasure to 
you (absolutely, not relative to 
the amount of knowledge it 
gives). In doing this you should 
confine yourself to the sensations 
themselves, not counting the 
ideas and feelings suggested by 
them. The combinations of sen- 
sations maybe counted; e.g., the feeling produced by 
two or more colors together, two or more notes in suc- 
cession in which the effect is different from that where 
they are perceived separately. 

Mental Images and Feeling — From just as vivid a 
mental image as you can of the visual appearance of 
some object or color you like to look at. Now notice 
whether a feeling similar to the one experienced in look- 
ing at it arises. Is it as intense ? Does it come as soon 



SIGHT 


/ 


HEARING 


/ 


Touch 


i/i 


SMELL 


s/ e 


TASTE 


/ 



136 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

as the mental image is formed, or not until it has been 
held before the mind for a while ? Does it come best 
when you represent its appearance or when you ignore 
the appearance and try to represent the feeling it 
produced ? Make the same observations upon mental 
images of things heard, touched, tasted, and smelled, 
which were either pleasant or unpleasant to you. Are 
we justified in making the generalization that all mental 
images arouse feelings similar to those experienced in 
the original sensations, but usually less intense ? 

Are there any places or objects that do not them- 
selves produce either very pleasant or unpleasant sensa- 
tions, yet when perceived or represented produce very 
pleasant or unpleasant feelings? Is it in any or all 
cases because of some pleasant or unpleasant experience 
or experiences that were incidentally associated with 
them ? May we then say that mental images not only 
call up feelings that were elements of the original sensa- 
tions, but also feelings that were experienced at the same 
or nearly the same time ! Mention sounds, odors, tastes, 
colors, persons, objects, names, etc., that are present or 
unpleasant to you, not in themselves, but because of feel- 
ings that have sometimes been associated with them. 
Mention subjects of study that you like and others that 
you do not, and say whether the feeling you have toward 
them is in any considerable degree the result of associ- 
ation. If you think pleasant associations important in 
education, give, fully and specifically, reasons for your 
belief. 

Feeling of Activity. — Not only do sensations and 
their reproduction in the form of mental images pro- 



SOURCES OF FEELING. 137 

duce feelings, but our own activity is felt in all mental 
processes, and this is an important element in nearly all 
feeling. Eecall your own experience and notice whether 
you have been in an almost or entirely passive state 
slightly affected by stimulations, yet not yourself active; 
and contrast that with times when you have been ac- 
tively observing, imagining, or reasoning. Probably 
the feeling in every process is largely or wholly the 
result of movement of muscles and of attention. Some- 
times the feeling is of effort and hindrance, sometimes 
of free movement and power. As seen in the study of 
pleasure and pain, moderate activity is in general pleas- 
urable. In general, however, exercise and the expendi- 
ture of surplus energy is more pleasurable if the activity 
is directed in some way either rhythmically , as in some 
plays, or to the attainment of certain ends, as in work 
and study. Have you ever felt a thrill of pleasure after 
working long for some end, as the solution of a problem, 
when you finally succeeded ? Do 5^ou find pleasure in 
the successful exercise of your powers of perception, 
memory, imagination, reasoning, etc., independent of the 
objects perceived, remembered, etc., and displeasure in 
unsuccessful effort ? Illustrate fully from your own 
experience, and also from your observation of others, 
especially children. May we say that intellectual ac- 
tivity is its own reward because of the pleasure resulting 
from successful effort ? If tasks were always suited to 
pupils^ ability, so that effort would be necessary yet 
success always obtained, would any other stimulus to 
study be needed than that coming from successful 
activity ? 



138 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

Feelings and Intellectual Processes. — We have al- 
ready seen that there are no purely intellectual processes, 
but that all are accompanied by feelings. We are now 
prepared to look for the source of those feelings. All 
mental processes require activity, and they cannot be 
carried on without sensations being received or mental 
images being found. These, as we have just seen, all 
produce feelings; hence we may analyze the various 
mental processes and find the sources of the feelings 
accompanying them. When you look at a nicely- 
frosted cake, what is the most important source of 
the feeling experienced — visual sensations, mental im- 
ages of how it will taste, mental images of pleasant or 
unpleasant experience associated with cake, or the feel- 
ing of activity in being able to recognize it and judge 
of its quality ? Analyze in a similar way the feelings 
accompanying the perception of roses, a maple-tree, a 
snake, a robin, a flag. Mention some things that are 
peculiarly agreeable or disagreeable to you, and state 
what is the principal source of the feeling. 

Use your memory in recalling a very pleasant experi- 
ence, also an unpleasant one, and state what the prin- 
cipal source of the feelings is. Use your memory in 
recalling some historical, mathematical, or geographical 
facts, and then determine the source of the feeling expe- 
rienced in doing so. 

Do you find pleasure in constructing mentally objects, 
persons, and scenes described to you or read about in 
books ? Do you find pleasure in using your creative 
imagination ? Is it greater or less than in the construc- 
tive ? Which is the most important source in each case 



SOURCES OF FEELING. 139 

— mental images or activity? Is there in some in- 
stances pleasure in using the imagination when the 
mental images used in construction or creation, or the 
images that result from those processes, call up un- 
pleasant feelings, as in reading tragedy ? Do you find 
much pleasure in contemplating the result of your 
imaginations ? Edison is said to take pleasure only in 
the activity of inventing and constructing, and to have 
no further interest in a machine when it is perfected. 
Tennyson, on the other hand, took great pleasure in 
reading his own poems. If you have observed such 
differences in children or others, report it. 

How much of the feeling aroused by each of the words 
brook, patriotism, spring, reptiles, lilies, is due to the 
sensation the sound of the word produces, how much 
to mental images belonging to the concept, and how 
much to those incidentally associated with it; also, how 
much to the activity of forming clear concepts of the 
classes named ? Answer the same questions in regard 
to other words. Analyze also the feelings called up by 
names of common school subjects, also by the names of 
individuals. What is the most important source of the 
feeling produced by reading Poe^s " Raven " ? 

Relation between Cognition and Feeling As already 

indicated, there is no feeling without some cognition and 
no cognition without some feeling; and now the question 
comes. Are they usually concerned with the same things, 
and do they increase together, or does one decrease when 
the other increases ? Do you in general think most 
about those things you feel most about, and feel most 
about the things you think most about ? Refer to your 



I40 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

past experience, and notice whetl^er, when anything has 
strongly affected your feelings, as sorrow, anger, joy, 
you think much about it ; also, whether you are apt to 
have considerable feeling in regard to things that have 
occupied your mind a great deal, as some plan you have 
been carrying out, or task you have been laboring to 
complete, even though you were not at first much inter- 
ested in it ? Do you generally attend to those things in 
which you are interested, and are you generally interested 
in some way in the things to which you attend ? Do 
cognition and feeling increase in intensity together 
when concerned with the same objects, or one decrease 
as the other increases ? Does your attention to subjects 
increase with your interest in them, and does your inter- 
est increase as you cognize them more clearly? Does 
the feeling of anger, fear, sympathy, joy, increase or 
decrease with increased clearness of perception or rep- 
resentation of the cause ? As you become more angry or 
frightened or sympathetic, do you perceive more or less 
clearly cause for it ? It is sometimes said that a man is 
" blind with rage." Is he blind to the cause of the anger, 
or only to everything but the cause ? It is sometimes 
said that a man's feelings prevent his judging correctly. 
Is it because he cannot cognize clearly that which con- 
cerns his feelings, or because he cannot attend to and 
clearly perceive other things necessary to a correct judg- 
ment ? It has sometimes been said that feeling and cog- 
nition are exclusive, one decreasing when the other in- 
creases; but it is probable that in most instances where 
this seems to be so they are really concerned with differ- 
ent things, and hence increase in one produces decrease 



SOURCES OF FEELING. 141 

in the other— as is usually the case when attention is 
drawn from one thing to another. 

Cognition and feeling continually exert a reciprocal 
influence upon each other. What attracts non-volun- 
tary attention depends upon one's feelings using the 
word in its broadest sense — of sensitiveness. Even in 
earliest infancy some are more sensitive to sounds and 
others to color; and all through life some are more sensi- 
tive to one kind of impression than to others. Can you 
illustrate this ? Does it not follow, then, that non-vol- 
untary attention is primarily determined by feeling in a 
large measure, both as to things attended to and in- 
tensity of attention ? Non-voluntary attention prepares 
the way for voluntary, arousing curiosity and desire ; the 
thing is more closely observed, and the feeling of interest 
increases, producing additional attention till the end 
toward which effort is directed is gained. On the other 
hand, there can be no feeling about anything not cog- 
nized; and hence what feelings shall be aroused depends 
upon what things are brought to our cognition. Could 
one feel sympathy unless something suited for exciting 
it were presented to consciousness ? Illustrate further 
how increased variety and clearness of knowledge may 
increase the number and intensity of feelings. 



142 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 



CHAPTER III. 

EMOTIONS. 

Nature and Varieties. — If a hard snowball strikes a 
boy in the face he experiences a feeling of pain, which 
is a purely sensory feeling. In addition to this, his face 
may flush, his breath come quick, his hands clinch, as 
the accompaniment of a feeling that is not sensory, but 
emotional. The sensations produced by these bodily 
changes, and the mental images perhaps of past evil 
treatment by the boy who threw the snowball, are im- 
portant factors in producing the feeling, for the complex 
feeling known as anger is not the immediate result of 
the contact of the ball with his face. The feeling may 
arise wholly from within, as when one hears of a small 
boy being abused by a large one. The auditory sensa- 
tions produced by the one telling have little or nothing 
to do with the feeling which is aroused by the ideas sug- 
gested by the words. All such complex feelings which 
result not from immediate sensory stimulations, but from 
ideas and induced bodily changes, are known as emotions. 
Give a number of illustrations showing the difference 
between a sensory feeling and an emotion. When an 



EMOTIONS. 143 

emotional feeling is somewhat continuous it is more 
properly called a passion. 

The variety of kind and degree of emotions that may 
be experienced is almost infinite, and the difficulty of 
classifying them correspondingly great. The following 
names indicate some of the most common emotions, and 
it will be a good exercise to spend a half -hour or more 
in trying to classify them, noticing what standards of 
classifications may be used and the impossibility of get- 
ting a good classification of all the emotions with any 
standard that is chosen : Embarrassment, horror, resent- 
ment, defiance, courage, sorrow, grief, suspense, anxiety, 
melancholy, expectation, hope, sympathy, reverence, 
pity, humor, respect, benevolence, admiration, esteem, 
patriotism, envy, scorn, remorse, jealousy, malevolence, 
novelty, contempt, monotony, doubt, surprise, belief, 
astonishment, reality, love of truth, curiosity, power, 
modesty, restraint, ambition, approbation of self, rivalry, 
humility, freedom, pride, feeling of relation. 

Fear and Anger. — These are probably the most primi- 
tive of the emotions, often being clearly manifested by 
babes only a few months old. Mention any instances 
of their manifestation by very young children that you 
have noticed. Do you think much intellectual develop- 
ment is required in order to experience those emotions ? 
Do sudden sights or sounds ever produce fear when 
there is no definite idea of danger aroused ? Illustrate. 
Give instances from your own experience or observation 
when increased experience and knowledge causes certain 
things to be feared that were at first not frightful; also 
of things ceasing to call forth fear. Is fear of any value 



144 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

in preserving the life and health of animals and men ? 
Illustrate, and give reasons. May it ever be a means of 
moral self-preservation and development ? Give reasons. 
Even if it is sometimes useful as a means, is it valuable 
as an end — a desirable feeling to cultivate ? What bad 
effects, if any, may result ? 

Is the feeling of anger more closely related in origin 
to pleasure, or to pain ? Illustrate. Is the feeling itself 
ever pleasurable ? Is the feeling of any value as a 
means of self-preservation ? Keasons. When excessive, 
does it ever injure the health ? In general, what is the 
effect upon moral development ? Will the feeling be- 
come stronger and more easily called forth if frequently 
excited ? What is the effect upon children of teasing 
and making them angry, as is sometimes done by older 
people for amusement ? 

Love and Sympathy, — These feelings are manifested 
at quite an early age, but not as strongly in young children 
as are fear and anger. Some ideas of previous experi- 
ences are necessary to their existence, probably, even in 
their earliest manifestation, while such is not the case 
with fear and anger. The love of a very young child 
for a person is probably largely the result of mental 
images of pleasant sensations associated with that person. 
Illustrate the fact that with children a few years old 
any one who is the means of giving them pleasant sensa- 
tions very quickly gains a place in their affection. Is it 
not true also that we are apt to love those who give us 
pleasure either sensory or emotional, and dislike those 
who produce in us unpleasant feelings ? After the feel- 
ing is strongly developed, however, it becomes less selfish^ 



EMOTIONS. 145 

and may be felt for those wlio no longer give pleasure, 
unless it be the pleasure of serving the one loved. The 
memory of past pleasu'res, however, is an important ele- 
ment in continuing the feeling. Do you think love has 
any self -preservative value, either directly or indirectly ? 
What would be the effect upon the continued existence 
and development of animals and men if no individual 
felt any regard or did anything for other individuals ? 
Is the feeling a desirable one to develop for its own sake ? 
Is it valuable as a means of moral development ? 

A young baby will sometimes reflect in its own feat- 
ures the smile of its mother. This is probably a sort 
of reflex imitation of what is seen, and at first only 
slightly if at all the sign of sympathy. No doubt such 
spontaneous imitation of the signs of feeling is an im- 
portant means of developing the feeling of sympathy. 
The further conditions are mental images of feelings 
sympathized with, and some feeling of love for the 
person experiencing the feeling. Is it possible to sym- 
pathize with a feeling entirely different from any that 
we have experienced ? Can you sympathize as perfectly 
with one of a different race as of your own ? One of a 
different age ? One of an entirely different disposition ? 
Does a vivid representation of the condition of another 
increase the feeling of sympathy ? Illustrate. Do you 
suppose people ever lack in sympathy because they lack 
in the power of imagination ? or, having the power, be- 
cause they do not think to use it in representing the 
condition of others ? 

Which is easier for you to sympathize with — joy or 
sorrow? Do you think avoiding envy and sympathiz- 



146 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

ing with joy indicates a higher development of sympathy 
than does sympathy with sorrow only ? Grive reasons. 
Social feelings of various kinds are probably dependent 
in the main npon sympathy, though they may be largely 
selfish — the outgrowth simply of a desire to have certain 
feelings aroused within us by others. 

Feelings of Self. — All feelings are in their very nature 
self feelings, being, as we have already seen, modifica- 
tions of self; but there are some that are concerned more 
exclusively with self — have but little reference to other 
things and persons. After the bodily sensations, which 
are wholly egoistic, the most prominent of these are the 
feeling of power, and growing out of that on the one 
hand ambition and pride, and on the other modesty 
and humility, also courage and fear, all of which are 
concerned principally with self. These . feelings are 
prominent elements in the feeling of self, and are the 
basis for the development of most of the other emotions. 

The feeling of self, the consciousness of our own ex- 
istence as a personality distinct from all external things 
and all other persons, is a gradual development usually, 
though some persons can remember the time when the 
idea first came clearly to them, and they thought of 
themselves as an existence distinct from the world 
around them. Even in those cases, however, they had 
probably already made the distinction, though they had 
not made it a special object of thought. The general 
bodily sensations are the basis of the feeling, which 
could probably never develop into distinct knowledge 
without movement, through which the child learns his 
power to change his own sensations and the things that 



EMOTIONS. 147 

affect him. All ideas gained through the special senses 
being associated with these general sensations and feel- 
ings of movement, are, in a way, a part of one's self, 
Hence Prof. James has good ground for saying that 
one's self is all that he can call his, including his prop- 
erty, friends, reputation, and intellectual acquirements. 
As these increase one's self seems to grow, and the loss 
of any of them seems to diminish one's personality. He 

gives the formula " Self-esteem = :^ — -. — ," and 

° Pretensions 

shows how this is true for each individual in different 

lines of his activity. Can you illustrate this ? To 

make it absolutely correct, we perhaps need to add to it 

" compared with his ideal of what ought to be done," 

though " pretensions " taken in a sufficiently broad 

sense might include the person's ideal. 

Is self-esteem a good basis for the development of a 
strong character ? Which could you hope to influence 
most — a boy with considerable self-esteem, or one with 
none? Hlustrate the effect of the opinions of parents, 
teachers, and friends upon the value one places upon 
himself. Does experience help one to value himself 
correctly ? Are tests in school subjects and in games of 
value in this respect ? 

Self -consciousness. — Turning one's thoughts within 
and observing introspectively one's own mental processes 
may be almost purely an intellectual act; but if at the 
same time we think of others as observing us and com- 
pare our mental operations with some standard of what 
they ought to be, there is a distinct feeling aroused, and 
we are then self-conscious. This self-consciousness may 



148 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

be temporary, as in embarrassment or triumph, or more 
continuous, as in bashful and egotistical persons who 
think of themselves a large proportion of the time. 

Children who are noticed a great deal by others are 
apt to have their own attention directed to self, and 
hence to become self-conscious. Mention any instances 
of this kind you have observed. Have you ever noticed 
instances of children silent and embarrassed when 
spoken to by a stranger about themselves, but respon- 
sive and free when spoken to about other persons or 
objects in which they were interested ? In general, 
is it well to arouse and to develop self-consciousness in 
a child? Why? 

In older persons may the direction of attention to 
one's activities be a means of becoming better acquainted 
with the peculiarities of those activities, so as to make 
them more like the standard with which they are com- 
pared ? Is continuous self -introspection and self-con- 
sciousness a good thing, or does it tend to prevent suc- 
cessful activity, and to foster undue pride, humility, or 
self-seeking ? 

Esthetic Feelings.— The feeling that arises upon 
the perception of beauty is peculiar in that it seems to 
have no purpose beyond the pleasure of the feeling 
itself. All pleasurable sensations have in them one 
element of the aesthetic, and in young children this is 
about all the element that is present. Another element 
is the harmonious combination and arrangement of 
sensations. The various forms, colors, and sounds give 
aesthetic pleasure according to the harmony with which 
they are arranged. In the more advanced stage of de- 



EMOTIONS. 149 

velopment of the gestlietical perceptions not only must 
the parts immediately together harmonize, but there 
must be a variety in the parts, and all together must 
constitute a unity. This highest form of aesthetic feel- 
ing may arise from the perception of harmony and unity 
in a literary or scientific essay, or in contemplating the 
laws of nature, as well as in perceiving the variety and 
unity in the form and color' of a picture or a building, 
or of pitch, quality, time, and loudness of sounds in 
music. 

There is a fourth source of the aesthetic feeling— the 
feeling aroused by the mental images suggested by what 
is perceived. The beiiuty of a picture or statue does 
not usually consist wholly or even mainly in the arrange- 
ment of form and color harmoniously into a unity, for 
the thought which the picture or statue expresses or 
suggests is one of the most important sources of the 
feeling produced, especially if it suggests something 
more agreeable than can be perceived at any one time, 
or in other words, suggests the ideally perfect. It is 
evident that only one who has had the requisite experi- 
ence can feel that which is suggestive in a work of art, 
and also that considerable intellectual development is 
necessary to the perception of unity where the variety 
is great ; hence children cannot be expected to appreciate 
works of art which require much experience or intel- 
lectual, development. 

The fact that objects that give aesthetic pleasure in 
childhood often cease to do so in later years suggests 
another source of the aesthetic feeling, i.e., mental ac- 
tivity. If the complexity of the parts is so slight that 



150 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

the perception of unity does not require sufficient mental 
activity, the object gives little or no pleasure. If the 
parts do not give sufficient variety the object becomes 
dull or monotonous for the same reason and because of 
fatigue of the parts concerned in the perception, while 
if they are too various there is a feeling of strain and 
baffled effort. With so many sources of feeling, varying 
with inherited tendencies, experience, education, and 
mood, it is not strange that the tastes of different in- 
dividuals differ so much, and that those of the same 
individual differ at different ages. 

The indefinite quality known as culture is simply a 
development of the aesthetic nature emotionally and in- 
tellectually, so that the individual has a keen and just 
appreciation of harmony and fitness, not only of objects, 
sounds, form, and color, but of words, ideas, and actions, 
in all the relations of life. For this reason, and because 
of the pleasurable character of the feeling itself and its 
close relation to morals, it is very important that the 
aesthetic feeling should be developed, and beauty in 
nature, art, and literature may all be used for this pur- 
pose. Many objects suited to arouse the aesthetic feel- 
ing in the child must be presented to him, and his 
attention given in such a way that he perceives and 
feels their beauty. Beautiful objects alone are not 
enough, but they must be suited to his powers and his 
attention must be directed to them. This is done most 
effectively and the feeling most surely aroused when 
those around the child notice the beautiful and give 
expression to the feeling. Indicate specifically some of 



EMOTIONS. 151 

the ways in which the aesthetic feeling may be cultivated 
in the schoolroom. 

Intellectual Feelings.— There are feelings accompany- 
ing intellectual operations arising mainly from the rela- 
tions of ideas in the mind and largely independent of the 
character of the ideas; hence they may be called intel- 
lectual feelings. That feeling which enables us to 
distinguish between mental states corresponding to 
realities and those that are imaginative may be called 
feeling of reality. If there is uncertainty as to the 
reality of the experience there arises a feeling of doubt, 
and when one is convinced by evidence of the reality, a 
feeling of lelief. There are also feelings accompanying, 
sometimes preceding, the perception of likeness, differ- 
ence, similarity, relation, etc. The repetition of any 
mental experience produces a feeling of monotony, and 
any new experience a feeling of novelty, and this usually 
arouses a feeling of curiosity ; and if it is not only new, 
but contradictory to past experience or opposed to the 
present feeling of exjjedation, it produces surprise or 
astonislwient. Curiosity leads to a feeling of interest, 
which prompts to activity to connect this new mental 
experience with other experiences. 

Interest, therefore, is the most important of the in- 
tellectual feelings, for it both prompts to intellectual 
activity and constitutes the principal pleasure of the 
activity. The feeling is the result partially of the new 
experience which always produces feeling, partially of 
the activity which, as we have already seen, is in general 
pleasurable, but mainly from the relation of ideas to each 
other especially new and old ideas. All perceiving of 



152 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

relations is interesting; hence, as previously discovered, 
in order that there may be attention and interest the 
subject must be neither entirely new nor entirely old 
to the one studying it but be such that the relation of 
the new ideas to old ones are perceived or new relations 
between old ideas discovered. Herbart^s theory of ap- 
perception and interest is founded upon this. The 
feeling that arises from new experiences he calls empiri- 
cal interest; that resulting from the perception of rela- 
tions, speculative interest; and that resulting from the 
perception of the harmony and unity of a number of 
diverse ideas, aesthetic interest. These feelings often 
experienced produce love of truth. 

Moral and Religious Feelings.— All feelings con- 
nected with ideas of duty are moral feelings. Ideas of 
duty involve the conception of several courses of action, 
a judgment in regard to them, and a feeling of obligation 
to perform the action approved by the judgment. The 
feeling that certain acts ought to be performed rather than 
others is the essential element in all feelings that may be 
classed as moral. The thought of a single action with- 
out reference to its effect cannot give rise to a moral feel- 
ing, for it is a moral -action only when considered with 
reference to its results, directly or indirectly, upon others. 
The time that you go to bed is morally indifferent, unless 
it affects others directly by disturbing them in some way, 
or indirectly by interfering with your health, disposition, 
or power to do. Give other illustrations of actions that 
are and are not moral. 

From the fact that actions derive their moral quality 
from their relation to other acts, they are closely related, 



EMOTIONS. 153 

on the one hand, to prudential or useful acts, which are 
so because of their results. Prudential acts, however, 
do not necessarily involve any thought of the results upon 
any one but ourselves, nor any feeling of obligation. If 
such thoughts and feelings come in, they become moral 
as well as prudential. On the other hand, the moral 
feelings are closely related to the aesthetic, for the ses- 
thetic feelings arise largely from the contemplation of 
the relations and the thought of an ideal, while the 
moral feeling arises from a contemplation of actions 
and the thought of the ideal action. They differ, how- 
ever, in that the moral feelings are concerned only with 
actions, and in that the feeling is not merely of approval 
of an ideal, but of obligation to conform to it. 

Feelings have a moral quality because they prompt to 
moral actions. No feeling is in itself moral, but only as 
it is a part of an action and is related to other action. 
Love is more frequently a moral feeling than hate, be- 
cause it prompts to actions that do not injure but help 
others. All feelings that are concerned mainly with self 
tend to make one think only of the acts whose results 
are favorable to self, and tend to stimulate one to such 
actions; hence egoistic feelings in excess produce im- 
moral actions. Sympathy, and similar feelings con- 
cerned mainly with others, on the contrary, prompt to 
actions resulting favorably to others; hence, if not car- 
ried to an extreme so as to decrease one^s power of 
action, they are favorable to moral action. The self 
feelings are morally wrong only in so far as they are ex- 
cessive and cause actions to be performed regardless of 
results upon others, and the sympathetic feelings are 



154 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

morally right only in so far as they lead to actions that 
harmonize the results upon others and upon self. The 
selfish feelings are more instinctiye and naturally 
stronger; hence moral training is directed more to the 
development of the sympathetic feelings and repression 
of the selfish so that a proper equilibrium may be estab- 
lished. 

Moral development results, then, through the arousal 
of unselfish feelings, the formation of ideals of right 
action, and increase in the feeling of obligation to con- 
form to the ideal of right action. Any experience or 
teaching that tends to develop a child in any of these 
three ways is valuable morally. It is only by experience 
of feelings that he is able to sympathize with the feel- 
ings of others, and largely by experience that he learns 
the effect of his actions upon himself and upon others; 
hence experience is the basis and the most important 
factor in moral development. If the attention of the 
child is called to the results of action, the formation 
of an idea of the results of various actions will be has- 
tened. The observation of noble actions and of regard 
for the right, either directly in those surrounding the 
child,pr indirectly through the medium of oral or printed 
story or history, is a most important means of developing 
an ideal of what is right and a desire to do it. Eules, 
maxims, commands, are also helpful in forming ideas of 
right action. Yet without the knowledge of the results 
of obedience or disobedience no feeling is aroused, and 
the ideas fail to become ideals. 

Eeligious feelings are closely related to moral feel- 
ings; the difference is that instead of being aroused 



EMOTIONS. 155 

by ideas of our relations to other persons, they are the 
accompaniment of ideas of our relation to some being 
-higher than man. Generally speaking, the ideas and 
feelings concerned with our relations to others are the 
basis of religious ideas and feelings. On the other hand, 
the moral feelings are in most religions intensified by 
the religious ideas and feelings. 

Desires.— Desires are distinguished from other feel- 
ings by the fact that they arise not so much from present 
experiences as from a representation of possible experi- 
ences more agreeable than the present, and by the fact 
that they involYC to a greater extent a tendency to ac- 
tivity. Any feeling may give rise to a desire, hence the 
number and varieties of desires are as great as the num- 
ber and kinds of feelings. The greater the variety of 
interests one has the greater the number of desires, and 
t-he greater the number and intensity of desires the 
greater the variety and vigor of will activity; hence 
wealth of desire is favorable to richness of character. 

Classification of Emotions — The classification of 
emotions in a satisfactory way has thus far proved an 
impossibility because of their great variety and the fact 
that those which are similar in one respect are entirely 
different in other respects. The classification followed 
in this chapter may be outlined as follows: 
I. Primitive Emotions : Fear, anger, etc. 

II. Developed Emotions: 

(a) Love, hate, etc. 

(b) ^Esthetic Emotions. 

(c) Moral and Keligious Emotions. 

(d) Intellectual Emotions. 



15^ INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

III. Self and Self Feelings. 

IV. Desires. 

The following grouping of the principal emotions, if 
carefully studied, will be found more suggestive and 
valuable than any rigid classification that can be given. 
The words suggesting the most typical emotions not 
contrasted are printed in small capitals, the typical 
contrasting emotions in bold-faced type, and the varieties 
and degrees in ordinary type. In a general way, those 
toward the top of the page are pleasurable and those 
toward the bottom painful. It will be a valuable exer- 
cise to notice the gradations of emotions and the con- 
nection between the different groups. 



EMOTIONS. 157 






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PARTED III. 

MilL 



CHAPTEE I. 

CONTROL OF MENTAL AND MOTOR 
ACTIVITIES. 

Nature and Functions of WiU. — Is there ever a time 
when you are conscious and yet not exercising your 
cognitive powers in some degree ? Is feeling in some 
degree always an element in your consciousness ? Are 
you ever conscious and yet not using your will in the 
►ilightest degree ? In answering these questions recall 
your past experiences; also spend some time in observing 
introspectively your own mental operations, trying to note 
when will is an element of the consciousness and when 
it is not. Would you say that there is always activity 
when there is volition ? Is this activity always visible 
bodily movement? Is there always activity of atten- 
tion in volition ? Now reverse the question : Is there 
always volition when there is activity ? Notice the 
various movements and changes of attention you make, 

159 



l6o INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

and observe when they are volitional and when they are ' 
not. Probably you will note various movements of the 
eyes, head, and perhaps other parts of the body, and at- 
tention to sounds or objects that you did not think of 
turning toward or attending to before doing so, while in 
other instances you thought more or less clearly of the 
result of the turning toward before making the change. 
Thus there comes to my ears the sound of a voice pro- 
ducing an intensification of consciousness upon that 
sensation and a barely perceptible turning of the head 
in the direction of its source; the sound is repeated with 
the same result; then a third repetition suggests the 
question, " What is the man saying to the boy " ? and 
there is a conscious pausing and attending to get an 
answer to that question. Would you say that there was 
any volition in the first two instances ? Was there in 
the last? Mention similar instances in your own ex- 
perience, and state in which ones there was some con- 
sciousness of the end, purpose, or result of the activity. 
Would you say, then, that will is present in con- 
sciousness only when there is activity, and when the 
end or result of the activity is more or less clearly repre- 
sented ? Is it always present under those circumstances, 
or may there be an end of activity represented and the 
activity not be toward that end ? If you represent as 
the end of your activity the solution of a problem, but 
your activity is toward the formation of a mental image 
of how you will look in your new clothes at a party to- 
night, is will an element in that activity ? If the repre- 
sentation of the end, (solution of problem,) results in de- 
creasing the activity of the imagination, should you say 



WILL. i6i 

that will is present in consciousness ? Is will^ then, pres- 
ent when the activity is modified toward the attain- 
ment of a represented end, or more briefly, in some de- 
gree directed toward the represented end ? 

Is the end represented usually in some degree desired 
— preferred to any other ? Would you say as some do 
that the activity is not volition unless the end is desired ? 
State in a single sentence the characteristics that dis- 
tinguish a volitional 'state of consciousness from one 
that is not volitional. 

In which kind of attention is there activity, but no 
represented end ? In which kind both, bat activity not 
toward the represented end ? 

Notice whenever there is movement of any kind in 
volition that the result is some change in the relation 
of external things to us, or of ourselves to external 
things. Mention some instances specifically in which 
this is true. Is there not also in such cases a change 
in our consciousness produced by the change in the 
relation of things with reference to us ? When there is 
no visible movement but only direction of attention 
toward the represented end is there not also a change in 
consciousness ? Notice your own consciousness at the 
beginning of some volitional activity of observation, 
imagination, or reasoning and at the close and see if 
your consciousness has not changed. May we say that 
all volitional activity produces a change in. conscious- 
ness ? Is this true of other activity ? In the latter case 
is that the purpose of the activity ? In volitional activity 
may we say that the ultimate purpose of the volition 
is to produce a change in consciousness ? Illustrate. 



i62 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

From previous study we know that there are very 
many kinds of activities. Every stimulation of the sense 
organs (and the eye, ear, and skin are being stimulated 
al] of the time) tends to excite activity. Every mental 
image or concept excites the mind to call up and com- 
bine in various ways other images and concepts. Every 
feeling produces movements and tends to excite in- 
tellectual activity of various kinds. One kind of activ- 
ity would result in one change in consciousness and the 
others in different changes. If there were no control- 
ling power there would be no unity of action, but only a 
seething commotion and overflow of thoughts and loel 
ings, producing diversity of movement and change of 
consciousness. Only when these various activities are 
controlled and directed to the attainment of definite 
ends do the activities becom^e the actions of a self-direct- 
ing person. That power of the mind which directs and 
controls these various activities to the attainment of 
conceived and desired ends is known as the will. Until 
a child develops this power he has no wiD, however, 
active he may be. Notice how the will acts with rclor- 
ence to the future. Illustrate how it determines what 
shall come into consciousness. 

All animals including human beings make spontane- 
ous movements — movements independent of external 
stimulation — from birth and even in the embryo. These 
movements when directed may be said to be willed 
movements ^«r excellence ; hence does it not seem that 
will performs the functions of exciting activity as well 
as directing activity already begun. Does it also increase 
activity already begun ? May it also decrease or prevent* 



WILL. 163 

activity ? Illustrate these latter points, and sum up in 
a sentence the functions of will. 

CONTROL OF II!^^TELLECTUAL ACTIVITIES. 

Observe your own intellectual activities of various 
kinds and notice to what extent they are controlled by 
the will. Eeport, for instance, the various stimulations 
of the senses that tend to attract your activities to them, 
and the extent to which you direct your activities to 
certain points to find out certain things in common 
instances of active perception, as, when looking at a 
book, or article of clothing you are thinking of buying, 
looking at a plant or animal you wish to classify, listen- 
ing to sounds you wish to identify, or observing a person 
or building that you wish to describe. Analyze several 
such instances, indicating specifically the various stimuli 
you refrain from attending to, and the direction of your 
activity to the attainment of definite ends. Mention also 
any individual difierences in the power to do this you 
have observed in others. 

Listen to a short description of some kind, and notice 
how your will limits and directs your activities in con- 
structing the mental images in accordance with the de- 
scription instead of following other lines of association 
or attending to the various things stimulating the senses. 
Again, try to construct a quilt or wall-paper pattern of 
equilateral triangles of two sizes or to write a brief imag- 
inary story. Notice in each case how you continually 
check yourself and keep your activity directed toward 
the attainment of the end set before you. 

Notice when you are trying to recall a certain name 



i64 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

or fact how you direct your attention to things associated 
with it^ and prevent yourself from running off on other 
lines of association. 

Notice when following a demonstration in geometry 
or the arguments of a speech how you continually direct 
your activities along certain definite, narrow channels. 
Notice in every lesson how your will is continually 
directing your activities to the accomplishment of rep- 
resented ends. 

Notice more definitely just liow the will directs the 
intellectual operations. Does it act directly upon what 
is not in consciousness, or only indirectly through what 
is in consciousness ? Can the will do anything more in 
controlling thought than to fix attention upon ideas in 
consciousness that seem to be associated with the one. 
desired ? 

Efficiency of Will. — Often in exercising our wills we 
have a feeling of effort sometimes very strong. Does 
the feeling of great effort necessarily indicate efficient 
activity of the will ? Does excitation or great increase 
of activity indicate an efficient will ? or is efficiency of 
will measured by the extent to which the activity, whether 
little or much, is directed to the attainment of the repre- 
sented end and independent of the amount of effort used ? 
Illustrate and give reasons for your answers, then sum 
up in a sentence the general truth in regard to the 
efficiency of will. 

CONTKOL OF FEELIKGS. 

If you are suffering from bodily pain of any kind, 
what is the effect of keeping the attention fixed upon 



WILL. 165 

the cause of the pain ? What is the effect of keeping 
the mind folly occuj^ied with things not connected with 
the pain ? Designating by the term " object" of feeling 
that with which the feeling is associated, whether it be a 
material object or an idea, what is the effect of fixing 
the attention upon the object of an emotion, as anger ? 
What is the effect of turning the attention to other 
things ? Is it possible for the will to act dio^ectly upon 
a feeling of any kind and increase or decrease it ? Can 
you prevent or produce the signs of a feeling ? What is 
the usual effect of doing so ? Can you direct the atten- 
tion to one or another object of feeling and thus indi- 
rectly increase or decrease any emotion ? G-ive several 
instances in which you have thus indirectly modified 
your feelings. Show how one might increase or de- 
crease his feeling of anger, fear, sorrow, or sympathy under 
circumstances tending to call forth those emotions, re- 
spectively, in a strong degree. May we not say that if 
one had complete control of his attention that he could 
have complete control of his feelings, and feel as he 
wished at any time ? The feelings, however, are power- 
ful stimuli to attention; hence the '^ if " may be infinitely 
large. 

Indicate how love for a subject of study, for one's 
country, or for a person may be increased or decreased 
by the will. Can the love of beauty, of truth, and of 
justice be increased by directing the activities to objects 
suited to call forth those feelings ? Illustrate. Could 
a permanent change in feeling and hence of disposition 
be brought about by the continued voluntary direction 
of the will to the object tending to produce the feeling ? 



i66 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

Indicate specifically liow one could voluntarily make 
his dis|)osition more cheerful or more sympathetic. 
Can young children be expected to voluntarily direct 
their attention so as to excite a certain feeling which 
others wish them to have? For instance, is it any use 
to tell a child that he ought to be interested in a certain 
subject or like a certain person ? If the teacher wants 
a pupil to experience such a feeling, what must he do ? 

CONTKOL OF MOVEMEN^TS. 

How Voluntary Motions are Made. — As already sug- 
gested, the greater number of volitions are expressed 
sooner or later in a movement of some kind. The idea is 
changed into a reality by muscular contraction, that is, 
the representation is changed into a presentation. Few 
if any of the ends that we strive for can be obtained 
without movement of hand, eye, vocal organs, or the 
whole body. The question to be considered now is how 
these movements are controlled by the will. 

In writing your name how do you control the move- 
ments of your arm so as to make the letters ? From 
physiology we know that when you write your name 
nervous impulses must pass out from the cortex of your 
brain down to the spinal cord, then from it along certain 
nerve fibres to the muscles of the arm so that the mus- 
cles are made to contract and relax just enough to pro- 
duce the desired movements of the hand and each move- 
ment at just the right time. Do you know the nerves 
and muscles concerned in making each letter, and the 
exact path the nervous impulse must take in passing 



WILL. 167 

from the brain to the arm ? If not^ is it not evident 
that your will has no direct control over the physiologi- 
cal process of movement ? Let us then turn our attention 
to the psychical process involved in movement. Look 

at this figure | '^ ; then with eyes closed try to 

draw it, noticing what mental images, if any, you have in 
mind as you do so, and also what sensations you receive 
by which you can form some idea of the correctness of the 
movements, is it a visual image of the figure and of the 
movement of the arm through space that you have while 
making the figure ? Is it the motor sensations that en- 
able you to know that the movement is being made and 
to judge of its accuracy ? If your eyes are open while 
you are making the movement do you depend upon the 
muscular sensations for judging of the accuracy of the 
movement or upon the visual ? If you try to move your 
feet in a certain way can you tell whether you make the 
movement correctly or not by the motor sensations or 
do you need to look at them ? Close your eyes and have 
some one guide your hand so as to make a simple figure 
of some kind, then with eyes still closed try to make the 
same figure and to judge of the success of your attempt. 
What sensation do you have to depend upon for getting 
knowledge of the shape of the figure ? Do you from 
those sensations form an image of the motor sensations 
to be obtained in making the figure or the image of 
the visual sensations you would get in watching the 
movement or both ? In making the figure which image 
is most prominent in your mind ? Can you readily 
translate motor sensations into a visual image of the 



l68 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

niovement, and the visual appearance into a motor image 
of the movement ? 

Try pronouncing some difficult words or sounding some 
notes, and notice what mental images you have in mind 
as you do so.. Is the image visual, motor, or auditory 
largely ? How do you judge of the accuracy, by the 
auditory or the motor sensations that you get as you 
utter the sounds ? 

It seems then, looking at movement from the psychical 
side, that there are mental images preceding and accom- 
panying the movement and sensations accompanying 
and following the movement, and that the accuracy of 
the movement is judged by comparing these two. Is 
there anything else involved in movement on the psychi- 
cal side ? If not, we are to think of the physiological 
process as carried on without conscious direction by the 
nervous and muscular apparatus, the course of the ner- 
vous impulse being determined on the psychical side by 
the kind of mental image formed, just as the note 
sounded by an organ is determined by the key struck. 
The musician needs not to know the mechanism by 
which the note is sounded, so the mind needs not to 
know the mechanism by which a motion is made. 

When the key middle G on the piano is struck that 
note will be sounded whether the key was struck acci- 
dentally or intentionally. If the nervous and muscular 
mechanism is like the musical instrument we should 
expect that when a mental image of a motion is formed 
the movement will be made whether the individual in- 
tends it or not. Have you ever written a word some 
one spoke in your presence instead of the one you in- 



WILL. 169 

tended to write ? Was it because you unintentionally, 
at the moment found a mental image of tlie word ? 
Have you ever spoken words you did not intend to in a 
similar way ? In the game at the words " Thumbs up," 
why is it that your thumbs go up when neither you nor 
" Simon says " for them to ? Give other illustrations of 
unintentional movements produced by mental images of 
movement. 

If our observation and reasoning thus far is correct it 
would seem that psychically control of movement means 
simply control of mental images. The will can decide 
what mental image shall be held in mind, and thus de- 
termine what motion shall be made, the nervous and 
muscular mechanism always, when in a normal condi- 
tion, acting in conformity to the mental image formed, 
and that these mental images may be either visual, mo- 
tor, or auditory. 

With most persons the visual images are the most 
prominent in moving the limbs and the auditory in mov- 
ing the vocal organs, but with some the motor images 
are most prominent in all movements, and with all per- 
sons probably the motor sensations are an important 
element in forming images of movement of all kinds. 

Learning New Motions. — If controlling movements 
is simply controlling the mental images suited for call- 
ing them forth, then to learn a new motion one must 
learn what mental image is suited for calling it forth. 
This can be learned only by experience — just as a begin- 
ner must learn by experiment what note will be sounded 
when a certain key of a piano is struck. AVhen a motion 
has once been made, then usually a mental image of the 



170 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

sensations experienced in making it will produce it 
again. Have you never, in learning to write, draw, or 
skate, or the movements necessary in any kind of work, 
after several trials more or less unsuccessful, finally suc- 
ceeded in making the movements once just right, so as 
to make you think "Now I have it " ? Perhaps, how- 
ever, the next attempt is unsuccessful; then you try to 
think just how the successful movement felt, and what 
you had in mind when you made it. The more per- 
fectly you succeed in doing this the more successful is 
your next attempt. When you get so you can form a 
perfectly distinct mental image of the movement and of 
its parts you can make it accurately. While this psychi- 
cal process of forming a distinct mental image has been 
going on, the physiological process of the nervous im- 
pulses taking more and more definite courses has been 
occurring. 

After one has had a great deal of experience in mak- 
ing movements he knows beforehand approximately 
what mental image will produce the new movement, and 
only a few trials are necessary to form just the right 
mental image. Perhaps you have never made a figure 

like this: Uv/ ^k^ ; but from former experience 

in making curves and straight lines you can form a fairly 
distinct image of the movements required to make it. 
In fact, the relation between the visual image and the 
movement is so close that the translation of the image 
of the figure into the image of the motions required to 
make it is little more than the formation of the visual 
image of the successive parts as one after the other is 



WILU 171 

made. Is it not true if you can hold accurately in 
mind the successive parts of this figure that you can 
make it accurately ? In writing or drawing is it not true 
that the more accurate your mental image of the letter 
or figure is, and the more perfectly you can hold the 
successive parts in mind, the more perfectly you can 
make it ? . Notice, as bearing on what is meant by con- 
trol of a mental image, that if your attention goes in ad- 
vance of the hand so that you are looking at a down 
curve when making an upward stroke, you do not make 
the figures perfectly. Is not, then, the improvement in 
writing and drawing a child makes an exact measure of 
improvement in his mental image of the object or letter, 
and in the power to hold the attention to the succes- 
sive parts as they are made ? May we not then look upon 
learning to draw as a means of training to form accu- 
rate mental images of objects, and to control them, and 
that the knowledge and power thus gained constitutes 
the real culture value of the subject to the pupil ? The 
lines, then, that he makes in controlling these images are 
merely an important means of expressing his ideas. 
The motor sensations experienced in making the lines 
are, however, valuable as well as the visual in forming 
the mental images. To the teacher the figures drawn 
are an objective means of observing and testing the 
progress of pupils in the formation and control of 
mental images. 

State which is lacking in the two following instances 
(supposing them possible) — perfect mental image or 
power of control of the mental image: (1) When the 
figure can be made perfectly, with a copy to look at, but 



172 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

not otherwise. (2) When, without a model to look at, 
accurate judgment can be made as to the correctness of 
the drawings or letters shown, but the individual him- 
self is unable to draw them with any accuracy. 
, In the latter case is it not true that if a person, besides 
recognizing that the letter or figure as a whole is accu- 
rate or inaccurate, can point out the part that is defec- 
tive, that he can also usually make the letter or figure 
himself ? If he cannot, it is then perhaps fair to infer 
that his defect is not in the correctness of the mental 
image as a whole nor of its parts, but either in the 
power of controlling the mental images or in the physi- 
ological apparatus. 

Theoretically it is conceivable that one might have 
perfect mental images and have perfect control of them, 
but not be able to draw or write well because of a defect 
in the motor apparatus— Just as a musician may strike the 
right keys in just the right order and time, but not make 
good music, because the instrument is defective. The 
drawer— the former of mental images and the maker of 
movements— is one agent, not two, as in the case of the 
musician and the piano; hence it may be doubted whether 
the power to form mental images can be gained without 
the power of movement or the power of movement with- 
out the power to form mental images of the movement. 
It is possible that the mental image-forming apparatus 
and the movement-making apparatus are not equally per- 
fect in the same individual, but it cannot be admitted 
without evidence. 

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is best 
to assume that not only are the drawings one makes an 



WILL, 173 

accurate measure of one's progress in image forming and 
controlling, but also that the drawings of any two in- 
dividuals are accurate measures of their relative powers 
in forming and controlling mental images. The state- 
ment that the one who draws poorly has just as good a 
mental image as the other, should not be admitted with- 
out good evidence in support of it, for the presumption 
is against it even more strongly than against the state- 
ment that "I know (certain truths) but cannot tell 
them," for language is an artificial means of expression, 
and movement a natural means. In either case a 
system of education which ignores or represses expres- 
sion may lead to a condition in which the thoughts 
and mental images are more perfect than the expres- 
sions of them would indicate. 

One's writing or drawing may not be equal to the 
mental images that he can form, but there is reason to 
believe that they are as perfect as the mental images he 
does form as he writes or draws. Eeport facts from your 
own experience and observation bearing on this ques- 
tion. The above discusion refers to plane figures not in 
perspective and some slight modification of the state- 
ment would be needed for solids. The evenness of 
the lines is also not referred to but only the form of 
the figure drawn, since steadiness of hand is largely 
physiological. 

In controlling the vocal organs the auditory images 
usually play the same part that the visual images do in the 
control of the limbs, hence learning to utter a new sound 
means that one must learn to form and control an audi- 
tory image of the sound. Frequent hearing of a word is 



174 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

then an important means of learning to speak it. Young 
children often form a great many mental images of words 
before they begin to speak; then after they begin talk- 
ing seem to learn with astonishing rapidity, and some- 
times utter new words perfectly the first attempt. The 
explanation is, that they have done the greater part of 
the learning before they begin to speak. If a child 
heard only a foreign language during the first two years 
of his life he would not make the usual astonishing prog- 
ress in his native tongue the third year. The sounds a 
child hears as well as those he makes are then impor- 
tant factors in forming habits of pronunciation. 

Defective hearing may be the cause of defective artic- 
ulation as well as defective vocal organs. Those who 
lose entirely the power of hearing usually cease speak- 
ing, unless special effort is made to induce them to 
continue speaking. Persons born deaf may, however, 
be taught to speak. What mental images and sensa- 
tions do they have to use in making the movements 
and judging of their accuracy ? Helen Keller, who is 
both blind and deaf, learned to speak by placing her 
fingers on her teacher's lips and throat and then imitat- 
ing the movements thus perceived. What mental 
images and sensations does she depend upon ? 

Making Familiar Motions — Try to make a new 
sound, then pronounce some word that is perfectly 
familiar, and notice the difference. In the former case 
are you not distinctly conscious of holding in mind an 
auditory mental image and of an effort to make the 
movements of the vocal organs correspond to it, while in 
the latter case you think the word and it is uttered 



WILL. 175 

with little consciousness on your part of auditory image 
and movement of vocal organs. Again, you sit with pen 
in hand, intending to express your ideas on a certain sub- 
ject: as you think of them your hand writes the words 
while you are scarcely conscious of the moveaients made 
or of the mental images controlling them, but only of 
your intention to express your thoughts in certain 
words. Contrast that with your first experience in try- 
ing to make those letters and words. Notice also in 
games and occupations that are more familiar to you, 
how you go through the operation with little thought 
of the movements you are making, perhaps performing 
less perfectly if you notice just how you make every 
motion. That is, after a movement or series of move- 
ments have been made a great many times with a pur- 
pose, tho thought of the purpose, or the thing to be 
done, is sufficient to call forth the necessary motion or 
motions. Can you say one has really learned to write, 
talk, draw, sing, or walk until he can do so at the 
thought of the thing to be done without attention to 
the motions involved ? 

Learning to Write, Draw, etc. — Learning to write 
means learning to make a series of movements for a pur- 
pose ; and, as already suggested, it is not learned till it can 
be done with little consciousness of anything except the 
purpose to write certain words. There is involved, then, 
in learning to write, three things : (1) learning the simple 
movements that compose the series, (2) combining these 
simple motions in a series, (3) association with the pur- 
pose or thought. The distinction between the first two 
may be made clear by writing your name as you ordi- 



176 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

narily write it, then one element (right curve, straight 
line, etc.) at a time; and between the second two by 
noticing the difference between the writing of a pupil 
in his copy-book and his writing in an essay or answer 
to a question asked him. There is no question that 
these three things must be learned, but the method o-f 
learning may be that of learning all at once, one at a 
time or a modified form of one of these methods. 

It sounds reasonable to say that the pupil should fi»rst 
learn the comparatively simple elements of the letters, 
then learn to combine them so as to make letters and 
words, then learn to write the words in expressing 
thought. Your own experience in writing your name all 
at once and by elements, however, probably showed you 
that the movements are quite different, so that learning 
to make the elements would be only a slight help in learn- 
ing to write words. This method of learning to write cor- 
responds to the alphabetical method of learning to read, 
and, like it, ignores the fact that children see things as 
wholes before they analyze them. Since the movements 
of writing are dependent upon the mental images gained 
through perception, the order of perception should be 
followed in learning to write, and children should never 
be expected to advance faster in writing than in the 
perception of form. Another objection to this method 
is that, in practice at least, if it is not a necessary result 
of the method, the last step of associating the series of 
movements with the thought or purpose has been im- 
perfectly made, so that the copy-book handwriting is 
not used at all in daily life, but a very mvich modified 
or entirely different style of writing, 



WILL. 177 

The opposite method is to begin writing at first for the 
purpose of expressing thought with the pen or pencil in- 
stead of the lips. This seems like commencing a pretty 
complex thing at first, but it is just the way in which a 
child learns oral language and the way in which he 
learns to move his limbs to obtain the various things he 
desires. Is it any more stimulating and interesting 
way of learning ? If one learns in that way will there 
be any danger that he will not be able to write as he 
thinks without attending to his movements ? In this 
and in fact in all methods of learning to write two prin- 
ciples must be kept in mind : (1) the movements can 
never go ahead of the power of perceiving form, (2) 
overy time a letter is made in a certain way the ten- 
dency to make it in that way is increased; hence a pupil 
should not be expected to make letters perfectly at first, 
but he should be expected to continually improve until 
he makes them sufiiciently well. In using this method 
there is no objection to calling attention to the form of 
letters or to practising certain movements, providing the 
thought is constantly kept prominent that the writing 
is only a means of expressing thought. If this is not 
done wa abandon what may be called the thought 
method of learning to write. 

What has been said about the different methods of 
learning to write applies to drawing and manual occu- 
pations of all kinds. In the thought method of learn- 
ing drawing it is used from the first simply as a means 
of expressing ideas of form. In the manual occupations 
the apprentice carpenter who begins working under the 
master learns to move the saw, hammer, and plane in 



178 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

various ways as a means to the accomplisliments of cer- 
tain ends, and hence learns by the thought method. 
The student, however, who learns by some systems of 
manual training, practises the various movements of 
sawing, driving, etc., before attempting to make any- 
thing, and is therefore using the synthetic and mechan- 
ical method first described. Be prepared to give some 
of the advantages and disadvantages of these two 
methods and of the various modifications of them that 
may be used. 

Kinds of Movements — There are two principal types 
of movement in persons and animals in all stages of 
development, including the embryological stage. The 
first is the reflex type, in which the movement is the 
result of an external stimulus of some kind. The, 
second is the spontaneous or impulsive type, in which 
there is no discoverable external stimulus, but the 
movement seems to be the result of changes taking 
place within the organism itself. Movements are clas- 
sified according to the relative prominence of the ex- 
ternal or internal factor, their purpose, and the degree 
of consciousness accompanying them. 

Reflex movements proper are the simplest movements 
of the first type. They are simple movements made in 
response to a single stimulus, usually the same for the 
same stimulus, not necessarily purposeful and not con- 
trolled by consciousness. Examples : jerking hand away 
when the finger is pricked, winking when an object ap- 
proaches the eye, etc. They are called forth by a sensory 
stimulus of some kind. 

Instinctive movements belong to the reflex type, yet 



WILL, 179 

vary considerably with changes in internal conditions 
resulting from variations in nutrition, time of day, 
season of the year, etc. They are much more complex 
than the reflex, and more purposeful, though the purpose 
is not necessarily known to the person or animal mak- 
ing the motion. Like the simple reflex movements, 
they are produced by nerve-centres naturally adapted 
for making them, so that they are made without ex- 
perience or practice, and are made by all animals of the 
species. The movements of walking, flying, taking 
food, etc., performed by many animals with consider- 
able accuracy at birth,, are of this type, as are also 
movements of pursuing prey, escaping danger, building 
nests, etc. These movements may be called forth by 
mental images, as are the voluntary, but are usually 
called forth by percepts or complex sensations. 

Impulsive movements proper are irregular, purpose- 
less movements originating from within, usually per- 
haps because of an accumulation of nervous energy to 
such a degree that it tends to flow out to the muscles 
even when there is little or no stimulus to excite move- 
ment. The movements often noticed in young children 
and animals especially after eating and sleeping are of 
this kind. There may or may not be a state of con- 
sciousness calling them forth. 

Expressive movements also originate largely from 
within, but instead of being irregular and indicative 
only of overflowing energy, they are quite definite for 
each bodily and mental state of which they are an indi- 
cation. All of the natural signs of emotion previously 
discussed are of this type. These are called forth by ?, 



i8o INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

feeling, and the cognitive element is often not very 
prominent. 

Automatic movements are movements made over and 
over, or a series of movements that are made without 
the direction of consciousness. They may be inherited, 
as are the movements of heart, lungs, and intestines; or 
acquired, as are the movements of walking and fre- 
quently writing, handling tools, etc. It is doubtful to 
which type of movements they belong, but there is no 
doubt that they are at least partially dependent upon 
afferent impulses coming from the parts being moved. 
These impulses are produced by the movement of the 
voluntary muscles in acquired automatic movements 
and by the stimulation of the contents of the organs in 
the inherited automatic movements. In walking, for in- 
stance, the afferent impulses resulting from the move- 
ment of one limb stimulates the centre for moving the 
other limb, and so on, the individual being only slightly 
conscious of the movements. 

Imitative movements are intermediate between the 
two types, and also between the voluntary and the non- 
voluntary. Though they are often indications of mental 
states more complex than simple sensations, yet they are 
made by babes so young as not to have any very com- 
plex mental states, and by children and adults with so 
little consciousness that they may, in their earliest a|)- 
pearance at any rate, be classed as belonging to the 
reflex and also to the non -voluntary motions. Of 
course imitative movements may be made voluntarily, 
but often they are not made as perfectly as when made 
dmost unconsciously. Imitative movements belong 



WILL. i8i 

to the same order of facts as those cited in show- 
ing that a mental image of a movement produces the 
movement, though what calls forth the movement is a 
precept of it. It is therefore not strange that a move- 
ment observed intently by a child is made more per- 
fectly even when unintentional than any made by 
voluntary attention to a mental image. All kinds of 
movements are therefore most naturally and easily 
learned by imitation. 

Development of Voluntary Motion. — Voluntary mo- 
tion, which is distinguished as being consciously pur- 
poseful, is possible only after the making of many non- 
voluntary motions. The child cannot know how to 
make a motion to attain a purpose until he has made it 
once — any more than a man who had never seen an organ 
would know what key to strike in order to sound a note 
that he had jast heard. It is not altogether a matter 
of chance, however, with the child as with the one who 
would play on the piano. There seems to be some 
kind of a natural relation between the auditory centre 
of the child^'s brain and the motor centre for speech, 
so that when he hears a sound an impulse passes from 
the former to the latter, and he makes a sound just 
heard with little or no effort or practice. Also, there 
seems to be some natural relation between the visual 
centre and the motor centre for the limbs, so that when 
a bright object is put before a child and he tries to get 
it, he makes a motion that is at least toward the object, 
though perhaps not at all accurate. After a few trials 
he makes it just right, and soon learns to make it ac- 
curately at will. If it were from the first entirely a 



i82 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

matter of choice, he would be just as likely to move a 
toe as a finger and away from instead of toward the ob- 
ject, and it might be years before he would happen upon 
the right motion. No doubt impulsive and expressive 
movements that happen to result in the attainment of 
desired ends are important factors in developing volun- 
tary motion, as well as this natural relation between 
the centres for the various sensations and the various 
movements. The most important factor is, however, 
the imitation of movements made by others. The ob- 
servation of a motion made by another naturally excites 
a similar motion on the part of the child observing it. 
The motion made thus can then soon be made volun- 
tarily — just as soon as he can voluntarily hold a mental 
image of it in mind. On the psychical side the child 
learns what movements are necessary to attain various 
desired ends, and is able to form more and more perfect 
mental images of the various motions. On the physio- 
logical side the natural connections between the visual 
and auditory centres are made more complete and defi- 
nite, and many new ones probably found, and more defi- 
nite " paths '' formed for the nervous impulses passing 
from the brain to the lower centres and to the muscles. 
Voluntary movements begin in attempts to attain de- 
sired ends by movement, next clear mental images of 
the movements made in attaining these ends are 
formed and power of controlling them gained; then, 
after they have been made many times, the images of 
movement become less vivid, and finally are scarcely 
noticed, the thought of the end being sufficient to call 



WILL. 183 

forth the movements. This is the natural course of 
development. In education there has probably always 
been an over emphasis upon the second stage. Report 
any facts you have observed on development of volun- 
tary motions. 



l84 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 



CHAPTER HI. 

ACTIONS. 

Action Distinguished from Movement. — Is it possi- 
ble to make the same movement and yet perform an en_ 
tircly different action (e.g., firing a gun at a dog and at 
a man) ? Illustrate further : When we speak of a move- 
ment do we necessarily have any reference to the end 
or purpose of the movement ? Do we usually when we 
speak of an action? The two terms are often used 
interchangeably, but the word movement refers only to 
the physical phenomenon, while the word action may, 
and frequently does, include also the psychical phenom- 
enon of which the movement is an indication. Action 
has a mental and moral significance that does not attach 
to movement. Movement affects the bodily develop- 
ment, action has a very important influence upon the 
moral development. Movements are a means to an end, 
while actions include both the movement and the purpose 
of the movement, the feelings and ideas accompanying 
and prompting it. 

Ideas as Stimuli to Action. — We have found that 
sensations or images of a movement, or those associated 
with a movement, tend to produce the movement; and 
now the question comes as to whether the same is true 



ACTIONS. 185 

of actions. Prom the fact that movement is a part of 
an action, and also that moments tend to excite feelings 
in accordance with themselves, it might be inferred 
a priori that the idea of an action would tend to produce 
the action. Let us see whether experience supports this 
view. Do you find in yourself or have you observed in 
others a tendency to do as others do, or as some one you 
have read about did ? Is this because the action is ap- 
proved or because the idea prominent in the mind tends 
to go out in action ? Sometimes when children are told 
very emphatically not to go into a certain room or open 
a certain drawer they do it the first opportunity. Men- 
tion similar instances you have observed. Is such action 
because children are naturally contrary or because ideas 
of action naturally produce the action ? A sentry in 
Napoleon's army committed suicide in his box. A little 
later another sentry committed suicide in that box, and 
soon afterward a third. Napoleon then ordered the box 
burned down, and no more suicides occurred. A sentry 
alone in that box would be likely to dwell on the action 
of the other man and imagine all the details until the 
idea produced its natural result — action. 

Many people when on a high building feel an impulse 
to throw themselves off, probably because looking down 
suggests very strongly the idea of moving down, and 
that tends to produce the action. Give other illustrations 
from your own experience, observation, and reading of 
ideas of action tending to go out in action. Does it seem 
correct, then, to say that an idea of an action naturally 
produces the action, and will do so unless other ideas or 
an act of the will prevents it ? 



i86 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

Impulsive Force of Ideas.— Many ideas that are not 
of actions are in some way associated with actions, and 
when held in mind impel to action. Some ideas have 
much greater impulsive force than others: thus, the 
idea of a comfortable seat may impel a man to move 
across the room, while the idea of danger may impel 
him to run for miles. G-ive other illustrations. Ideas 
do not have the same impulsive force for all persons : 
thus, the idea of seeing a new species of animal may 
impel one person to walk across the street and another 
to go a day's journey, or the idea of solving a problem 
may induce one to work at it a half hour and another to 
spend days in its solution. Give other illustrations. 
The closeness of association between any idea and a 
corresponding action and the degree of impulsive force 
it \as varies with the following factors: instincts, in- 
^lerited tendencies, feelings, habits, and ideals. Some- 
times the impulsive force of an idea is due almost 
wholly to one or two of these factors, at other times to 
all. 

All ideas connected with the preservation and enjoy- 
ment of life, as food, clothing, shelter, power, reputation, 
have great impulsive force, due largely to instinct. Do 
they all have great impulsive force to all men ? A num- 
ber of men who tried to hold their fingers against a 
pane of glass while a rattlesnake struck at it from the 
other side were unable to do so. Why ? Give other 
illustrations of the impulsive force of instincts and of 
the tendency of such ideas to dominate consciousness. 
May we say that all ideas that have great impulsive 
force for all men are probably instinctive ? 



ACTIONS. 187 

Edwards, the Scotch naturalist, from earliest child- 
hood would go almost any distance and suffer any hard- 
ship or punishment if he could thus satisfy his impulse 
to be with and find out about living creatures. Audu- 
bon from the earliest years was stimulated more by 
ideas associated with birds than almost any other ideas, 
even those of food and clothing. Give other illustra- 
tions of ideas that have great impulsive force by inheri- 
tance. 

Illustrate the fact that ideas of pain or pleasure to be 
experienced or avoided tend to produce vigorous action. 
Does the nearness or remoteness of the pain or pleasure 
to be experienced make any difference as to the impul- 
sive force of the idea? Illustrate. Is the difference 
any greater with children than with older people ? with 
savages than with civilized ? Illustrate. 

What is it that makes a man work hard to gain addi- 
tional wealth when he has much more than he can ever 
use or enjoy in any way ? What is it that makes a man 
continue to drink though he knows that he could live 
longer and happier without it ? Give illustrations from 
your own experience and observation of habit determin- 
ing the actions of men. 

Oner's ideal of what should be done is often an impor- 
tant factor in influencing action. This ideal may be 
general and more or less indefinite, or it may be embod- 
ied in a maxim, a proverb, a rule, a principle, or, a per- 
son may be taken as a model. Give several instances of 
actions by yourself that were influenced by ideals in one 
of the above forms. State what ones of these five factors 
influence your actions the most. 



i88 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

Instincts, inherited tendencies, and habits are doubt- 
less all powerful influences in determining one's actions: 
but is it not true that they are largely unconscious influ- 
ences, and more evident to others than to the individual 
acting? Feelings and ideals, however, are distinctly 
conscious factors influencing action, sometimes both 
impelling to the same action, sometimes to entirely 
different actions. The first three factors probably influ- 
ence the feelings and the ideals, do they not ? Do not 
the feelings also tend to modify the ideals and the ideals 
the feelings ? So, finally, would not all of these factors 
tend to act in the same direction, the result being more 
consistent and vigorous action ? 

Feeling is, of course, always involved in the ideal, for 
an ideal means an idea plus a feeling of approval of that 
idea and a desire that it shall be. realized. This appre- 
ciation of what is right and proper may be and often is 
however, opposed to the more immediate and sensory or 
instinctive feelings; hence when these two kinds of feel- 
ings are opposed to each other it is only after much 
action in accordance with the ideal feelings that the 
ideal becomes the all-powerful factor in determining 
action. 

Attention and Action — ^From previous discussion it 
appears that the actions are determined by ideas of the 
actions or ideas associated with them; hence we might 
infer that the ideas that dominate consciousness, i.e., 
'that are attended to, will determine what the actions 
shall be. Is it not true that the five factors that deter- 
mine the impulsive force of ideas also determine in a 
large measure what ideas shall be attended to and domi^ 



ACTIONS. 189 

nate consciousness? An action results whenever 
the ideas associated with it are powerful enough to 
dominate consciousness a sufificient length of time. 
Thus if an agent can suggest and keep before the mind 
of a person the idea of buying he usually makes a sale, 
and much of his art is usually exercised in keeping the 
mind of the desired customer upon ideas associated with 
purchasing, such as the kind of article he would prefer, 
and when he would want it how he would use it. All 
men, whether agents, lawyers, ministers, politicians, or 
teachers, who are successful in influencing the actions of 
others consciously or unconsciously do so by directing 
their attention to ideas associated with the action they 
wish them to perform. Give specific illustrations from 
your own experience, observation, or reading. If one 
can by any means succeed in keeping the attention of 
another upon certain ideas for a sufficient length of 
time, the action associated with those ideas will be 
likely to result. The actions of the hypnotic subject 
are completely controlled by the operator, because the 
will of the subject is not active to direct his attention, 
and it is directed wholly by the operator, hence the 
actions of the subject are in accordance with the ideas 
suggested by the operator. 

Deliberation and Inhibition. — If action always re- 
sulted immediately from attention to ideas associated 
with the action there would be little chance for wise 
action. Many ideas, however, are usually claiming the 
attention at the same time, and prevent the complete 
dominance of one, and immediate action in accordance 
with it. We have also learned by experience that actions 



ipo INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

often have unpleasant results; hence we usually volun- 
tarily inhibit the action we have a tendency to perform 
until ideas of the results can arise and we have deliD- 
erated upon them for a time that may vary from seconds 
to years. This power to inhibit and tendency to delib- 
erate varies greatly in different individuals. Perhaps no 
more striking instance of the power could be given than 
that exhibited by an officer of whom this incident is 
related: Upon placing his hand upon the ground beside 
him he felt something cold, and looking down saw that 
his hand was upon the neck of a poisonous serpent. 
Instead of jerking away his hand as he had a natural 
tendency to do, though doing so would have released the 
serpent and given it an opportunity to strike him, he 
kept his hand upon it, drew a knife with the other hand 
from his pocket, opened it with his teeth, and then cut 
off the reptile's head. Few have such power of inhibi- 
tion and deliberation as this, but all have the power to 
some extent and use it in a greater or less degree. Ee- 
call several- instances in which you have exercised this 
power, indicating the idea that helped to inhibit the 
action. 

Many disadvantages result from failing to use this 
power. Eecall instances of bodily injury, such as indi- 
gestion or a cold, that you have observed result from 
failing to deliberate or " think." Eecall also instances 
of social mistakes due to the same cause, and also of 
wrong acts. Is not deliberation an important element 
in tact and prudence ? (Good judgment is probably the 
other most important element.) People in making in- 
ferences of ten make absurd errors because they "jump 



ACTIONS. 191 

at conclusions/' or, in other words, do not deliberate 
long enough for all ideas bearing on the question to 
come into the mind. Illustrate this. Mention also 
instances of financial loss resulting from failure to 
deliberate before acting. 

Deliberation is always an advantage if it is not con- 
tinued too long, so that the opportunity for action is 
gone or the impulses to action are weakened, and little 
or no vigorous action is performed. Mention persons of 
this kind that you have known or read of in history or 
literature (e.g., the character of Langham in Robert 
Elsmere). 

Basis of Individual Differences in Activity.— We 
have already pointed out individual differences in the 
impelling force of ideas and also in the power of inhibi- 
tion. A moment's thought shows that if inhibition were 
continually greater than the impulsive force of ideas, or 
if the impulsive force of opposing ideas remained equal, 
there would be no action. On the other hand, were 
there no inhibition and no deliberation sufficient for 
conflicting ideas to arise before action, there would be 
continual activity with but little consistency in it, every 
idea producing its appropriate action. Is it not evident, 
then, that the amount of activity of any individual de- 
pends upon the relation between the impulsive force of 
his ideas and his tendency to deliberate and his power 
of inhibition ? Suppose a person is very active in gen- 
eral or in certain ways, does it follow, then, that ideas 
have for him any more impulsive force than for the 
average man, or may it be the result of lack of power or 
tendency to inhibit his activity ? If one drinks or talks 



192 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

excessively, or fights or steals, does it follow that his de- 
sire to do those things or the impelling force of those 
ideas is any stronger in him than in other people, or 
may they be explained by supposing that they are a little 
stronger than his tendency to do the opposite, yet no 
stronger than that of the average person, but that the 
power of inhibition is unusually weak ? Give any ex- 
amples that have come within your observation or 
reading. 

When a person is very inactive either in general or in 
special directions, is it always because ideas have not for 
him the usual impulsive force, or may it be because he 
has more than the usual tendency to deliberation and 
inhibition, so that the tendency to the action is neutral- 
ized ? Illustrate and give reasons. 

Which of the following four conditions do you think 
most favorable to vigorous and well-directed activity: 
(1) weak impulse and little inhibitory power; (2) strong 
impulse and little inhibitory power; (3) weak impulse 
and strong inhibitory power; (4) strong impulse and 
great power of inhibition ? Why ? Which would you 
rather attempt to train — a child who shows a very strong 
tendency to activities of all kinds both good and bad, or 
one who showed little tendency to activity in any direc- 
tion? AVhy? 

Types of Decision. — In deliberating upon alternative 
actions, ideas associated with one of those actions become 
dominant and are accepted as the ones to be realized, 
and thus a decision is made. The manner of making a 
decision varies greatly, but the following modes of de- 
ciding suggested by Prof. James are typical. Perhaps 



ACTIONS. , 193 

nearly every person has at some time decided in all these 
ways, but many habitually decide in accordance with 
one of the types. 

Do you ever, when a course of action is proposed, 
think the matter over, the reasons for and against, then 
decide without any particular effort in accordance with 
the weight of evidence either for or against ? Illustrate. 
This may be called the reasonable type of decision, for 
reason decides. 

Again, do you ever consider the action and the reasons 
for or against, but find them balancing pretty equally. 
In such cases do you ever in a way let yourself drift till 
something happens in external circumstances that either 
decides the matter for you or enables you to decide 
easily ? Illustrate. This may be called circumstantial 
decision. 

Do you ever deliberate until you get tired or impatient 
and decide on the impulse of the moment rather than 
in accordance with the reasons or in accordance with the 
suggestion of external circumstances? Illustrate. This 
may be called impulsive decision. 

When the decision involves a conflict between ideas of 
actions both of which are desirable but only one of which 
is possible, there is often considerable feeling accompa- 
nying the deliberation and the decision. In such cases 
the reasons do not decide the matter, and perhaps v/e 
feel the matter is too important to leave to circumstances 
to decide for us, or there is no probability of their doing 
it, and no internal impulse sufficiently strong comes to 
decide the matter. Finally, we give up one of the desir- 
able ends and decide to act for the attainment of the other, 



194 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

perhaps feeling all the time that we are losing something 
very desirable, and deciding only with an effort; hence 
this may be called an efortful decision. Have you ever 
experienced such a decision? Give illustrations from 
your observation or reading of decisions of each of these 
four types. 

Desire, Decision, Resolution, Action.— Do you ever 
desire a thing without trying to get it? In order to 
desire a thing is it necessary to know a means of attain- 
ing it ? Are desires likely to develop into actions when 
means of attainment are presented ? Illustrate. Is the 
continued harboring of desires good or bad likely to result 
in corresponding actions ? Could one be legally pun- 
ished for desiring the death of a man or the desire to 
steal a horse? Could he if he not only desired but 
decided to kill the man or steal the horse, yet did noth- 
ing? Could one be punished for killing a man in an 
entirely accidental way without desiring to do so ? or 
must one desire, decide, and act before he is guilty in the 
sight of the law ? If the desire is momentary, as in 
anger, and not previously cherished, the guilt is not 
considered so great; but if the desire has been cherished, 
and an attempt made to carry it out there is guilt 
whether the act is successful or not. 

Did you ever decide to do a thing, but not perform 
the act for days or months ? The choosing to do that 
thing rather than any other was a decision. If that de- 
cision is kept in mind and reaffirmed, what would you 
call it ? Is it necessary for the means to be clearly rep- 
resented in order to resolve, or may the means of attain- 
ing the end be but vaoiiely known? Which is most 



ACTIONS. 19s 

typical of a man and hence most worthy of punishment 
or reward, as the case may be— action performed as the 
result of a hasty decision, or one that is performed as 
the result of a resolution long held in mind ? Why? 

Actions and Rules or Commands. — It is held that, 
theoretically, there is a choice and decision in every 
action — at least as to doing or not doing; but practically 
there is often no thought of any other action, or of not 
acting. In obeying commands or in following rules 
that we expect will lead us to ends previously chosen 
there is little or no choice, but the mind is occupied 
only with ideas of the means of conforming to the rule 
or command. Verify this in following directions given 
in physical exercises, marching, performing a new kind 
of manual work, conforming to the rules in arithmetic, 
or in a game. Notice also in the above and in the fol- 
lowing instances to what extent inhibition is used in 
conforming to rules: the child upon entering school 
must not do as he feels like doing, but as told; the young 
person entering society must act in accordance with the 
rules of etiquette, and the young business man with 
business customs. 

Strength of Will — We have already found that the 
function of will is to direct activities toward represented 
ends, and that will is efficient just in proportion as it 
directs all activities toward the end represented, and as 
it is able to do this for many ends. Would you not say 
that a strong will must have these characteristics of an 
efficient will ? Is great impulsive force of ideas and 
power of inhibition necessary to great strength of will ? 
Is there anything else involved in your idea of a strong 



196 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

will ? Suppose the activity is directed toward the rep- 
resented end only a short time, then ceases or is directed 
toward another represented end, would you say that the 
person possessed a strong will? Is constancy, then, a 
necessary element ? Give three examples of what you 
would call an exhibition of a strong will from your own 
observation or reading, then state in a sentence or two 
the characteristics of a strong will. In accordance with 
your definition of a strong will, could one show a strong 
will in doing evil as well as in doing good ? 

We have found that the most conscious and the most 
variable factors affecting one's choice of ends are feelings 
and ideals, and as adherence to a decision once made is 
neccGsary to strength of will, the cpiestion arises as to 
whether a strong will is influenced most by feelings or 
by ideals. Which will be most likely to be adhered to — a 
decision influenced mainly by a feeling or one influenced 
mainly by an ideal of what is right, proper, or advanta- 
geous ? Would you say that a strong will cannot be one 
that is influenced mainly by feelings in opposition to 
ideals, or only that it is not likely to be ? Thus, if the 
desire for drinking or gambling remains constant and 
determines all the action, would you say that the individ- 
ual has a strong will, though of an evil kind ? If an indi- 
vidual has no very definite ideal of what one ought to do 
or a wrong ideal, yet has feelings that continually impel 
him to act so as to make other people happy or so as to 
attain great skill in a certain direction (e.g., skill as a 
mechanic), would you say that he has a strong will, though 
of an unusual type ? Or would you say that not only is 
a strong will one that is usually directed by a definite 



ACTIONS. 197 

ideal, but that it cannot be a strong will unless it is ? 
Compare your opinions with your first statement of what 
a strong will is, and see if you need to modify it. 

What is the difference between a stubborn or obstinate 
man and a strong-willed man ? l^ame the characteristics 
that seem to you common in the two and those that are 
special to each. Will a stubborn man change his course 
of action when convinced it is wrong ? Will the strong- 
willed man ? After making a decision will a strong- 
willed man ever change it because of a change in feel- 
ing ? Will he change it unless circumstances change or 
some new consideration is brought to his mind that he 
had not thought of when he first decided ? Can a man 
have a strong will who does not deliberate and take into 
consideration everything bearing on the case known to 
him before making a decision ? Why ? Which will be 
most likely to have a strong will — one in whom by inheri- 
tance or through habit the five factors influencing action 
all impel in the same direction, or one in whom they 
impel to opposing actions ? If one has not acted in 
accordance with one ideal all the time, will not every 
act opposed to the ideal decrease his power to act in 
accord with the other ? 

Sum up now in definite statements the conclusions 
you have reached as to what constitutes strength of will 
and the conditions necessary to its existence. 

Freedom of the Will — We will first consider freedom 
in the sense of partial or complete independence of ex- 
ternal influences. In the very nature of the case is it 
possible for a volitional act on the part of an individual 
to be produced wholly by some external force ? Could 



iqS inductive psychology. 

we not say that if the act is produced wholly from with- 
out, that not only is there no free will, but no will? 
However, will may be influenced from without by excit- 
ing ideas and feelings that lead to action. Which has 
the freest will— one who acts almost wholly in accord- 
ance with these influences, or the one who acts in accord- 
ance with his ideals, whatever the external influences 
may be ? If a boy cut with companions or in new sur- 
roundings continues to act in accordance with what he 
thinks right and proper, regardless of external influences, 
would you say he possesses great freedom of will as well 
as strength of will? Should you consider that good 
training which produces such a result ? Is it not one of 
the main purposes of will training to make the person 
independent of all influences not in accordance with his 
ideals, or, in other words, to make ideals stronger than 
external influences ? 

There is a freedom of the will which may be known as 
practical freedom. It is freedom to attain represented 
ends. This means not only independence of external 
influences, but also independence of internal impulses to 
act in ways not in accord with represented ends. If 
one's feelings, inherited tendencies, or habits prevent 
him from acting in accordance with his ideals, from 
attaining the ends he sets before him, is he, in your judg- 
ment, any m.ore free than the one who is prevented from 
attaining represented ends by external influences ? 

In order to attain one's ends not only must one be in- 
dependent of external influences and internal impulses, 
but he must know how to use external things to attain 
his ends. Verify this by reference to the actions of car- 



ACTIONS. 199 

penters, artists, farmers, and politicians. Furthermore, 
he must know how to direct his own activities to the 
represented end, and have the power of control that 
will enable him to so direct them. If a boy wishes 
to be able to draw as perfect a picture as his teacher, he 
must know how to work and gain the power to control 
his motions. If he wishes to be able to solve any prob- 
lem in the arithmetic he must know how to do it, and 
gain the power to direct his intellectual powers to the 
task. Illustrate further the fact that practical freedom 
requires a knowledge of means of attaining desirable 
ends and power to direct one^s activities in the use of 
those means. Indicate the difference between educated 
and uneducated and civilized and savage, as to the 
practical freedom of will they possess. 

Notice also how the farmer, in attaining the end of 
raising good corn, learns to know and make use of the 
means by which good corn can be raised. This means 
that he must know the laws according to which plants 
grow, and particularly those governing the growth of 
corn, and that he attains the desired end, good corn, only 
by conforming to those laws. If he attempts to obtain 
good corn in any other way he fails. In other words, he 
is free to obtain the desired end only so far as he obeys 
the laws of nature by which that end is obtained. A 
mechanic also can succeed in making a machine that will 
run only by conforming to the laws of mechanics in con- 
structing it. Give other illustrations of the truth that 
in order to attain any end one must use certain means 
in accordance with certain laws. This leads us to the 
seeming paradoxical statement, but really very profound 



2^0 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

truth, that freedom is possible only in conformity to law. 
The civilized nations are freer to obtain many desired 
ends than the savage, because they know more of the 
laws of nature and have the power to act in accord with 
them. That individual, then, has the greatest prac- 
tical freedom who most perfectly directs his activities in 
accord with the laws by which the desired ends are to be 
obtained. 

There are many ends desired by every one, but not all 
can be obtained. The choice of one end often means 
that several others are rendered impossible. Thus the 
choosing and obtaining of certain bodily pleasures often 
mean loss of the pleasure of health and of the power 
to attain many other desired ends; the gratification of 
certain selfish feelings often means the loss of the sym^ 
pathy and regard of others that are desired. It follows, 
then, that one may in choosing and obtaining certain ends 
render impossible the attainment of a great many other 
desired ends, and so his freedom is very much limited in 
that he can obtain but few of the many desirable ends. 
The one who can so choose his ends and direct his 
activities that he shall obtain the greatest number of 
desired ends has the greatest practical freedom. There 
are certain ends which, when striven for in the right 
way, do not render impossible other desired ends, but, on 
the contrary, help in the attainment of a large number of 
other ends. Those who choose such ends and means of 
attainment possess the greatest practical freedom. Those 
who best know the laws of nature and of their own 
nature, and most perfectly choose ends and direct activi- 
ties in accordance with those laws, are the ones who pos- 



ACTIONS. 201 

sess the greatest freedom. If this is true, does it not 
follow that a bad person cannot be free in any consider- 
able degree ? — for evil action is evil because it interferes 
with the attainment of yaluable ends through want of 
conformity to the laws of nature. 

Does it not also follow that only he whose actions have 
been consistent can have a strong free will, since every 
act in accord with certain ideals increases the power and 
tendency to act in accordance with those ideals, while 
opposite action decreases the power and tendency to 
act toward the attainment of such ideals ? One may 
therefore lack all power of acting toward the attainment 
of ideal ends, because all the actions of his past life have 
been of the opposite kind, and the result is that they all 
detract from his power to act as he would. On the other 
hand, one who has always acted consistently will have 
his power to act increased by every act that he has pre- 
viously performed. 

Relation of latellect, Feeling, and Will. — It is evi- 
dent from the preceding discussion that the intellect is 
used in finding out the various ends that may be chosen, 
in deciding which is best, in clearly representing the end, 
in finding out, choosing, and using the best means of 
attaining the chosen ends; hence the will could not act 
without intellect, and the effectiveness of the will activ- 
ity is determined by the kind and amount of intellectual 
activity. It is also evident that feelings are the great 
stimuli to action, ideals becoming without them mere 
ideas without impelling force: so the disappearance of 
feeling would mean the cessation of will activity. Intel- 
lect and feeling might exist in some degree without will, 



202 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

but the intellectual activities excited by the various 
stimuli would not be directed to the attainment of any- 
definite ends, and the feelings of desire excited by the 
various intellectual activities would remain unsatisfied. 
Ideas have no value in themselves, but only as they 
show to us objects of desire and means of obtaining them. 
Desires and feelings have no value, only as they stim- 
ulate to action that will attain the end of the desires; 
hence the important thing is not intellect alone, nor 
feeling alone, but intellect, feeling, and will united and 
fused in action. The natural result of all intellectual 
activity and all feeling is action, and any marked ten- 
dency to isolate one of the three powers of the mind 
from the others must be considered as abnormal. 
Perfect balance and union of these three forms of 
mental activity is the ideal condition, and any training 
that tends to isolate them, or develop one in excess of 
the other, is to be condemned. Cold intellectuality, 
sickly sentimentality, or unwise or useless action are the 
natural results of isolation and over-development of one 
or the other of these powers. Kot what a man thinks 
during purposeless mental activity, not what a man feels, 
but what a man does, and the wisdom, goodness, and use- 
fulness of his actions as the result of his thinking and 
feeling, are the important things to the world, and to the 
man in determining what he is and shall be. A man 
should not be merely a thinker, even though a purpose- 
ful one, nor merely a sentimentalist, though his feelings 
are of the highest, nor merely a doer, though his activity 
be ever so great, but one who thinks, feels, and acts, 
whose thoughts and feelings go out in action. The 



ACTIONS. 203 

action should not be too quick, lest the thinking be not 
finished and the action unwise; nor too slow, lest the 
impulse die and nothing be done. 

The natural relation between intellect, feeling, and will 
has perhaps been most ignored in education, which has 
not only made scholars and thinkers rather than workers, 
but has not even produced the highest intellectual de- 
velopment, because the natural relations existing between 
the three mental powers have not been sufficiently 
recognized. The intellectual efforts have lacked vigor 
and useful direction, because the feelings that should 
accompany them have not been aroused to serve as a 
stimulus, and because little opportunity has been given 
for the expression of the thoughts and feelings in action. 
Every object of knowledge should and, if suited to the 
mental condition of the person at the time, does excite a 
feeling of interest of some kind. This feeling of interest 
produces a desire for further knowledge, and knowledge 
gained and appreciated naturally expresses itself. The 
kindergarten is the only place where this fundamental 
truth is fully recognized, and every thought and feeling 
is provided a means of expression in action. 

Conditions Favoring Vigorous Volition. — In observ- 
ing children and others we are often puzzled by the 
fact that in doing some things they show great 
energy and persistency, while in others they work fit- 
fully, languidly, or not at all. In one instance they 
seem to have great will-power and in the other little or 
none. Mention some instances of this kind that you 
have noticed either in the activity of work or play of 
particular kinds. Now let us analyze and see what con- 



204 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

ditions of mind are necessary to vigorous activity in any 
particular direction, even when the individual is known 
to possess energy and will-power. 

In the jarst place we have already found that in all 
volitional activity the end to be gained must be repre- 
sented in the mind of the person who is active. But in 
order that the activity be vigorous, there must also be a 
feeling of the value of the end to serve as an impelling 
force. Again, the end represented can be gained only 
through the use of the necessary means, and the indi- 
vidual must know these means and believe that they 
will be effective in reaching the end. All these mental 
conditions, however, may be present in an individual 
possessing plenty of energy, and yet he may say " I can%'' 
and either not try or try in a half-hearted way, simply 
because he does not believe that he can use those means 
so as to reach the desired end. In order to act vigor- 
ously he must have confidence in his ability to direct 
his activity in the use of those means so as to reach the 
desired end. The individuaFs past experience as well as 
his natural disposition will have much to do with this 
latter condition. If he has frequently failed, especially 
in similar attempts, confidence will be lacking; but if 
he has usually been successful, particularly in activity 
similar to that now engaged in, he will have all the'con- 
fidence necessary for vigorous effort. Indicate how the 
wgrk of the school may be arranged so as to inspire 
children with such confidence. 

The first-named conditions of vigorous volition are not 
so much dependent upon the past as upon the present. 
The end may be clearly set before the person so that he 



ACTIONS. 205 

will clearly perceive it and appreciate its value, and the 
means of attaining it may be clearly pointed out and 
shown to be practicable. Indicate some use and some 
violation of these principles in assigning lessons. May 
not their use in school be a means of increasing intel- 
lectual attainments and also of developing will-power ? 

Development of Will. — Every observer of young 
children knows that children are knowing and feeling 
creatures before they are willing persons. They are 
active before they control their activities. Every activity 
is performed non-voluntarily before it is performed 
voluntarily. They learn by experience the results of 
their activities, and learn to control and direct those 
activities. Through the intellect the child learns to 
know the ends and the means of attaining the ends, 
while the feelings aroused by the idea of the ends impel 
him to activity; heAce his will activity is called forth by 
the ideas received and the feelings aroused. 

In the will activity thus called forth two things are 
involved — choice of ends and the direction of activities 
to the attainment of ends. It is usually thought that 
children are not sufficiently intelligent to do the first, so 
will-training is usually begun by training them to direct 
their activities toward the attainment of ends chosen 
by older persons — parents or teachers. If the ends are 
wisely chosen and consistently adhered to, and the 
activities well directed, the training given is unquestion- 
ably a valuable one. To be able to control the thoughts, 
feelings, and movements is a necessary condition of a 
strong, free will, and there is no doubt that conformity 
to commands, rules, and laws given by parents, teachers. 



2o6 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

and society develops power in this direction. It is 
equally evident, however, that no amount of such con- 
formity could ever produce perfect and complete develop- 
ment of will, for the power to choose ends and means of 
attaining them is not developed. If training in obedi- 
ence to rules were given continually and no other, the 
result would be a human machine suited to act perfectly 
in definite ways under certain fixed conditions, but in- 
capable of acting wisely under new conditions. 

On the other hand, if a child is left entirely without 
direction or help and required to obey no rule his 
choices may be very unwise ones, or he may fail to 
develop any power of control, though, if the surround- 
ings are good, neither of these results are likely to 
follow, for imitation of others and experience of the 
results of actions will give him a good education in 
both choosing and controlling actions. In most cases, 
however, assistance may be rendered in the develop- 
ment of a free, strong will by a wise educator. 

It is evident, however, that if the will is to be 
trained by parent or teacher that there must be training 
in choosing as well as in acting in accordance with rules 
or commands. In its truest sense will activity is from 
within — the result of feelings, desires, and inherent ten- 
dencies, and a strong, free will can only be developed by 
strengthening and harmonizing these interior springs of 
action; hence rules and commands should not (in the 
ideal method of will training) be imposed from without 
in opposition to the feelings of the individual, but in- 
stead feelings and ideas aroused that will lead to choice 
and vigorous action in accordance with the rule or 



ACTIONS. 207 

command, which may be giYen as a snggestion. In 
cases where the child is likely, through want of com- 
prehension of the results, to choose actions that are 
very hurtful, the educator is justified in choosing for 
him. In all other cases children should be permitted 
to choose for themselves, being helped, however, by the 
ideas presented by parent or teacher and the feelings 
aroused by attention to those ideas. Since a child can 
know of the results of action and how to control ac- 
tivities only by experience, he should be allowed to learn 
in that way, even though he makes many mistakes in 
choosing ends and means of attainment. Lessons thus 
learned form the basis of all will training. No other 
need be given, except where the results are very remote 
and hard to see or very dangerous. In these instances 
the child should be and will be ready to choose what 
the parent or teacher says is best if in all its previous 
experience it has found that what they said about the 
results of action has been true. If the child has had no 
such experience it has no basis for making an intelligent 
choice, and very naturally does not obey the command 
or rule unless made to do so by punishment. Punish- 
ment often produces a dislike for that rule, and perhaps 
for all rules ; and the child instead of learning that rules 
arc guides that help him in attaining desired ends, looks 
upon them as hindrances arbitrarily placed in the way 
of the attainment of his desires, and so he makes it his 
aim to disobey them as much as possible. 

The best will training, then, is that which presents to 
the child ideas suggesting right and wise action, and 
directs his attention to the results of action in such a 



2o8 INDUCTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 

way as to lead to more wise choices and more effective 
direction of activities, and to a more and more perfect 
consciousness of the fact that there is freedom only in 
conformity to law. As essentials to a strong free will, 
the effort should be to build up in the mind of the child 
right ideals and to develop the power and habit of di- 
recting his activities in accordance with those ideals. 

These ideals are formed not so much by being told 
what is right and best, as by the ideas and feelings sug- 
gested and aroused by what is told and the manner in 
which it is told. The most important factors in form- 
ing the ideals are the actions of the person the child 
comes in contact with, and that he hears and reads 
about. They are the models which he both uncon- 
sciously and consciously imitates, and the more he imi- 
tates them the more fully do they become his ideals of 
action, for he has the idea of the action more perfectly, 
and habit tends to make the idea pleasant, and thus it 
becomes his ideal and determines his action. 



Parker's Talks on Pedagogics: An 

OU «XINE OF THE THEORY * >F CONCENTRATION. By Col. F. W. 
Parker, Prin. Cook Co. Normal School. This author n^eds no introduc- 
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repetitioni have been omitted ana modifications and additions have oeen 
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WHAT IT CONTAINS: 

The following titles of the cbapters 
of the book will indicate the subjects 
of which it treats: I. The Child; IT. 
The Central Subjects of Study; [11. 
Form as a Mode of Judgment; IV 
Number and its Relation to the Cen- 
tral Subjects; V. Wha? can be done 
with NTumbers; VT. Attention ; VIE. 
Observation; Vlil Languagf^, and 
Hearin Language; IX. Reading and 
its Relations to th ■ Central Surgect; 
X. Modes ot Expression ; XI. Unity of 
Expressive Acts ; XII Acquisition of 
the Forms of Thought Expression ; 
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School Groveroment and Moral Train- 
ing ; XV. Summary of the Doctrine of 
Concentration ; XVI. Democracy and 
Education 

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Cloth, 491 pages. Price «1.50 ; to teachers, $1.31^ ; postage 13c. 

Kellogg's Outlines of Psychology. 

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COL. F. W. PARKER. 




Payne's Lectures on the Science 

OF l^DUCATIO.N. By JosKPHP4Y«E or the College 01 Prrc'ptt^ 
London England This ^ook owes its 
f^tfl^^""^^^ ^^'^ .popularity to the fact 
that the great principles of education are 
clearly set f orf h in it over and over agaJL 
PriQcrples are the basis upon which all 
right methods must be founded. So 
wJ'i^P^i' ^^^^ ^^"'^ t^at If a teacher 
were to decide to own but three works 
on education, this would be one of them! 
ihis edition contains all ot Mr. Payne''* 
writ rows that are in any other American 
abridged edicion, and is tne only one with 
his portrait. It is tar superior to any 
other eaition pabiishi-d. ^ 

WHS' OCR ^LieaANT NEW EDI- 
TION IS TtlE BEjsX. 

■tJr^^ Jjie sMe-fit?e«. Toese give the con 
tents of the page. 

(2.) The analysis of each lecture, with 
reference to the educatwnal points in it. 
• K ^u ® general aoalysit, poiu'mg out 
JOSEPH PAYNE. i"*' three great principles found at the 

Th'sbook has been adopied by rt-e readiu'^ ir. les ol N V nt i in 
^ ol., and manv local circles, showioy us areaF value ' ' ^"•' 

Perez's First Three Years of Child= 

^^p-:^^^zjiis?^/^:^, -r.- 's^sn^ sffi 



Col. Parker, John Basom, and Pr; s. G. Stanley Hall praise this book 
very highly. Cloth 12mo. 324 pp. 
Price S 1 .50 ; to teachers ^ i .30 ; by mail, 10 cents extra. 

Welch's Teachers' Psychology 

By Sdrae author. Of Th«- absolute necessity of the study of psycholog-y in 
a tiueher's preparacioo there is no rtouht This i^^ the best book publisher! 

designed especially for teachers and as 
a text-book for normal schools, insti- 
tutes, etc. One-third of tbe book is 
specially devoted to the ''education" 
side of the study of the mind 

How to train the powers that deaJ 
with th*; concept — that is the question. 
There must be exercises to train the 
mind to ynther, store, divide, dbstracL 
Dudd, grouu, connect, and derive f^on- 
cepTSc The author shows what studies 
do ttiis appropriately, and where there 
are raistakps made m the selection of 
studies. It is invalU'-^ble to the teacher 
w'ho wishes to Know the strncrure of 
the mind and tbe way to minister to its 
g-rowth. 

The logical arrangement, the drreci- 
ness of piesentatK^a, without unnec- 
essary words or repetition, the questions 
at end of each chapter, and typograph- 
ical features make it an id-^al text- 
book. Only two months atter publica- 
tion it was introduced into many nor- 
mal sch ols as «■ teyt-book. -^nd adontod 
by the « -aiifornia ?tate Teachers'' Uead- 
ny Circle 




DR. A. 



WELCH. 



OUTtejSlE OF CONTKNTS 

PSYCHOLOGY 



CHAP. 

I Introductuin— Terms Dehnef) 

<»nd their M^-^nings iillusrrared. 

11. Mind, and us rhr«^eMani(esta- 

tions. 
(II. On the Intellect— the Spnie;- 
rv. rnternal Percopt^:on 
V. Memory. 
Vr. Conception. 
VIT. Analysis. 
VI 1 1. A^^straction. 



CHAP. 

IX. ImHtfinatioo.. 
X. riv-siflcatioQ. 
XI. Judgment. 
X[r. Heasuninfes. 

XI [1. The Unavoidable Series oJ 
Mental Acts that in the Growtii 
of the Mind begin with 'h*^ 
Senses and end in Kea.*or)int'. 
XIV. Intuition. 



P8YCH01.0GY AND EDUCATION 



CHAP 

XV. Gducatl in— What it is ann 

how Attained. 
XVr Special Means oi Training 
each Faculty m the Order of 
Jts Growth 
XV [I Expression 9« a v^ansof Tn- 
tellectua' (discipline. 
XVI II. Higher Spontaneities STjriny- 
ing from Pruiued Effort 
Vhis book is written by one who. 



CHAP. 

XIX. Injurious Etteci ol 



IV 



rong 



Arrangement of Studios. 
XX. Stufiies must be Selected that 
will Discipline the Faculties 
strictly m the Orrinr oi their 
Development 
XXI. Arrangement «^»f Studies and 
Method of Instrncti g iu 
Earlv Eriucatine. 
eac her, institute conductor, presi- 



dent of a normal school (Mich.. 15 years, president of oolleiie (Iowa, for 
many years), has shown himself to b a thoughtful stucien- of education. 
He has made the volume one that will a d the teacher in carryinu ''orwatd 
*he school-mom work in accordance with minxl laws. 
Price, SI. 95; to teachers, $1.00; postagre, 9 cents. 



Welch's Talks on Psychology. 

By A. S Welch, I.L.D., late president of the cohege at Ames, Iowa. No 
Droflciency that does not include the fitudy nf the mind can ever qualify for 
tae worK of teaching. The teacher must comprehend not only the objects 
studied by the learaer, but the efforts put forth in studying them, the 
effect ol these ottorts on the faculty exhibited, and their result!^ in the 
form of accurate knowledge. This book states in a remarkably clear 
and effective way the outlme prmciples, and the entire second part is 
devoted to the educational side. A well-known School rnspector (Dear- 
ness' of Canada, e«ys ; '' It is the most lucid and practical introduction to 
mental science 1 have ever seen." 

WHAT IT CONTAINS : 

PART I.— Chapter i.— MIND GROWTH AND ITS HELPS. Chap- 
ter 2.— The Feelings. Chapter 3.— The Will and the Spontaneities. Chap- 
ter 4.~Sensation, Chapter 5.~Sense Perception, Gathering Concepts. 
Chapter 6.— Memory and Conception. Chapter 7.— Analysis and Ab- 
straction. Chapter 8— Imagination and Classification. Chapter 9.- 
dudji^ment and Reasoning, the Thinking Facultles- 

f'ART II.— HELPS TO MIND GROWTH. Chapter 1.— Education an-d 
the Means of Attaining it. Chapter 3.— Training of the Senses. Chapter 
3— Reading, Writing and Spelling. Chapter 4.— Composition, Element- 
ary Grammar, Abstract Arithmetic, etc. 

i^^ This r»ook as will be seen from the contents, deals with the subject 
differently from Dr. Jerome Allen's " Mind Studies for Youne Teachers,'' 
(same price) published by us. Note very low price. Cloth, 16 mo, 136 pp. 

Price. 50 eents : to teachers, 4<» cents: by maii. 5 cents extra 

^° Over thirty volumtb on the Study of the Mind are kept 
in stock by us at teachers' prices and described in our new gen- 
eral catalogue. 

Currie's Early Education, 

By James Cfrrie, Prin. of Training College, Edinburgh, Scotland. 
Here is a grand book for primary teachers on the principles and practice 
of early and inlanr school education. Mt. Currie is the leading disciple of 
Pestalozzi in "cotland and was one of the first to comprehend his ideas 
and spread rhemby writing and teaching. This book is a manual of prin- 
ciples laid down in a simple and concise way, thus forming a psycho- 
logical basis for the methods and practice. He declares emphatically that 
one cannot watch a teacher and see how he does it and then imitating, 
claim to be a teacher. No; the principle>* must be learned. In the method 
iepartment he gives a world of valuable suggestions for teaching num- 
ber, object Itssons, color, form, reading, and singing. Then he points out 
the characteristics of good teaching: the language, tone ot voice, ques- 
tioning, sympathy, cheerfulness, self-possession, animation, decorum, and 
discipline. Then follow the mutives to be Ubed in teaching, and these are 
stated in a way to gain special attention. He puts (1) activity, {2) love, 
'3) social relations, as the three main motives. Reward and punishments, 
bribery, etc., are here well treated. Supt. C. K. Meleney, of Somer\alle, 
Mass .a disciple ot the " New Education," has written an admirable intro- 
duction. A Itogether it is a very important work for any grade of teactier 
WHAT TT COf^TAINS. 

i^art 1. Introduction: II. Physical Laws; III. Law of Happiness; IV. 
Social Character of Infant Sohoo ; V. Intellectual Training; VI oncep- 
nve faculty; ViT. Reasoning ^acuity; VIIJ. Imagination; IX. Moral 
Training; X. The Will. Part 3—1. General Character of Instruction; II. 
Physical Circumstances; III. Intellectual Instruction— Object Lessons, 
^'umber. Color. Form. Singing, Gnography. Reaoing. and Spelling; IV. 
Religious Instruction. Part 3—1. c;!haracteristics of Lesson Giving: TI. 
Language of Teaching; III. Questioning; [V. Manners; V. Discipline. 
I 'ART 4—1. Buildings; 11. Organization: III. Apparatus; IV. Pupil Teachers. 
<;ioth, 16mo, 300 pa^es. 

Price $1.95: to tedcliers, SI. 00; by mail. 8 rents extra 



AIIen'5 Mind Studies for Young 



TKACHFUS. Bv Jefome ALLEU, PH.D. 
Udiv. of Ciiy o» New York. 

To aid lebcbti-s wbi kcow little 
about psychology, aud ■- to desire 
to be mformed coDCerniDe it? prin- 
ciples, especially its relation to the 
work of teaching,this book has been 
prepared. Its method is' subjective 
leadintr the student to watch men- 
ral procostes, and draw his own 
conclusions, ft is written in lan- 
guage easily comprehended, with 
mauy practical illustrations. 

To most teachers psychology 
seems to be dry. This book shows 
bow it may become the most inter- 
esting of all studies, also how to 
begin the knowledge of self. " We 
c«nnot know in others what we do 
not know first m ourselves." This is 
its keynote. 



CONTETST*. 

CHAP. 

I. Ho<v to Study Mind. 
11. Some Facts in Mind Growth, 
fll. Development. 
IV. Mind Incentives. 
V. A few Fundamental Princi- 
ples Settled. 
VI. Temperaments. 
VTI. Training of the Sen&es. 
Vni. Attention. 
TX. Perception. 
X. Abstraction. 
X3. Faculties used in Abstract 

Thinking. 
Xn. From the Subjective to the 

Conceptive. 
XIII. The Will. 



late Dean of Pedagogy, 




CHAP. 

XTV. Diseases of the Will. 
XV. Kinds of Memory. 
XVI. The Sensibilities. 
XVII. Relation of the Sensibilities 

to the Wall. 
XVIIT. Training of the Sensibilities. 
XIX. Relation of the Sensibilities 
to Morality, 
XX. The Imagination. 
XXI. Imagination in its Maturity. 
XXII. Education of the Moral 
Sense. « 

THIS IS THE BEST SMAI^Ii TEXT-BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 
FOR I'^ACHKKS, and has been adopted by more teachers' reading cir- 
cles than any other psychology, viz.; Cal- Ark., N. J.. Texas, Md. Many 
County iT»8titnt*>o u"*^ oia/^ "siinsr 't '^npt RdwarrJ Rrooks. John Swett 
A. P. IVfar>"le, frwin Shepard, Rev. R. H, Quick have praised it highly. 
Cloth binding- large clear type 128 pp. 

Price 5'> Cfnt»i to teacliers 40 cents : by mail, 5 cents extra. 

Allen'5 Temperament in Education 

By same author, with very important chapter on " How to Become a Suc- 
cessful Teacher. " Tben^ wasn-^ book in the Buirlish language accessible t/> 
students on this important subject, yet it is a topic of so much importance 
to all who wish to beccme better acquainted with themselves that its sug- 
gestions will find a warm welcome everywhere, especially by teachers. Its 
value will be readily seen by the subjects discussed. 



CONTENTS. 

How We Can Know Mind— Native Characteristics of Children— How to 
Study Ourselves— The Sanguine Temperament— The Bilious Tempera- 
ment—The Lymphatic Temperament— The Nervous Temperament— Physi- 
cal Characteristics of each Temperament ; Tabulated— The best Tempera- 
ment—How to Conduct Self Study— Many Personal Questions for Students 



of Themselves— Row to !m prove— specific Directions— How to Study 
Children— How Ohildren are Alifce, How Different- Factsiu Child Growth; 
Tat)Uiated and Explained- How to Promote Child Grrowth Full directions 
concerning how to treat temperameutai fiitterenc^s. How ro fr fleet change 
in temperament. 

Under " How to Become a suecessluJ Teach r," the following topics are 
discussed : " What books and papers to read."—" What schools to >asit." 
— " "What associates to select."—" What subjects to stuoy.''— " How to find 
helpful critics." — " How to get the greatest good from institutes."—" Snail 
I attend a Normal school ? "— " How to get a good and permanent posi- 
tion. " " How 10 yet good pay. " " How to grow a better teacher year 
after .year." "Professional honesty and dishonesty."-"! he best and 
most enduring reward." Neat cloth binding, 16 mo. 

frice, 50 ceuts: to ti^achers 4?) cents; by mail 5 cents extra. 

Rooper's Apperception 

or, "A Pot oji' Gbeen Feathers," is a very simple book on psychol- 
ogy — strange as the titl*:: may seem. It is by an educational man in Ensr- 
land ; one of the school inspectors. It discusses perception and shows 
bow perception b comes apperception. It is a book that any teacher may 
read with profit. Commissioner Harris recommends it, so (io other emi- 
nent educators. Let mo teacher feel th- 1 it will be too nifficult tor him ; it 
IS as easy as a F surth Reader and will let much light in on educational 
pr')cesses. Remember this edition has many special points of excellence. 
It is accurate, has paragraph headings, is clearly printed j^ nd well bound 
in limp cloth, yrt is half th", price of a greatly infer'or edition. 

Price 35c.; to teachers, 80c.; postage, 3e. 

Kel logo's School Management. 

By AMOS M. Kellogg, Editor of The School, .Jo rnal Of how many 
teachers is it paid. "She IS a firjit -rate teacher but .-he tnils in iiscipiine '" 
Thi3 bo k is cntlrelv devoted to tins point— the most difficult ot all school 
wor"— the fjoverriment of a school, and it is filled witri orit; nal a' d (>rac 
tical Ideas on thw subject. It is invaluable ro the teachi r w lo desires to 
make his ■'chool a " well-governed " scho'-l. 

1, It suggests methods of awakeniner an mirre-^t in rhf ,-tuiifS. and in 
schoui work. " The problem tor the teacher,"' sa.vs Joseiih ^■a.vne, ** t-i 
iiet the pupil to study." If be CaU do this he will be educated 

2. It i dggests method* oi makiny: th.-» school attractive. Ninety-nine 
hundr Uchs of the t> ackers think y.unar people sho'dd cum -to school any 
how ; the wise o^-es kaow tha* a pioil who wants to come tu school will io 
^omeiuing when he ge»s th<-rp, and so "Hke the school attractive. 

3 ^boveall it show? that the pupils «il! be self-governed when well 
J ivernf^d. Ir sh >ws how to develop tbe process of sell-jovprnmenr, 

4 It 'T-hows bow regular att<intion Hnd courteous behavior may be 
•i'Hniredc 

5 It has an admirable pretace by that remarkaolp man and teanhe- 
>)> riioraas fHlunter, Pres. New York City Normal Ccllej . . 

CHAPTER HKADING*. 

f^reface. Introductory. Visit to a Well Manag* d ^cbool. Love for tbe 
Work. Prmcloles Which Uud^rhe "^r-bool Maniycment. The Tf arher in 
rre Sribool Room. Reyular \ttendan e. DisripUne**'' Training. Penalties. 
The Te-'Ch«^r Must Interest hi- Puoils. V|us Fuliy E <>pioy his Pupils. 
Must Conduct his ^vorR s<jstemati.i'.l.iy Mi-oeil'>. e')us Suggestions, 
^nhool Amusements. Unt-uly ^•upils. 

This IS a remarkably useful book f..r the district school teachpr. The 
fi St took we published, it is one of he most widely read and s'udifd, "-e- 
:ai/se it goes directly ru f be point in i plnin »\'ay. » i-nn, 128 oagcs. 

Price. <5 cents lo teachers. 60 cents: by mail 5 ct-nts extra 



Hughes' Securing and Retaining 



ATTJ^^NTIOM. By JAMES L. 
' Htjghes, Ensp ctorof'^criools,To'ODio. 
Canada. Author of "Mistakes in TeacL- 
ng." The teaehf t who t&ils ro g-et the 
attention of his pupils, fails totally. So 
true is this and so important that it 
justifies tbepttblif'ation of a book spe- 
cially df voted to this g-reat subjeit. 
Somt teachers are naturally giited w itb 
a hiyh decree of power to gain and hold 
the attention of their pupils, and all 
may add to that power. This book tells 
how This can be done. It is very val- 
uable especially to the young 
teacher. Thousands have read it, but 
it would make tens of thousan* sbptter 
teachers to thoroughly master its prin- 
ciples. Our new edition is entirely re- 
written by the author and coatains 
several important chapters. It is thf 
only authorized copyright ediHr.nand 
is as cheap as any other. W' at ii 
contains: 

I. General Principles; If. Kind- of 
Attention; 11 [ Chara<"teristi sol G-.od 
-attention; IV. ConMti»ns uf Atten- 
tion; V. ! ss> nri 1 Charbcteristics o1 
the Teaeher in "^(-curing un.i Retaining 
Attention; V(. How to <'ontroi a Class : 
VII. Mc'thftcSv ni STimularlng an<i Uon 
trolliiig a Desire fnr Knowledge ; Vlll. How to Gratify and Develop h^ 
DttSire f or "^<^ntal Activitv ; IX. Distrnctlng Attention; X. 1 raining th< 
Power of Attention : XL Geo'^ra! SuggestiO' s regarding Atienriun. 



•SECVRINGAND- 

A^-RETAINING-^ 

ATTENTION 

•J'L-MVGHEi 



Beautitnlly hound in cloth. 1-mo. 

Price i>0 cfnt-i •. to teac»»ers 40 cents: bv 



sail 5 cents »-x^r-. 



Fitch's Lectures on Teaching, 




J. G. Fitch, Inspector of the 
Trailing Colleges of England. 



By J. G. Fitch, inspector ol Teac i^^r,- 
Tr:'inmg S> huois, England. This book 
is one »if tii^ two most valuable rtci nt 
Engli'^h books on the priocipir"; o' 
teaching published (The other is Joseph 
Payne's Lectures on Education pub- 
lished by us.) The author is pro>^ably 
the most noted educarional teacher m 
Entiand. In hi- oouk he 'akes as bis 
topic the application of principles of the 
aft of te 'ching to S'''hools with a psycho 
logical basis. There are no vague and 
general propositions, but in every page 
we find the problems of the school-room 
f!iscussed with detiaiteness ot mental 
grip. N: teacher who has read a simi le 
ier-ture by ttiis ^raineot man but will 
desire ro read another, and the reading 
will surely leod to increased power. This 
book is highly praised io England. It 
has a valuable preface by Thos. Hunter, 
President of the New York Normal 
College, and has been adopted by many 
important state teachers' reading circles, 
and l,cal circles, and recently by the 
State Beading Circle of Maine, showing 
in what high esteem it is held. 



Toronto, Canada. The fact that 



WHAT IT CONTAINS. 

I. The Teacher and His Assistant. II. The School, Its Aim and Organiza- 
tion. III. The "^School- Room and its Appliances IV. Discipline. V. Lenrn- 
ing or RememberiniT. VI. Rxaraimng. VI I. preparatory Traming. VIII. 
Study of Language. IX. The English language. X. Arirhmetic as an 
Art. XI. As a Science. XII. Geography and the Learning of Facts. XTIL 
History. XIV. Natural Science. XV Correlation o» Studies. 

This is a compact, yet Jarge hook of 400 pp., nio-ly hound in cloth. 

Price, S1.35 ; to teachers, $1.00 net, postpaid. 

Hughes' Mistakes in Teaching. 

By Jas L. Hughes, Inspector Schools 
thousands of this remarkable book 
have been placed in the hands of teach- 
ers ; That oundreds of county superin- 
tendents. In the West especially, have 
used it, and continue to use it as a text- 
hook in their County Institutes, prove 
its great value to every teacher in the 
United States. Our new copyright edi- 
tion is entirely rewritten by the author, 
has two important new chapters as 
below, and is beautifully printed and 
hound. Get our edition only. Others 
lire incomplete and badly printed. 

CONTENTS OF OUK NEW 
EDITION. 

Chap. I. 7 Mistakes in Aim. 
Chap. II. 21Mistalies 1q School Man- 
agement. 
Chap. III. 24 Mistakes m Discipline. 
Chap. IV. 27 Mistakes in Method. Ling. 
Chap. V. 13 Mistakes in Moral Train- 




i^^Chapfi. L and V. are entirely new. 
Chapter II. hits the mark every time. 



JAS. li. HUGHES. 

The titles are ; 



Mi&tuke 8. To neglect details of 

management. 
J). To omit yard superAasion. 
If}. To abstain from playing with 

children. 

11. To stand too near the olass. 

12. To take hold of a pupil to put 

him in line. 

13. To give many demerit marks. 

14. To censure trifling errors 

severely. 

15. To complain or grumble much. 

16. To keep pupils in at recess. 

17. To invoke higher authority. 

18. To confound giving evidence 

with talebearing. 

19. To be late. 



20. To be careless about personal 

habits. 
21. To sit much while teaching. 
33. To give commands instead ot 

suggestions. 

33. To allow pupils to be frequent- 

ly troublesome without noti- 
fying their parents. 

34. To annoy parents. 

35. To show temper in dealing with 

parents, 

36. To disrmte with an angry pa 

rent before the class. 

37. To make spit el ul remarks 

about parents. 



28. To neglect opportunities tor 
arousing interest of parents in 
school enterprises. 
Very tasteful limp cloth binding. 16 mo., 115 pp. 

Price, 50 cents ; to teachers, 40 cents ; by mail, ."i cents extra 
"Special rates lor quantities. 

E. L. KELLOGG & CO., New York& Chicago. 



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